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Introduction
This article investigates the prospects for
successful litigation in American1 courts to influence
United States foreign policy by forcing federal govern-
ment compliance with United Nations Security Council
resolutions. The feasibility of such an undertaking
is evaluated through a study of the foremost such
effort to date, the Namibian fur seal skins case. 2
In recent years, United States foreign policy
has often diverged from that of the majority of United
Nations member states. The gap between the two has been
particularly pronounced with respect to Southern Africa,3
and a growing domestic movement has mirrored interna-
tional opinion in demanding stronger United States
support for self-determination in that region. Conse-
quently, it was perhaps inevitable that legal challenges
to the federal government's stance on Southern Africa
would be brought. 4 The most important such challenge
was Diggs v. Dent,5 which attempted to block the
importation of fur seal skins from Namibia (Southwest
1. Throughout this article, "American" refers to the
"United States of America," not to the American continents.
2. Diggs v. Dent, No. 74-1292 (D.D.C., filed May 14, 1975),
reported in 14 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 787 (1975), aff'd sub nom.
Diggs v. Richardson, 555 F.2d 848 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
3. See pp. 246-50, 266-69 infra; DIGEST OF UNITED STATES
PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 9-15, 44, 164-66, 571, 721-23
(E. McDowell ed. 1976) [hereinafter cited as E. McDowell].
4. For example, in Diggs v. Shultz, 470 F.2d 461 (D.C.
Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 931 (1973), plaintiffs un-
successfully attacked the legality of the Byrd Amendment, which
permitted the importation of chromium ore from Rhodesia in viola-
tion of the sanctions imposed on Rhodesia by the United Nations.
See pp. 261-62 infra.
5. See note 2 supra.
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Africa)6 on the grounds that such importation
violated United Nations resolutions prohibiting
actions which would imply recognition of or help to
entrench South African control over Namibia. The legal
theory underlying this suit was that the federal
government's policies on South Africa, which were at
variance with United Nations resolutions, violated
United States treaty obligations under the United
Nations Charter.
The issues in such litigation can be grouped
under the following three questions: (1) Are there
any jurisdictional or other threshold barriers in
American courts to the assertion of claims based on
United Nations resolutions? (2) Are particular
United Nations resolutions binding as a matter of
United States domestic law? (3) Have particular
United Nations resolutions nevertheless been
effectively nullified as a matter of United States
domestic law by subsequent and inconsistent
6. Namibia is the territory to the north of the Union
of South Africa, lying on the Atlantic Ocean, and bordered
by Angola on the north, Zambia on the northeast, and Botswana
on the east. In 1884 it became the German colony of South-
west Africa. South African forces occupied the territory
during World War I, and a League of Nations mandate placed
it under South African trusteeship in 1920. After the
founding of the United Nations in 1945, South Africa refused
to surrender its mandate and place Southwest Africa under a
United Nations trusteeship. In October 1966 a United Nations
General Assembly resolution declared the mandate terminated,
and in 1968 the General Assembly renamed the territory Namibia
(after the Namib Desert, which runs along its entire Atlantic
coast). South Africa continues to administer Namibia, in
defiance of the United Nations and of the International
Court of Justice, which has also declared the mandate terminated,
See p.211 infra.
The past two years have witnessed complicated maneuvering by
internal forces for power over the future of Namibia, and
complex negotiating efforts by the major Western powers to
persuade South Africa to accept Namibian independence with
black majority rule. See pp. 250-56 infra. At present, the
outcome of these developments remains uncertain.
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congressional or presidential actions?7
The first question involves the threshold
issues of jurisdiction and standing. Litigation
seeking to enforce United Nations resolutions in
American courts is especially likely to be vulnerable
to these threshold challenges, because it involves
both the sensitive foreign affairs area and
Cprobably) "public interest" plaintiffs.O
7. The focus of this article is on the influence of
international law on United States domestic law. Consequently,
this article will not address the validity -under international
law of decisions by the International Court of Justice or of
United Nations resolutions. International legal periodicals
have exhaustively treated the question of whether United
Nations resolutions are binding as a matter of international
law, and the majority of commentators have answered it
affirmatively, See, eg., Higgins, The Advisory Opinion on
Namibia: Phich UN Resolutions are Binding Under Article 25
of the Charter? 21 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 270, 286 (1972); Note,
Security Council Resolutions in United States Courts, 50 IND.
L.J. 83 (1974). But see Watson, Autointerpretation, Competence,
and the Continuing Validity of Article 2C71 of the UN
Charter, 71 AM. J. INT'L L, 60 (1977).
A conclusion that United Nations resolutions in
general and those respecting Namibia were not binding under
international law, of course, would end any chance of
success for litigation like that in Diggs v. Dent, supra note
2. In any event, the district court in Dent easily
crossed this preliminary hurdle and implicitly decided that
they were binding. Indeed, defendants did not contest this
issue, although they did contend that the Security Council
resolutions in question were not binding as a matter of
United States domestic law. Thus this article assumes, on
the basis of the majority of commentators and the Dent
decision, that International Court of Justice decisions and
United Nations resolutions are binding as a matter of
international law.
8. Actions to enforce United Nations resolutions in
American courts are especially likely to involve "public
interest" plaintiffs because 1) the group (Namibians) with the
most important interests at stake is located in a foreign land,
and such foreign residents would have great difficulty suing
in American courts; 2) consequently, if such litigation is
to be undertaken, it will almost necessarily have to be done
by surrogates for the foreign group, as in Dent; and 3) such
surrogates are likely to be motivated by the desire to vindi-
cate the collective rights and interests of the foreign group,
rather than interests peculiar to them as individuals. In
addition, insofar as the surrogate plaintiffs are Americans
165 [VOL. 4
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Accordingly, it is necessary first to investigate
whether a court might disclaim jurisdiction of the
case under the political question doctrine, and second
to examine the problem of standing to bring private
suits on questions of international affairs.
Once the threshold questions of jurisdiction and
standing have been considered, it is appropriate to
consider the substantive question of whether United
Nations resolutions are binding and enforceable as a
matter of United States domestic law. The issues dis-
cussed here are whether United Nations member states
are obligated to comply with Security Council
resolutions; whether the United Nations Charter and
Security Council resolutions constitute international
legal obligations of the United States; whether the
United States recognizes any such obligation as a
matter of United States domestic law; and whether the
Charter and Security Council resolutions are self-exe-
cuting treaties under American law, or, if not, whether
they have ever been "executed".
The final question considered in the article
encompasses the theory of "override". Even if United
Nations resolutions in general prove to be valid under
the substantive tests outlined in the preceding paragraph,
a particular resolution could be deprived of any effect
if an American court determines that Congress or the
President has manifested, through inconsistent
subsequent action, an intent to override or negate
that resolution. This part of the article will first
outline the legal foundation of the theory of over-
ride. It will then investigate the official position
of the State Department and the executive branch with
respect to United Nations resolutions on Namibia,
assessing whether this record embodies an intention
to override the presumed obligations of the United
States. In conclusion, this article will discuss
Footnote 8 continued
rather than members of the foreign group, their stake in the
group's rights and interests is likely to be somewhat indirect
and derivative.
Courts have questioned the efforts of those purporting
to defend the interests of others--the "public interest"--rather
than their own personal interests. The doctrine of standing to
sue has developed as the principal means of eliminating such
lawsuits. See pp. 196-209 infra (discussion of standing).
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whether the outcome of Dent9 signaled the futility of
efforts to enforce United Nations resolutions through
litigation in American courts, or whether such efforts
might still succeed in the future.
The Namib-an Fur $'eal Skns Case
Before addressing any legal issues, it is first
necessary to give a brief outline of the history of the
fur seal skins litigation. For at least a century
South African Cape fur seals, which live on the mainland
and coastal islands of Southern Africa from Cape Cross
in Namibia to Algoa Bay in South Africa, have been
hunted for their skins, Seals from both Namibia and
South Africa are annually "harvested" under the
authority of the South African government's Marine
Fisheries Service and then exported in large numbers
for the manufacture of coats.
In 1973 the Fouke Company of South Carolina became
interested in importing these seal skins. The Marine
Mammal Protection Act of 1972 (MMPA), however, imposed
a moratorium on the taking (capture or killing or
importation of seals and other marine mammals, 0 Thus
the Fouke Company was required to seek a waiver of
this prohibition from the National Marine Fisheries
Service (NMFS) of the Commerce Department's National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, the agency
entrusted by Congress with administration of this
portion of the MMPA. Two distinct groups opposed the
granting of this waiver: conservationists determined
to prevent any weakening or dilution of the MMPA,ll
9, The court in Dent granted defendants' motion to
dismiss on the grounds that the Security Council resolutions
invoked by plaintiffs did not confer legally enforceable rights
upon the plaintiffs. The Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia in Diggs v. Richardson, 555 F.2d 848 (D.C, Cir. 1976),
affirmed this decision.
10. P.L. No. 92-522, 86 Stat. 1027 (current version at
16 U.S.C. § 1371(a) (1976)) [hereinafter cited as EMPAI.
11. Among these were the Animal Welfare Institute,
the Wilderness Society, the Defenders of Wildlife, the Humane
Society of the United States, and Friends of the Earth, Inc.
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and the congressional Black Caucus and others claim-
ing to defend Namibian interests,12
The Fouke Company imported over 42,000 Cape fur
seal skins pursuant to NMFS authorization in 1973, and
it applied for another waiver for the succeeding year
in the fall of 1973. Commerce Department officials
twice visited South Africa and Namibia to observe
the seal harvest and to determine whether it complied
with MMPA standards. Despite protests from congress-
men and church groups, and the opinion of the State
Department that such a visit would contravene
United States treaty obligations under the United
Nations Charter and Security Council resolutions on
Namibia,13 the Commerce Department sent a third mission
to Namibia in August 1974.14
12. The latter included Congressman Diggs; George Houser,
Executive Director of the American Committee on Africa; Theo-Ben
Gurirab, Representative Plenipotentiary of the Southwest Africa
People's Organization (SWAPO) to the United Nations; and SWAPO
itself, on behalf of itself and its members. This group was,
of course, particularly concerned with seal skins from Namibia.
The conservationists, on the other hand, wished to prevent the
importation of seal skins from South Africa as well. They eventu-
ally prevailed in Animal Welfare Inst. v. Kreps, 561 F.2d 1002
(D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied sub nom. Fouke Co. v. Animal
Welfare Inst., 434 U.S. 1013 (1978), in which the court of appeals
overturned the Commerce Department's grant of a waiver to permit
importation of seal skins from South Africa, holding that it was
inconsistent with the NMPA.
13. See pp. 263-65 infra (discussing State Department opinion)
Letter from United States Senators to Robert Ingersoll., Under
Secretary of State (July 30, 1974) (urging that 1974 Commerce
Department visit to Namibia not be permitted) [on file with
Yale Studies in World Public Order].
14. See the File on Diggs v. Dent, supra note 2, at the
Center for Law and Social Policy in Washington, D.C. (hereinafter
cited as Dent File). The File was compiled by attorneys of the
International Project at the Center, who represented the plaintiffs
in Dent and the intervenor-appellant conservationist organizations
referred to in note 11 supra.
The author, as a Yale Law School student intern, assisted Mr.
Leonard Meeker of the Center in the seal skins case during the
spring semester of 1976. Mr. Meeker, who was Legal Counsel for the
State Department during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations,
served as lead counsel throughout this litigation. The author is
grateful to Mr. Meeker for his invaluable aid in the preparation
of this article.
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On August 28th, Congressman Diggs1 5 and other
plaintiffsl 6 -brought suit in the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia seeking
a declaratory judgment condemning the mission and
asking for an injunction against further dealings
involving Namibia between the Commerce Department
and the South African government. 1 7 Plaintiffs
claimed that the Commerce Department's activities
violated United States treaty obligations.±o
In May 1975, in Diggs v. Dent,1 9 the district
court granted defendants' motion to dismiss, holding
that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction
because the applicable United Nations Charter
provisions and Security Council resolutions did not
constitute self-executing United States treaty
obligations and therefore did not confer legally
enforceable rights upon the plaintiffs. 2 0 While
the court's perfunctory opinion was unfavorable to
plaintiffs on the substantive issues, they gained
a partial victory when the court acknowledged their
standing to sue by invoking the holding in Diggs
v. Shultz. 2 1
The Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia issued its decision on the appeal of Dent
in Diggs v. Richardson.2 2 In a three-page opinion by
Judge Leventhal, that court affirmed the dismissal
of plaintiffs' action
on the ground, related to the issue of
standing, but analytically distinct,
that even assuming there is an interna-
tional obligation that is binding on
the United States--a point we do not
in any way reach on the merits--the U.N.
resolution underlying that obligation
does not confer rights on the citizens
of the United States that are enforceable
in court in the absence of implementing
legislation. 23
15. Charles C. Diggs, Jr. (Dem. Mich.) was head of the
congressional Black Caucus as well as Chairman of the Subcommittee
on Africa of the House Committee on International Affairs.
16. See note 12 supra (listing plaintiffs).
17. See Diggs v. Dent, supra note 2.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. See id., 14 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS at 803-05.
21. 470 F.2d 461 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert denied, 411 U.S.
931 (1973).
22. 555 F.2d 848 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
23. Id. at 850 (footnote omitted).
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This was equivalent, as the court implied, to a con-
clusion that the provisions of the relevant ecurity
Council resolution were not self-executing.2  Judge
Leventhal's carefully circumscribed opinion explicitly
avoided, however, deciding whether and under what
circumstances a Security Council resolution might be
self-executing.25
The terse decision in Richardson omitted any
detailed discussion of the complex issues of inter-
national law involved. Therefore, its conclusory
holding may not have shut the door on all such future
litigation, because the court narrowly limited the
decision to the facts of the case and to only those
parts of the relevant resolution invoked by plaintiffs.
Since the court declined the opportunity to provide
general clarification about the extent to which United
Nations resolutions could become binding upon the
United States, actions similar to Dent can be expected
in the future. The balance of this article consists
of a case study utilizing the seal skins case to
illustrate issues relevant to lawsuits which seek
to enforce United Nations resolutions in American
courts.
I. The Threshold Issues
The decisions in Diggs v. Dent 2 6 and Diggs v.
Richardson 27 point to the importance of threshold
issues in litigation seeking to enforce United Nations
resolutions in American courts. Plaintiffs may be
barred from the courthouse at the outset and
consideration of their substantive legal claims
precluded. The major problems facing litigants at
the threshold are the possibility that a court might
decide that they lack standing to sue, and that the
issues raised are non-justiciable because they present
a political question. Consideration of the political
question problem is analytically antecedent to the
question of standing, because a judicial determina-
tion that a complaint raises a political question is
equivalent to a holding that the court lacks juris-
diction-of the subject matter, regardless of who the
plaintiffs are. Hence the political question issue
will be treated first.
24. Id. at 850 n.9,
25. Id. at 851 n.10. ("We made [sic] no decision with
respect [sic] those provisions of U.N. Security Council Resolu-
tion 301 which are not involved here.")
26. See note 2 supra.
27. 555 F.2d 848 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
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A. The Political Question Doctrine
The district court in Diggs v. Dent 2 8 implicitly
invoked the political question doctrine to hold non-
justiciable the issues raised by the case:
Even if the court had subject matter
Jurisdiction, it would be forced to con-
clude that the issues before it are ones
which are within the foreign policy
authority of the President and are non-
justiciable. It is not for the court to
say whether a treaty has been broken or
what remedy shall be given. . . . Nor
should the court direct the manner in which
the Executive is to carry out his foreign
relation [sic] responsibilities. 29
The court of appeals in Diggs v. Richardson) 0 however,
avoided the political question doctrine and affirmed
Dent on other grounds. Nevertheless, because foreign
affairs questions are involved, plaintiffs in any future
American lawsuit which seeks to enforce United Nations
resolutions can expect to be challenged on political
question grounds.
"CT]he nebulous neighborhood of political ques-
tions"31 comprises those cases which the judiciary
abstains from deciding because the issues presented
appear to be entrusted by the Constitution exclusively to
the executiye or legislative branches. In the leading
Supreme Court case in this area, Baker v. Carr32 the
Court was unable to reduce political question cases to
fewer than six categories,3. thereby reflecting the
28. See note 2 supra.
29. Id., 14 INTtL LEGAL MATERIALS at 804-05 (citations
omitted). Since the court had already decided that it lacked
jurisdiction because the Security Council resolutions involved
were non-self-executing, the court's statement was dictum.
30, 555 7.2d 848 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
31. Bickel, The Supreme Court - 1960 Term, 75 HARV. L. REV.
40, 74 (1961).
32. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
33. See pp. 192-93 infra (listing six categories). The
Court, over the strong dissent of Mr. Justice Frankfurter,
removed the fairness of state legislative apportionments from
the political question category.
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failure both courts and commentators have experienced
in attempting to impose analytical order upon this
doctrine.34 The disparate nature of these categories
suggests that the doctrine developed through a hap-
hazard process of accretion rather than through the
articulation of a coherent constitutional principle.
Part of the confusion surrounding the political
question doctrine results from a basic disagreement
among commentators about its source.35 Two principal
interpretations have developed. The first or "classi-
cal" view is that the constitutional division of
powers mandates judicial abstention from deciding
political questions.3 6 One difficulty with the
"classical" view is that the divisions of authority
over political questions, especially those involving
foreign affairs, are not clearly marked. Conflicts
among the three branches of government exist, and
spheres of authority expand and contract 3 7 under
34. See Tigar, Judicial Power, the "Political Question
Doctrine", and Foreign Relations, 17 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1135 (1970)
(criticizing Baker rule for vagueness). Professor Louis Henkin
argued that the political question doctrine is merely a "package"
which contains certain valid and legitimate reasons for judicial
abstention; he suggests that these be retained but that the
"package" be discarded. See Henkin, Is There A "Political
Question" Doctrine? 85 YALE L.J, 597 (1976).
35. The courts have done little to resolve this debate; they
have tended to label certain questions "political" in a conclu-
sory way, eschewing further discussion of substantive considera-
tions and neither explaining how they reached their conclusion
nor distinguishing similar cases.
36. See, e.g., Dickinson, The Law of Nations As National
Law: "Political Questions", 104 U. PA. L. REV. 451, 492-93 (1956)
(describing "classical" view); Scharpf, Judicial Review and the
Political Question: A Functional Analysis, 75 YALE L.J. 517 (1966)
(same); Weston, Political Questions, 38 HARV. L. REV. 296, 331 (1925).
37. For example, a major expansion of executive control over
foreign policy, at the expense of Congress, was made possible by
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
In that case, the Supreme Court upheld President Roosevelt's
authority, conferred by Congress, to prohibit American export of
arms to foreign countries when he determined that such export
would entail a threat to peace. Justice Sutherland's opinion con-
tended that at the time of the Revolution the foreign policy
powers of the British Crown devolved collectively upon the colonies
rather than individually. From this he concluded that, even in
the absence of a specific constitutional provision or express
congressional authorization, the executive possessed a broad if
not exclusive discretion to conduct the nation's foreign affairs.
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the influence of changing circumstances and
personalities.38 What might be regarded as usurpation
or abdication in one era becomes the accepted norm
during the next. While the "classical" approach based
on the constitutional separation of powers is logically
appealing, it fails to explain the complexities of
the case law or to yield a workable rule to determine
what questions in future cases will be considered
political.
Nonetheless, the constitutional scheme implies
that judicial scrutiny of many political questions
is inappropriate. For example, Article II gives the
executive exclusive power to appoint ambassadors and
to negotiate and conclude treaties with the advice
and consent of the Senate. 3 9 Although the Constitution
does not exclude such areas from judicial review, courts
have often applied the political question doctrine in
38. This phenomenon is perhaps most marked in the growth
of executive power over foreign policy from the Roosevelt to
the Nixon administrations, and the contrary trend since that
time. The Vietnam War provided the impetus for Congress to
reassert its control over foreign policy. In 1969 the Senate
passed the National Commitments Resolution, which called upon
the President not to commit troops or financial resources to
foreign countries without Congress' express approval. The War
Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C.A. 0 1541-1548 (1973 ed.), limited
the President's authority to commit troops to hostilities
abroad unless Congress first gave its express approval. Some
observers see signs in 1979 that the pendulum has begun to
swing back toward presidential power over the conduct of
foreign policy. See, e.g., Finney, War Powers Pendulum Swings
Back - A Little, N.Y. Times, Apr. 8, 1979, § 4, at E5, col. 1.
The fate of the lawsuit recently filed by Senator Barry
Goldwater, which challenges President Carter's power to
terminate the defense treaty with Taiwan without prior congres-
sional approval, may indicate how far this trend has progressed.
See Goldwater, Treaty Termination Is a Shared Power, 65 A.B.A. J.
198 (1979).
39. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
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either deferring to the executive view or in abstain-
ing from deciding cases involving foreign affairs
questions. 40 In fact, no United States treaty has
ever been declared unconstitutional by the Supreme
Court, although this would not be impossible. 41
The prevalent interpretation of the political
question doctrine among contemporary commentators
follows the "prudential" theory, which developed
in reaction to the inadequacies of the "classical"
theory. According to the "prudential" view, judi-
cial abstention in political question cases is a
matter of discretion rather than a constitutional
obligation.4 2 An examination of the lawsuits attack-
ing the constitutionality or legality of the Vietnam
War43 lends support to this theory. The courts
dismissed almost all of these cases on political
question grounds. 4 4 If judicial abstention were
constitutionally mandated, the courts would have
withdrawn at the outset of each such case before
reaching any of the substantive issues. Instead,
they invoked the doctrine at different stages of
their consideration of the issues.
40. See pp. 186-88 infra (discussion of Vietnam War cases),
41. The latest challenge to the constitutionality of a
treaty was Edwards v. Carter, 580 F.2d 1055 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 436 U.S. 907 (1978), which was brought by 30 members
of the House of Representatives opposed to the Panama Canal
treaties. Plaintiffs argued that the treaties were uncon-
stitutional because they disposed of federal property without
the consent of the House of Representatives as required by
U.S. CONST. art. IV, 9 3, cl. 2. The Supreme" Court rejected
this claim, on the grounds that art. II, § 2, cl. 2, gave the
President and the Senate full authority to take such action.
See Note, PANAMA CANAL -- Legal Issues Involved in the Trans-
fer of the Canal to Panama,. 19 HARV. INT'L L.J. 279 (1978)
(discussing Edwards).
42. See, e.g., Bickel, supra note 31; Scharpf, supra
note 36.
43. See pp. 186-88 infra.
44. The one exception was Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 361
F. Supp. 553 (E.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 484 F.2d 1307 (2d Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 410 U.S. 936 (1974). In Holtzman, District Judge
Judd issued an injunction on July 25, 1973, barring the government
from participating in military activities in or bombing raids
over Cambodia on the grounds that there was no congressional
authority for such activities. Id. at 566. The Second Circuit,
however, reversed the district court's judgment and directed
it to dismiss the complaint. 484 F.2d 1307 (2d Cir. 1973).
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Prudential considerations stemming from the
uniquely sensitive nature of foreign relations
probably account for the fact that the political
question doctrine has had "its most comprehensive
development" in the area of foreign affairs. 45
International law is essentially based on consensus
among states. Unlike the United States Supreme
Court, which imposes domestic legal obligations
and sets uniform domestic norms when it proclaims
"what the law is", no court can impose international
legal obligations on a nation-state or set interna-
tional legal norms in the absence of consensus.
Consequently, American courts have recognized that
decisions based on American law would not bind
foreign governments to comgly with American
standards and procedures.4 Foreign adherence to
American law can be won only through the flexible
give-and-take of political negotiations.
Chief Justice John Marshall exerted a formative
influence on the political question doctrine in the
first case raising this issue. In refusing to
adjudicate a boundary dispute growing out of the
Louisiana Purchase, the Chief Justice stated in
45. Dickinson, supra note 36, at 452.
46. One outcome of this principle is that the courts
have traditionally been reluctant to adjudicate matters
arising in foreign territories because this might represent
an infringement on the complete sovereignty of a foreign
power over its own territory. In Oetjen v. Central Leather
Co., 246 U.S. 297 (1918), a high point of judicial
abstention on political questions, the Supreme Court
stated that "[tlo permit the validity of the acts of one
sovereign State to be relxamined and perhaps condemned
by the courts of another would very certainly 'imperil the
amicable relations between governments and vex the peace
of nations."' Id. at 304. And in Underhill v, Hernandez, 168
U.S. 250 (1897), the Supreme Court cautioned that "the courts
of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the




Foster & Elam v. Neilson 47 that
Lif those departments which are
entrusted with the foreign intercourse of
the nation, which assert and maintain its
interests against foreign powers, have un-
equivocally asserted its rights of dominion
over a country of which it is in possession,
and which it claims under a treaty; if
the legislature has acted on the construction
thus asserted, it is not in its own courts
that this construction is to be denied. A
question like this respecting the boundaries
of nations, is, as has been truly said, more
a political than a legal question; and in its
discussion, the courts of every country
must respect the pronounced will of the
legislature.48
Later courts have sometimes appeared to remove
foreign affairs questions completely from the scope
of permissible adjudication.49 But the Supreme
Court rejected such an extreme rule in Baker v.
Carr: 50
47. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829). Ironically, the
result in this case was later overturned in United States v.
Arredondo, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 691, 741 (1832) and United States
v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51, 87-88 (1833), on the
authority of the Spanish text of the treaty, which was
considered superior to the English text. The validity of the
principles enunciated in Foster & lam with respect to the poli-
tical question doctrine has nevertheless continued undiminished.
See, e.g., Maiorano v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 213 U.S.
268, 272-73 (1909); Edye v. Robertson (The Head Money Cases),
112 U.S. 580, 598-99 (1884); Scharpf, supra note 36, at
575-76.
48. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 309,
49. See, e.g., Chicago & Southern Air Lines v. Waterman
S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948):
[Tihe very nature of executive decisions as to
foreign policy is political, not judicial. Such
decisions are wholly confided by our Constitution
to the political departments of the government,
Executive and Legislative. . . . They are decisions
of a kind for which the Judiciary has neither aptitude,
facilities nor responsibility and which has long been
held to belong in the domain of political power not
subject to judicial intrusion or inquiry.
50. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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There are sweeping statements to the effect
that all questions touching foreign relations
are political questions. . . . Yet it is
error to suppose that every case or controversy
which touches foreign relations lies beyond
judicial cognizance. Our cases in this field
seem invariably to show a discriminating
analysis of the particular question posed,
in terms of the history of its management by
the political branches, of its susceptibility
to judicial handling in the light of its nature
and posture in the specific case, and of the
possible consequences of judicial action. For
example, though a court will not ordinarily
inquire whether a treaty has been terminated,
since on that question "governmental action
• . must be regarded as of controlling
importance," if there has been no conclusive
"governmental action" then a court can con-
strue a treaty and may find it provides the
answer. 51
The holding that the issues raised by Diggs v.
Dent5 2 were non-justiciable in effect invoked the
political question doctrine: "Even if the court had
subject matter jurisdiction it would be forced to
conclude that the issues before it are ones which
are within the foreign policy authority of the
President and are non-justiciable." 5 3 This cryptic
statement, however, raises more questions than it
answers.
The statement has two possible constructions,
If the court meant that all foreign policy issues
are non-justiciable, such an assertion contradicts
not only the Baker dictum but also a number of cases
in which the Supreme Court adjudicated such issues.
It is well-settled, for instance, that the courts
can both interpret treaties54 and adopt interpreta-
tions which conflict with those of the executive.5 5
51. Id. at 211-12 (footnote omitted).
52. See note 2 supra.
53. Id., 14 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS at 804.
54. See, e.g., Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1 (1899); Ware
v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796); Dickinson, supra note 36,
at 489-90.
55. See, e.g., Perkins v. Elg, 307 U.S. 325 (1939);
United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407 (1886).
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On the other hand, if the district court in Dent
was merely stating its conclusion that the particu-
lar foreign policy questions raised by the case were
non-justiciable, it failed to explain how it reached
this conclusion and instead begged the question.
This failure stemmed in part, no doubt, from the
difficulty of deriving from the case law any
workable rule for identifying political question
cases. The lack of conceptual clarity in this area
may explain why the court of appeals in Diggs v.
Richardson5 6 avoided the political question doctrine
and affirmed Dent on other grounds. Since the
appellate decision left the political question issue
in the first seal skins case unresolved, it is
appropriate to investigate further the standards
necessary to determine when lawsuits to enforce
United States treaty obligations present a political
question.
As noted above, constitutional and legal princi-
ples are of little assistance in explaining the
divergent results in political question cases.
Consideration of the political context of the cases,
however, may shed some light on the subject. In
its origins in Foster & Elam v. Neilson,5 7 the word
"political" in the tem "political question" referred
to the functions of the executive and legislative
branches, the elected branches of the federal govern-
ment. 5 8 More recent case law suggests, however, that
the significance and application of the term have
evolved in the direction of judicial abstention from
cases which are politically "sensitive". This sensi-
tivity is related more to the political context of
the issues or to the position taken by the executive
or legislative branch than to a reasoned view of a
proper constitutional allocation of powers among the
various branches of government. In effect, the pru-
dential rather than the classical interpretation of
the political question doctrine has dominated the
case law.
The Supreme Court in Baker, for instance, em-
phasized the importance in political question cases
56. 555 F.2d 848 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
57. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829).
58. See i'd. at 309, 314; note 49 supra.
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of analyzing "the particular question posed, in
terms of the history of its management by the
political branches, of its susceptibility to
judicial handling in the light of its nature and
posture in the specific case."59 The Court
further implied that one indication that judicial
construction of a treaty might be appropriate is
the fact that "no conclusive 'governmetal
action'' has been taken on the matter. 0 Signi-
ficantly, the approach suggested by the Court for
identifying political question cases is not based
on pure constitutional analysis but rather on a
consideration of political context. Foster & Elam
v. NeilsonGl suggested a similar approach when it
based judicial abstention on executive assertions
of territorial domipion and on the "pronounced will"
of the legislature.6 2 Accordingly, it is more
illuminating in analyzing political question cases
to adopt a prudential view which focuses on the
political context from which the issues arise and
on the position taken by the executive on the issues.
One authority has grouped political question
cases in the foreign affairs area in five major
categories,.63 The first four of these, which con-
cern territorial disputes, recognition of govern-
ments, sovereign immunity, and the exclusion and
expulsion of aliens, are specific, discrete clusters
of cases whose only unifying thread is the judiciary's
notion that they present sensitive foreign policy
questions. They do not lend themselves to conceptual
generalizations from which one can extrapolate to
cases presenting other foreign policy questions.
A brief review of these four categories will
demonstrate that they bear little resemblance to the
kind of political question issues raised in Dent or
similar prospective litigation.
Some analogies to Dent can be drawn, however,
from the last category (cases concerning treaties)
and from a new category which comprises the most
important group of political question cases in recent
years--the cases challenging the federal government's
conduct of the Vietnam War. Not all the cases in
59. 369 U.S. at 211-12.
60. Id. at 212.
61. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829).
62. Id. at 309.
63. See Dickinson, supra note 36.
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these categories have been held to present political
questions, and resolution of the political question
issue with respect to them requires more detailed
analysis. Upon closer scrutiny, nevertheless, it will
be seen that the political question cases in the latter
two categories are also distinguishable from Dent in
essential respects. Consequently, as-the district and
circuit courts in Dent-implicitly recognized, the poli>
tical question doctrine should not pose an insuperable
barrier to adjudication.
Foster & Elam, the first territorial dispute
case to raise a political question issue, involved
a challenge to the federal government's official
position in a dispute with Spain over the boundaries
between Spanish Florida and the United States.
Such a territorial dispute is the classic situa-
tion in which judicial abstention and deference to
executive and legislative action are deemed appro-
priate. Indeed, it would have been almost incon-
ceivable for the Supreme Court in the nineteenth
century to question the process by which the nation
extended ,ts rule over a continent and the surround-
ing seas.A
Subsequent courts, accordingly, took a similar
approach in such circumstances. FoE instance, the
defendant in Jones v. United Stateso5 was convictad
of a murder committed on an island in the Caribbean
claimed by the United States. On appeal he argued
that the lower court had lacked jurisdiction
because the act annexing the island to the United
States was unconstitutional. The Supreme Court
dismissed the claim on political questt.on grounds,
The Supreme Court in In re Cooper6 again dis-
played deference towards an American territorial
claim. The United States had recently purchased
Alaska and was attempting, over British opposition,
to enforce an American statute which restricted
seal hunting. American authorities seized a
British sealing ship more than fifty miles off the
coast of Alaska. A lower court dismissed a challenge
to this action, and the Supreme Court refused to
64. See generally J. PRATT, AMERICA'S COLONIAL
EXPERIMENT (1950) (history of United States' expansionist
movement).
65. 137 U.S. 202 (1890).
66. 143 U.S. 472 (1892).
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review the dismissal. 67
Recognition of foreign governments is a
second category in which the courts have viewed 68
the executive's position as exclusively controlling.
The issue of recognition is an area in which the
executive cannot avoid taking a position: failure
of the United States to act on a government's claim
to recognition itself constitutes an affirmative
decision by the executive, even though the decision may
be provisional and subject to change. Thus the
Supreme Court has viewed an unrecognized foreign
government as "a republic of whose existence we know
nothing. ,69
It would be an undesirable encroachment upon the
executive's foreign policy if the courts were to declare
the legitimacy of a foreign government before the
executive had done so; the encroachment would become
outright interference were the courts to "recognize"
a government when the executive had refused to do so. 7 0
67. Section 1956 of the Revised Statutes prohibited
the killing of fur seals "'within the limits of Alaska
Territory, or in the watets thereof"', and an Act of Congress
in 1889 stated that Section 1956 applied to the United
States dominion in the waters of the Bering Sea. See d. at
496-97 (citing statutes). While there was considerable doubt
that Rpssia possessed such dominion and could transfer it by
the 1867 Treaty ceding Alaska to the United States, the
Supreme Court upheld the seizure on this authority. See
Dickinson, supra note 36; at 459-61 (discussing Cooper). A
trend by many countries toward extending their off-shore
sovereignty in recent years has revived this issue.
For additional examples of judicial deference to the
executive branch's treatment of territorial claims, see
Wilson v. Shaw, 204 U.S. 24, 32-33 (1906) (upholding the
legality of the acquisition of the Panama Canal Zone);
Williams v. The Suffolk Ins. Co., 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 415, 420
(1839) (executive rejection of "Buenos Ayres" government's
claim of sovereignty over the Falkland Islands held binding
upon the judiciary).
68. See Dickinson, supra note 36, at 464-69.
69. United States v. Klintock, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.)
144, 149 (1820).
70. It is most doubtful, moreover, whether foreign
governments would credit judicial determinations of recognition
which differed from those of the executive.
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As a practical matter, the fact that many nations
experience frequent changes of government makes
executive authority over questions of diplomatic
recognition essential. The executive is able to make
flexible and pragmatic adjustments to ever-changing
international conditions, while the decisions of the
judiciary reflect the rigidity of legal principles.
The executive, furthermore, can act immediately in
each instance where the question of recognition
arises, while the constitutional prohibition against
the issuance of advisory opinions by the courts pre-
cludes the judiciary from deciding the question un-
less it is litigated.7 1  Consequently, the courts have
traditionally treated recognition of foreign govern-
ments as a political question within the exclusive
control of the executive. 7 2
The resolution of territorial boundary and
recognition issues clearly hinges on the determina-
tion of complex factual questions and international
political issues which are best handled by the
executive. The sovereign immunity from lawsuits
enjoyed by foreign governments in American courts, on
the other hand, might seem at first blush to be a
matter of pure legal principle appropriate for judi-
cial decision. Nevertheless, a significant group of
political question cases has developed in this area,
71. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (authorizing
the federal courts to decide only "cases or controversies").
72. See, e.g., Kennett v. Chambers, 55 U.S. (14 How.)
38, 50-51 (1852). The history of United States recognition of
the Soviet Union illustrates this point. Until 1933 the
United States refused to recognize the new government. Conse-
quently, it was refused standing in American courts. In United
States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942) (argued and decided during
the early months of the United States-Soviet alliance in
World War II), the Supreme Court reversed its position. Indeed,
on the strength of the executive's Litvinov Assignment agree-
ment with the Soviet Union concerning the settlement of private
creditors' claims, the Court gave extraterritorial effect to
decrees of the Soviet Government issued even before its
recognition.
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and sovereign immunity appears to have become a sub-
category of the political question doctrine, at least
in the operational sense. This has come about because
an issue akin to that of recognition arises in such
litigation: to what extent are foreign sovereigns
acting in their governmental capacity--and thus entitled
to sovereign immunity--when they are involved in quasi-
governmental activities such as shipping? In deciding
whether to accord sovereign immunity to such foreign
activities the courts have, as in the case of terri-
torial boundary questions, deferred to and solicited
the opinion of the executive.
The tradition of consulting the opinion of the
executive branch on claims of sovereign immunity for
foreign ships originated in The Schooner Exchange v. )Mc;Fad-
den. 71 In The Schooner Exchange, a United States Attorney
filed a "suggestion" requesting the dismissal of a libel in
admiralty brought by the purported owners of a former
American merchant ship which had been confiscated by
Napoleon and which later entered the port of Phila-
delphia. The Supreme Court dismissed the action,
accepting the United States Attorney's argument that
foreign ships of war entering American ports were
exempt from American jurisdiction.74
Courts have continued since The Schooner Exchange
to defer to the executive's position on whether to
allow claims to sovereign immunity by foreign govern-
ments. 7 5 This principle of deference was, moreover,
73. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812); see Dickinson,
supra note 36, at 469-79 (discussing sovereign immunity of ships).
A large proportion of the sovereign immunity cases concern ships;
a partial explanation for this may be the fact that admiralty
law enables a plaintiff who libels a ship in rem to shift the
burden of proof to the defendant, who then must plead sovereign
immunity as an affirmative defense.
74. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 146-47.
75. See, e.g., Ex parte Muir, 254 U.S. 522, 533 (1921)
(endorsing the practice of judicial deference to executive
"suggestions" on sovereign immunity on the grounds that "it makes
for better international relations, conforms to diplomatic usage
in other matters, accords to the Executive Department the respect
rightly due to it, and tends to promote harmony of action and
uniformity of decision"). But see Berizzi Bros. Co. v. S.S. Pesaro,
271 U.S. 562 (1926) (although the State Department had not presented
any "suggestion," the Court rejected the State Department's general
position on the substantive legal issues of whether to grant
sovereign immunity to foreign commercial ships).
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affirmed and extended in two decisions by the Stone
Court. In the first case, Ex parte Peru,7 6 a United
States Attorney, acting upon the advice of the State
Department, endorsed the claim of sovereign immunity
advanced by the Peruvian government on behalf of a
Peruvian steamship. The district court, however,
found that sovereign immunity had been waived.7 7 The
Supreme Court, ruling on a petition for a writ of
mandamus to the district court, held that the district
court should have relinquished its jurisdiction once
the State Department made its position known. The
danger to avoid, according to the Court, was
embarrassing the executive branch with a contrary
judicial determination:
[C]ourts may not so exercise their
jurisdiction, by the seizure and detention
of the property of a friendly sovereign, as
to embarrass the executive arm of the
Government in conducting foreign relations.
S.Upon recognition and allowance of the
claim by the State Department and certifica-
tion of its action presented to the court
by the Attorney General, it is the court's
duty to surrender the vessel and remit the
libelant to the relief obtainable through
diplomatic negotiations. . . . This practice
is founded upon the policy, recognized both
by the Department of State and the courts,
that our national interest will be better
served in such cases if the wrongs to
suitors, involving our relations with a
friendly foreign power, are righted through
diplomatic negotiations rather than by the
compulsions of judicial proceedings.7d
The Stone Court subsequently established a
corollary proposition in sovereign immunity cases in
Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman. 7 9 In Hoffman, it
treated the refusal of the State Department to certify
the soveriegn immunity of a ship owned by Mexico as
conclusive upon the courts. Since Hoffman, the courts
have continued to follow the State Department's
76. 318 U.S. 578 (1943).
77. The Ucayali, 47 F. Supp, 23, 206 (E.D. LA, 1942).
78. 318 U.S, at 588-89,
79. 324 U.S. 30 (1945).
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suggestions with respect to sovereign immunity.80
As we have seen, the position taken by the
executive has proven decisive in most political
question cases involving territorial boundaries,
recognition, and sovereign immunity. Historical
circumstances, however, have played a more decisive
and central role in a fourth area of political
question cases, the alien exclusion cases. In
Chae Chan Ping v. United States 8l and Fong Yue Ting
v. United States, 8 2 the Supreme Court upheld legis-
lative decisions to exclude Chinese immigrants
from the United States as political decisions which
could not be challenged in the courts. 83 Although
the Court viewed the right to exclude aliens as an
inherent attribute of national sovereignty, a
80. This deference is all the more noteworthy since
the State Department's position on the substantive issues of
sovereign immunity has evolved during this period. The
Department adopted the "restrictive" view that sovereign
immunity should not benefit merchant ships in the Tate Letter
of 1952, 26 DEP'T STATE BULL. 984 (1952), and this approach
was subsequently codified in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-11 (1976).
Some commentators have deemed this deference to the
executive to be so extreme as to constitute abdication of an
essential judicial role. See, e.g., Jessup, Has the Supreme
Court Abdicated One of Its Functions? 40 AM. J. INT'L L. 168
(1946); cf. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398,
439 (1964) (White, J., dissenting) (criticizing Court's total
deference to the executive). There is no indication, however,
that this deference will be abandoned.
81. The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
82. 149 U.S. 698 (1893).
83. The continuing validity of the alien exclusion
cases was recently affirmed by the Court in Matthews v. Diaz,
426 U.S. 67, 81 (1976), although the Court intimated that
limited judicial review was appropriate in some immigration
and naturalization questions. Id. at 82. See also Harisiades
v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952) (holding that the .right to
expel resident aliens is a corollary of the right to exclude
the entry of aliens).
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consideration of such cases cannot ignore the climate
of anti-Asian racism in the American West during the
last century. This climate, which stemmed in part
from the fear of competition for jobs by Chinese and
Japanese immigrants, was responsible for the treaties
and statutes barring such immigrants; it also
influenced the Court's reaction in these cases.
Sensitive political issues and the position
taken by the executive both played an important role
in the fifth group of political question cases: the
lawsuits attacking the constitutionality or legality
of the Vietnam War. Engaging in war is the most
complex and sensitive of the foreign policy powers
shared by Congress and the President. Not surprising-
ly, therefore, all but one8 4 of the federal courts
which decided lawsuits challenging the legality or
constitutionality of the war in Indochina either
concluded that they should not exercise jurisdiction
because political questions were involved, or--if
they rejected the political question defense and
ruled the issues justiciable--upheld the legality and
constitutionality of the challenged executive actions
and measures. The Supreme Court sidestepped the
opportunity to clarify the applicability of the
political question doctrine to the exercise of war
powers8 5 when it denied certiorar 6 hin all of these
cases except one, Atlee v. Laird, which it affirmed
without opinion.
The practical result in all of these cases was
to uphold the legality of the executive's policies and
its conduct of the war. The different lines of
reasoning by which the courts reached this p gctical
result, however, are difficult to reconcile.u° While
some courts did not invoke the political question
doctrine at all, those that did invoked it at varying
stages of their adjudication. Some courts refused
even to consider whether American participation in
the hostilities in Vietnam was a "war" in the consti-
tutional sense, on the grounds that this was a political
84. See note 44 supra.
85. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. ii.
86. 347 F. Supp. 689 (E.D. Pa. 1972), aff'd sub nom.
Atlee v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 911 (1973).
87. 411 U.S. 911 (1973).
88. See p. 174 supra.
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question. 89 Other courts decided that they had juris-
diction to c6nsider this question and concluded that
the Vietnam involvement was a constitutional war. 9 0
The only unifying thread in the Vietnam cases
appears to be a pronounced disinclination on the part
of the federal courts to question executive policies
in such a sensitive foreign policy area. Litigation
to enforce Security Council resolutions, on the other
hand, would not, ordinarily, pose such profoundly
sensitive political questions, even if Congress or
the President had publicly opposed such resolutions.
Past Security Council resolutions have not affected
thousands of American lives nor challenged a central
area of American foreign policy as did the Indochina
conflict. Future Security Council resolutions are
unlikely to deviate from this pattern.
Another distinguishing feature of the Vietnam
War lawsuits is that the executive policies they
challenged were at least tacitly endorsed by Congress.
The constitutional arguments of plaintiffs that the
89. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F.2d 611, 614 (D.C.
Cir. 1973); Atlee v. Laird, 347 F. Supp. 689, 705 (E.D. Pa. 1972),
aff'd sub nom. Atlee v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 911 (1973).
90. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. Laird, 451 F.2d 26, 34
(1st Cir. 1971); Orlando v. Laird, 443 F.2d 1039 (2d Cir. 1971).
Other issues concerning the Vietnam Wiar which courts held
presented political questions included: (1) whether President
Nixon after 1969 fulfilled his "duty" to try to end the war as
promptly as was consistent with the national interest and the
safety of the American combatants, see Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F.2d
611, 616 (2d Cir. 1973); (2) whether Congress had taken
sufficient action to authorize continuation of the war by the
executive, see Atleey. Laird, 347 F. Supp. 689, 706 (E.D. Pa. 1972),
aff'd sub nom. Atlee v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 911 (1973); (3)
whether the President had conducted the war in a constitutional
fashion and whether he was justified in maintaining American
forces in Southeast Asia, see id.; (4) whether the President was
empowered to wage war in the absence of a congressional declara-
tion of war, see Sarnoff v. Connally, 457 F.2d 809, 810 (9th Cir.
1972); (5) whether the May 1972 mining of North Vietnam's ports
and harbors constituted an unlawful escalation of the war in the
absence of an explicit congressional authorization, see DaCosta
v. Laird, 471 F.2d 1146, 1147-50 (2d Cir. 1973); and (6) whether
the 1973 bombing of Cambodia was a basic change in American
conduct of the war requiring renewed congressional authorization
or a tactical decision within the President's discretion, see
Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307, 1311-13 (2d Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 416 U.S. 936 (1974).
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executive had unlawfully usurped Congress' role with
respect to war were undercut by the fact that Congress
had continued to vote funds to carry on the war and
had repeatedly defeated resolutions calling for its
termination. 91 The courts, not surprisingly, concluded
that this accord between the two political branches
satisfied constitutional requirements and precluded
judicial review.92 Thus, the situation with respect
to United States policy on Namibia is readily dis-
tinguishable from the Vietnam War cases, since Congress
has not taken a collective stand on the subject of
Namibia.
Moreover, the executive itself acted consis-
tently during the Vietnam War. In the Namibian seal
skins case, on the other hand, there was disagreement
within the executive branch, which ended only when the
Commerce Department bowed to the State Department's
view that importation of the fur seal skins could not
be harmonized with the international legal obligations
of the United States. 9 3 The views of the State
Department concerning the existence and validity of such
legal obligations are entitled to "much weight,"94 and
perhaps this ultimately influenced the Commerce
Department to stop invoking executive primacy in
support of a position the State Department opposed. For
some time, however, the Commerce Department persisted
in its support for the importation waiver despite
State Department opposition. In the presence of
such executive disarray, courts are likely to prove
less reluctant to hurdle the political question barrier
and resolve the controversy than in a conflict like
the Vietnam War, in which executive policy was consis-
tent. 9 5
91. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. Laird, 451 F.2d 34 (1st
Cir. 1971); DaCosta v. Laird, 448 F.2d 1370 (2d Cir. 1971).
92. Orlando v. Laird, 443 F.2d 1039, 1042-43 (2d Cir. 1971);
see'Massashusetts v. Laird, 451 F.2d 34 (1st Cir. 1971).
93. See p. 103 infra.
94. Sullivan v. Kidd, 254 U.S. 433, 442 (1921).
95. It is difficult, of course, to predict what the
respective positions of the President and of Congress might be in
future disputes involving Security Council resolutions, but dis-
agreement within the branches or between them, such as occurred
in Diggs v. Shultz, 470 F.2d 461 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
411 U.S. 931 (1973), is not improbable.
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The sixth and final category or political ques-
tion cases, which involves claimed United States
obligations under treaties, has the greatest bearing
on the Namibian case and prospective similar litiga-
tion. Plaintiffs in the Namibian case invoked United
States international obligations under the United
Nations Charter. The Charter is a treaty of the
United States, and treaties have the same binding
domestic effect as statutes. The strongest basis
for seeking to force compliance by the United States
with United Nations resolutions is the argument that
resolutions are as binding on the United States as
the Charter under whose authority they were passed.
Thus in seeking to enforce Security Council resolu-
tions in United States courts, plaintiffs were in
effect invoking American treaty obligations.
Cases in which treaty obligations have been
raised in American courts cannot all be classified
under the political question doctrine, but many of
them have been held to raise non-justiciable issues.9 6
The courts have held both the negotiation of treaties
and questions concerning the validity or duration
of treaties to be matters exclusively reserved for
executive control. 9 7 The courts have also declined
to adjudicate whether a foreign sovereign had the
capacity to enter into a treaty. In Doe v. Braden,98
for example, a plaintiff claimed land in Florida
under a grant from the King of Spain made shortly
before Spain ceded the land to the United States.
The United States insisted upon including a provision
in the treaty annulling this grant, and the King of
Spain agreed. Plaintiff argued that this annulment
was illegal under Spanish law and that the United
States government could not sanction such an injustice.
A unanimous Supreme Court ruled, however, that deter-
mination by the President and Senate that Spain had
validly ratified the treaty under Spanish law was con-
clusive and that the Court had no authority to review
this determination because it raised a political
96. See Holmes v. Laird, 459 F.2d 1211, 1215 n.26
(D.C. Cir. 1972) (citing cases); Dickinson, supra note 36, at 484-
92 (same).
97. See, e.g., Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447 (1913);
Terlinden v. Ames, 184 U.S. 270 (1902); Doe v. Braden, 57 U.S.
(16 How.) 635 (1853).
98. 57 U.S. (16 How.) 635 (1853).
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question.99
Similarly, courts have deferred to the execu-
tive's determination of whether the violation of a
treaty by a foreign country or a country's loss of
independent existence terminates a treaty between it
and the United States. In Terlinden v. Ames,10 0 for
instance, American authorities had taken steps to
comply with a request by the German government to
extradite a German citizen to face criminal charges
in Germany. The plaintiff argued that the treaty authori-
zing such extradition, which had been entered into
by the United States and Prussia, had been terminated
by Prussia's subsequent integration into the German
empire. Nevertheless, the United States and Germany
continued to treat the treaty as binding, and the
Supreme Court refused to review this determination.
The court stated, "We concur in the view that the
question whether power remains in a foreign State to
carry out its treaty obligations is in its nature
political and not judicial, and that the courts ought
not to interfere with the conclusions of the political
department in that regard."101
In Charlton v. Kelly, 1 02 plaintiff's case for
resisting extradition to Italy was stronger: the
evidence was clear that the Italian government had
refused to abide by and had violated the treaty at
issue. The State Department, however, elected to
view the treaty as still in force. The Supreme Court
ruled that Italy's violation made the treaty merely
voidable rather than void, that the executive's
decision to waive Italy's default was controlling, and
that the treaty therefore remained in effect.
Doe, Terlinden, and Charlton apparently reflect
a judicial rule which holds that the President or an
appropriate executive official is authorized to deter-
mine the duration and validity of an international
agreement used by the United States in the conduct of
its foreign relations. A different rule applies,
however, in interpreting treaty obligations when the
99. Id. at 657-58.
100. 184 U.S. 270 (1902).
101. Id. at 288.
102. 229 U.S. 447, 469-76 (1913).
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validity of the underlying treaty is unquestioned103
Courts are not barred by political question con-
siderations from interpreting treaties. Courts,
however, have been reluctant to decide whether high
government officials have violated treaty obligations.
Nevertheless, in various cases, the courts have
interpreted and applied treaty law in controversies
involving alleged treaty violations by lower govern-
ment officials. 104
In Chew Heong v. United States, for instance,
the Supreme Court under authority of a treaty between
the United States and China ordered immigration
officials to readmit plaintiff, a Chinese alien, to
the United States, notwithstanding a statute which
restricted Chinese immi ration. In Fourteen Diamond
Rings v. United StatesT05 the Court overturned a
ruling by customs authorities that the Philippine
Islands were to be considered a foreign country after
Spain had signed, the 1898 treaty ceding the Philippines
to the United States. The Court held that an American
soldier returning home after the Spanish American
War did not have to pay a foreign import duty on rings
which he had brought from the Philippines.
The Supreme Court ordered the Coast Guard to
release a British ship suspected of furnishing liquor
to American smugglers during Prohibition in Cook v.
United States,lUb on the grounds that the Coast
Guard had erroneously concluded that the terms of an
American treaty with Britain were overridden by a
tariff st~ibte. In Bacardi Corp. of America V.
Domenech, the Court instructed the Treasurer of
103. The Court stated in Doe v. Braden that it was a judi-
cial duty "to interpret [a treaty] and administer it according
to its terms." 57 U.S. (16 How.) 635, 657 (1853). According
to the American Law Institute, "[u]nder the law of the United
States, courts in the United States have exclusive authority
to interpret an international agreement to which the United
States is a party for the purpose of applying it in litigation
as the domestic law of the United States." RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 0 150 (1965).
104. 112 U.S. 536, 549-50 (1884).
105. 183 U.S. 176 (1901).
106. 288 U.S. 102, 114-20 (1933).
107. 311 U.S. 150 (1940).
[VOL. 4191
SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS
Puerto Rico to cease enforcement of a 1937 Puerto
Rican statute limiting the use of foreign trade
names. The Court found that the statute was incon-
sistent with the 1929 General Inter-American Conven-
tion for Trademark and Commercial Protection.108
In these cases, the courts did not hesitate
to compel federal officials, albeit minor ones, to
perform duties mandated by American treaties.
Political question considerations did not bar the
exercise of such compulsion.10 9 Such cases thus
demonstrate that not all auestions of treaty law
are reserved exclusively for executive determination,
although they do not reveal whether or not the
Namibian case or other prospective cases to enforce
Security Council resolutions in American courts are
justiciable. The only apparent way to determine
whether courts will find that a non-justiciable
political question is present in the Namibian case
is to make a more detailed analysis according to the
six Baker v. Carr ll O criteria:
Prominent on the surface of any case
held to involve a political question is
found a textually demonstrable commitment
of the issues to a coordinate political
department; or a lack of judicially dis-
coverable and manageable standards for
resolving it; or the impossibility of
deciding without an initial policy deter-
mination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial
108. See pp. 221-22 infra (discussing case).
109. In one case, moreover, the Supreme Court even applied
norms of customary international law to declare illegal the
American military seizure of two Cuban fishing boats during the
Spanish American War. See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
Since international obligations arising under a treaty are more
obvious than those arising under "custom", it is argued in Comment,
Public Interest Litigation and United States Foreign Policy, 18
HARV. INT'L L.J. 375, 417-18 (1977), that if the political
question doctrine did not bar the application of custom in the
absence of a treaty in The Paquete Habana, there is even less
reason for courts to hesitate in holding federal officials to
their binding responsibilities under a treaty. However, as Scharpf,
supra note 36, at 575, emphasizes, the Court pointed out that
the officer responsible for seizing the boats had acted without
specific authorization from the Navy Department, and that the
President had declared that the United States intended to abide
by international rules and customs in its conduct of war. The
decision can, therefore, be narrowly limited to these facts.
110. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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discretion; or the impossibility of a
court's undertaking independent resolution
without expressing lack of the respect due
coordinate branches of government; or an
unusual need for unquestioning adherence
to a political decision already made; or
the potentiality of embarrassment from
multifarious pronouncements by various
departments on one question.1 1 1
With respect to the first Baker criterion, the
issues of American treaty law raised by the seal skins
case are not within any of the limited categories
of treaty law the courts have designated as exclusively
for executive determination. In view of the results in
such cases as Chew Heong v. United States,1 1 2 Fourteen
Diamond Rings v. United States,ll 3 Cook v. United States,1l4
and Bacardi Corp. of America v. Domenech, 1 1 5 the state-
ment of the district court in Dent that "[ult is not
for the court to say whether a treaty has been broken
or what remedy shall be given" 116 is simply not accurate 1 7
Since the issues in Dent are also not exclusively for
congressional determination, the case does not meet
the first political question criterion under Baker v.Carr.1iI
111. Id. at 217.
112. 112 U.S. 536 (1884).
113. 183 U.S. 176 (1901).
114. 288 U.S. 102, 114-20 (1933).
115. 311 U.S. 150 (1940).
116. See note 2 supra, 14 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS at 804.
117. In support of its statement, the Dent court cited
Z. & F. Assets Realization Corp., v. Hull, 31 F. Supp. 371 (D.D.C.
1940), aff'd, 114 F.2d 464 (2d Cir.), aff'd on other grounds,
311 U.S. 470 (1941). That case involved a challenge to the
validity of certain awards, which the State Department had recog-
nized, made by the Mixed Claims Commission established after
World War I. The district court dismissed the challenge and the
court of appeals affirmed on political question grounds, but
the Supreme Court affirmed on statutory grounds. It is therefore
inapposite to Dent for at least two reasons: (1) the Supreme
Court did not treat it as a political question case and (2) in
Dent, plaintiffs were asking the court to uphold rather than
to reject a State Department position. See Comment, supra
note 109, at 418 nn.162-63 (distinguishing cases).
118. 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). In any event, the thoughtful
opinion of the district court in Atlee v. Laird, 347 F. Supp. 689,
703 (E.D. Pa. 1972), aff'd sub nom. Atlee v. Richardson, 411 U.S.
911 (1973), concluded that in foreign policy cases where it is
claimed that a political question is present, courts should focus
their attention not on the first but on the other five Baker
criteria.
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Neither does there seem to be a "lack of judici-
ally discoverable and manageable standards for resolv-
ing" the case.1 1 9 This second Baker criterion was the
one presumably invoked by courts when they held the
Vietnam War cases to be non-justiciable.1 2 0 In the
Namibian case, however, there would seem to be no such
problem; on the contrary, the case law, treatises, and
commentaries provide standards which are both "judici-
ally discoverable and manageable for resolving" the
issue of whether United Nations resolutions are bind-
ing under international and United States domestic
law.121
Resolution of the Namibian case, furthermore,
did not require "an initial policy determination of a
kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion."'1 2 2 Although
they disagreed on what the requirements of international
law were, both the Commerce Department and the State
Department (as well as the parties in the case)
articulated the issues in Dent in terms of lbgality
rather than of policy. Neither executive department
claimed that in resolving the intra-executive dispute
over American treaty obligations the court would en-
croach upon the executive's policy-making sphere.
The sixth Baker criterion for political question
cases is "the potentiality of embarrassment from
multifarious pronouncements by various departments
on one question."1 2 3 Whatever embarrassment could
result from such multifarious pronouncements already
existed as a result of the split between the State and
Commerce Departments in Dent. Adjudication of the
case wold reduce rather than add to such embarrass-
ment. 1 2  Instead of communicating any "lack of the
119. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) (second
criterion).
120. See pp. 186-88 supra.
121. See, e.g., pp, 224-3G infra (citing cases); Higgins,
supra note 7.
122. See Baker V. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) (third
criterion).
123. See id. (sixth criterionl.
124. If the term "various departments" is construed as
applying to different branches of government rather than parts of
a single branch, of course, Dent completely fails to meet this
criterion, since the dispute there was intra-branch rather than
inter-branch.
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respect due coordinate branches of government,"1 25
a court in agreeing to decide the case would only
be serving its traditional dispute-resolving func-
tion.
Finally, in Dent there was no "unusual need
for unquestioning adherence to a political decision
already made."1 2b President Ford, like Presidents
Nixon and Carter, expressed at least qualified
support for the United Nations' position on Namibia.
The State Department repeatedly supported this
decision.
The State Department, moreover, and not the
Commerce Department, had the prerogative to decide
United States policy concerning American treaty
obligations under the United Nions Charter and
Security Council resolutions. The Commerce
Department's decision-making process revealed that
its initial position on the treaty issues concern-
ing Namibia was merely ncidental to its support
for the Fouke waiver.1 2  The result of such a
process was scarcely entitled to the deference which
might be merited by a reasoned and thorough deci-
sion by the State Department, which had the compe-
tence and the responsibility to decide such cases.
In the absence of presidential intervention1 29 to
resolve such an intra-executive dispute, the Commerce
Department, which had no special expertise in foreign
relations, should have deferred to the State
Department's opposing position. In the end, the
State Department position on the Namibian seal
skins prevailed without judicial intervention, but
it would not have been inappropriate for judicial
intervention to have contributed to such a result.
125. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) (fourth criterion),
126. Id. (fifth criterion).
127. See p. 188 & note 94 supra.
128. See 24 U. KAN. L. REV. 395, 405 (1976).
129. Such intra-executive disputes are not uncommon, and
the President sometimes permits them to continue without resolu-
tion. Cf. Hollick, Bureaucrats at Sea, in NER ERA QF OCEAN
POLITICS 1-73 (A Hollick & R. Osgood eds. 1974) (describing
competing assertions of government interest in law of the sea).
It seems unwarranted, however, to infer any covert presiden-
tial support for the Commerce Department's position from
President Ford's failure to resolve the Namibian seals dispute.
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In summary, neither judicial precedents nor
policy considerations supported the invoking of
the political question doctrine in the Namibian
case. This may explain why the court of appeals
in Diggs v. Richardson, 1 3 0 while generally affirm-
ing the district court, did not affirm but rather
omitted discussion of the district court's poli-
tical question holding. Consequently, it appears
that the Namibian case did not involve a political
question, and that the political question doctrine
should not bar the adjudication of plaintiffs'
claims in the seal skins case or similar prospective
litigation.
B. Standing to Sue
Standing requirements have, in recent years,
thwarted many lawsuits oriented to the public
interest. The doctrine of standing is a corollary
of the constitutional provision authorizing courts
to adjudicate only cases and controversies.131
The core of the standing concept is that the
plaintiff must have a genuine personal stake, not
a generalized interest, in the resolution of the
issues in controversy.132 Only if a plaintiff
has such a personal stake, the-Supreme Court has
stated, can there be assured "that concrete adverse-
ness which sharpens the presentation of issues
upon which the court so largely depends for illumi-
nation of difficult constitutional questions."1 3 3
As the flood of litigation has threatened to
overwhelm the courts, the Burger Court has narrowed
access by tightening standing requirements, partic-
130. 555 F.2d 848 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
131. See U.S. CONST. art. III, 0 2, cl. 1.
132. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498-99
(1975).
133. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962). The
standing rule is also based in part on consideration of the
effects of stare decisis. Under this doctrine, the
principles of law issuing from litigation may affect the
future rights and interests of non-parties, although such
non-parties have no right to intervene in the lawsuit. Stand-
ing requirements are imposed to protect such non-parties
from inadequate presentation of a case or more serious abuses
such as barratry, maintenance, and friendly suits.
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ularly for "public interest" plaintiffs.134
Accordingly, the problem of standing might have
posed avery serious obstacle to a court's adjudi-
cation of a suit involving Namibia brought by
American citizens. Plaintiffs in Diggs v. Dent1 35
had the advantage, however, of relying on Diggs v.
Shultz,139 a decision of the same circuit acknow-
ledging plaintiffs' standing under quite similar
circumstances. The plaintiffs in Shultz failed to
achieve their principal objective, injunctive
relief against the importation of Rhodesian chromite
ore permitted by the Byrd Amendment. In denying
this relief the court claimed that it had no power
to nullify the Byrd Amendment, which plaintiffs
contended was contrary to United States treaty
obligations under the United Nations Charter.137
Nevertheless, in affirming the district court's
dismissal of the action, the court of appeals
rejected the district court's conclusion that all
the plaintiffs lacked standing.
In order to establish their standing to chal-
lenge the Byrd Amendment in a lawsuit against the
United States government, plaintiffs in Shultz had
to demonstrate that they had been injured by the
Byrd Amendment. Plaintiffs argued that the Amend-
ment, by limiting the effectiveness of the United
Nations embargo directed at ending the Rhodesian
policies which had caused them harm, deprived them
of the embargo's potential benefits.
134. See, e.g., Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare
Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26 (1976); United States v.
Richardson, 418 U.S. 466 (1974); Schlesinger v. Reservists
Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974); Sierra Club V.
Morton, 40 U.S. 727 (1972). This trend runs counter to
some earlier cases which permitted "private Attorney Generals"
to litigate on behalf of the public interest. See, e.g.,
Associated Indus., Inc. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 704 (2d Cir.
1943), vacated, 320 U.S. 707 (1943) (per curican); Scripps-
Howard Radio, Inc. v. F.C.C., 316 U.S. 4, 14-15 (1942).
135. See note 2 supra.
136. 470 F.2d 461 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411
U.S. 931 (1973).
137. See pp. 257-70 infra (discussing treaty override).
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The district court found that appellants had
been injured by the fact that two were natives of
Rhodesia unable to return to their homeland, that
six others (including four black congressmen) had
been refused entry to Rhodesia, that others
(missionaries of the United Church of Christ) had
been arrested and deported from Rhodesia, and that
another's books had been banned from sale in
Rhodesia. The court concluded, however, that the
causal relationship between Rhodesia's denial of
rights to plaintiffs and their challenge of the
Byrd Amendment was too attenuated to constitute
the "logical nexus" required for standing.13 8
The court of appeals reversed this holding.
The court acknowledged that appellants' "primary
quarrel" was with Rhodesia,139 but it stated that
this did not foreclose the existence of a cognizable
dispute between them and the United States.
Significantly, it emphasized that plaintiffs lacked
any recourse other than their lawsuit:
It may be that the particular economic
sanctions invoked against Southern
Rhodesia in this instance will fall
short of their goal, and that appellants
will ultimately reap no benefit from
them. But, to persons situated as are
appellants, United Nations action con-
stitutes the only hope; and they are
personally aggrieved and injured by the
dereliction of any member state which
weakens the capacity of the world organ-
ization to make its policies meanin ul.1 40
Plaintiffs' injury in Diggs v. Dent uI was
identical or similar to that in Shultz. Both Congress-
man Diggs and Executive Director George Houser of
the American Committee on Africa had been denied
entry to Namibia by the South African government.
138. Diggs v. Shultz, 470 F.2d 461, 464 (D.C. Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 411 U.S. 931 (1973).
139. Id. at 465.
140. Id.
141. See note 2 supra.
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South Africa had outlawed the South West African
People's Organization (SWAPO); many of SWAPO's
members are refugees living abroad, and they and
plaintiff Theo-Ben Gurirab, SWAPO's director and
representative plenipotentiary to the United
Nations, would be subject to arrest if they
returned to Namibia. Because of these similarities,
the district court in Dent found Shultz controlling
and held that plaintiffs had standing. Judge
Flannery stated that:
[tihe factual similarity between Diggs
v. Shultz and the case at bar is undeniable.
As in Diggs v. Shultz, pjaintiffs claim
various personal injuries resulting from
illegal actions of a foreign nation. Thus
plaintiffs allege a sufficient personal
interest in the controversy to insure
concrete adverseness in the presentation
of the issues. . . . United Nations
Resolutions 276 and 301, like the
Resolution in Diggs v. Shultz, attempt to
deter a foreign government from activities
which adversely affect plaintiffs by means
of concerted international pressure. As
a result, plaintiffs are arguably within
the zone of interest sought to be protected
by those Resolutions. . . . The only signi-
ficant difference between the earlier case
and the case at bar is that the embargo in
Diggs v. Shultz had been made effective in
this country by Executive Orders which
imposed penalties upon persons who violated
their directives. The Executive Orders
were not apparently relevant, however, to
the existence of standing and thus their
absence in the present situation is
insufficient to distinguish the two cases. 1 4 2
The court of appeals in Diggs v. Richardsonl43
affirmed the district court's dismissal in Dent, and
it held that the United Nations resolutions at issue
did not confer judicially enforceable rights on
142. Id., 14 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS at 802-03.
143. 555 F.2d 848 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
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plaintiffs. It referred to but declined to comment
on defendants' argument that the holding with
respect to standing in Shultz was unsound in light
of subsequent Supreme Court decisions. Accordingly,
the decisions on standing in Dent and Shultz remain
intact, at least in the District of Columbia Circuit,
and they should ease the way for future plaintiffs
seeking enforcement of United Nations resolutions
in American courts.
Attempts will no doubt be made by prospective
government defendants, however, to limit narrowly
the standing precedents of the Diggs cases. Because
standing is largely dependent on the facts of the
plaintiff's situation and his or her relationship
to the legal interests he or she invokes, it is
difficult to predict to what extent future plaintiffs
who invoke United Nations resolutions will be able to
rely on the favorable Diggs holdings to establish
their standing. Thus, a broader discussion of re-
cent cases on standing is necessary to shed light
on the prospects for such future plaintiffs.
The litigation in the Diggs cases or similar
prospective litigation involves the assertion of
rights derived neither from the Constitution nor
from a federal statute,144 but from a treaty of
the United States (the United Nations Charter).145
None of the Supreme Court standing decisions deals
with such a treaty claim. Nevertheless, although
it may be true that "generalizations about standing
to sue are largely worthless as such,"1 4 6 it is
144. The Supreme Court has long recognized congres-
sional power to confer standing on a class of plaintiffs by
statute. See Associated Indus., Inc. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d
694 (2d Cir. 1943), vacated, 320 U.S. 707 (1943) (per curiam);
Scott, Standing in the Supreme Court - A Functional Analysis,
86 HARV. L. REV. 645, 647-48 (1973).
145. But see Comment, supra note 109, at 405 (arguing
that Security Council resolutions and relevant United Nations
Charter provisions in Dent constitute "legislative action"
to which American courts should give cognizance).
146. Data Processing Serv. Org., Inc. v. Camp, 397
U.S. 150, 151 (1970).
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likely that the Court would be guided by its recent
decisions involving constitutional and statutory
claims in assessing plaintiffs' standing to enforce
United Nations resolutions. Treaties are on a par
with statutes insofar as their legal effect is
concerned;1 47 there is no obvious reason for dis-
tinguishing the standing of a plaintiff invoking
a treaty from that of one invoking a statute.
It has become customary when beginning a
discussion of the doctrine of standing to note the
confusion which prevails in this area of the law. 1 4 8
Not only has the Supreme Court applied a number of
different standards in its recent major decisions
in this area, but it has not overruled prior cases
on standing.149 Consequently, various standards
coexist in the law for deciding the issue of
standing. These standards, moreover, are unanchored
to specific subject areas and are ready to be
invoked by the Supreme Court whenever a specific
result is desired. The application of the holdings
is elastic: it seems that they can be expanded or
restricted to suit the needs of a new case and the
predilections of the majority of the Court.1 5 0
There are two basic requirements for standing
relevant to the seal skins case: plaintiffs must
show that they have suffered an injury and that
there is a logical nexus between their grievance
and the claim they seek to have adjudicated. As
noted above, plaintiffs in Shultz and Dent could
convincingly claim to have suffered "injury in fact.,'1 5 1
147. DuPree v. United States, 559 F.2d 1151, 1154 (9th
Cir. 1977) ("Presumably treaty and international conventions
being on the same footing as legislative enactments may
serve the same function in affording standing.")
148. See, e.g., Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights
Organization, 426 U.S. 26, 66 n.13 (1976) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting); Note, Standing to Assert Constitutional Jus
Tertii, 88 HARV. L. REV. 423 (1974).
149. See, e.g., Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968);
Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
150. See, e.g., Linda R. S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614,
617, 619 (1973); Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights
Organization, 426 U.S. 26 (1976).
151. See United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 659, 686 (1973)
("injury in fact" requirement for standing); Data Processing
Serv. Org., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152 (1970) (same).
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Proof of a "logical nexus between the status asserted
and the claim sought to be adjudicated,"1 5 2 however,
is more difficult. Just as the district court in
Shultz found that the causal relationship between
Rhodesia's denial of the plaintiffs' rights and the
plaintiffs' challenge of the Byrd Amendment was too
attenuated to constitute such a nexus, 1 5 3 it could
be argued that plaintiffs in Dent had a grievance
only against the South African authorities rather
than against United States officials who were con-
sidering waiver of the MMPA to permit importation
of seal skins from Namibia.
Recent Supreme Court decisions cast doubt on
whether the Court in future attempts to enforce
United Nations policies would recognize the nexus
of injury and claim found in Shultz and Dent. The
Court has stated that although it does not foreclose
standing, indirectness of injury "may make it sub-
stantially more difficult to meet the minimum
requirement of Art. III: to establish that, in fact,
the asserted injury was the consequence of the
defendants' actions or that prospective relief will
remove the harm.''1 5 4 The Court in several cases has
denied standing when it concluded that the relation-
ship between plaintiffs' alleged injuries and
defendants' actions was speculative.
For example, the Supreme Court in Warth v.
Seldin1 5 5 denied standing to low-income plaintiffs
challenging a town's restrictive zoning ordinance
which virtually restricted housing to single family
units.156 The Court determined that plaintiffs had
failed to show that their failure to obtain adequate
housing was attributable to the zoning ordinance
rather than to other factors such as their low in-
come. Similarly, in Linda R.S. V. Richard D. 157
the mother of an illegitimate child contended, in a
suit against the state of Texas and the father, that
it was discriminatory for a criminal statute penaliz-
ing non-support by parents to be enforced only
against parents of legitimate children.1 5 8 Because
152. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 102 (1967).
153. 460 F.2d 461, 464 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
411 U.S. 931 (1973).
154. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 505 (1975).
155. Id.
156. Id. at 518.
157. 410 U.S. 614 (1973).
158. Id. at 615-16.
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the child's father might have chosen incarceration
rather than paying support and plaintiff was thus
unable to show that her failure to obtain child
support resulted from the state's nonenforcement
of the criminal statute, the Court held that
plaintiff lacked standing.
Finally, in Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare
Rights Organization, 1 5 9 the Court denied standing
to indigents and associations of indigents who
claimed that a revised Internal Revenue Service
ruling lowered the level of service hospitals were
required to provide indigents in order to qualify
for tax exemption as charitable organizations and
thereby contributed to plaintiffs' exclusion from
hospital emergency rooms. The Court found that
"speculative inferences [were] necessary to con-
nect [respondents' injury to the challenged actions
of petitioners." 16 u
Applying the above principles to the Namibian
case, it seems inescapable that the asserted injury,
however characterized, was at best only an indirect
result of the action or inaction of the United
States government. -lPlaintiffs' exclusion from
Namibia (or inability to return there) was not the
consequence of the Commerce Department's intention
to authorize importation of the seal skins. There
was little likelihood, moreover, that the prospective
relief, denial of the waiver, would remove the harm
and cause the South African authorities to permit
plaintiffs to visit Namibia. South Africa would
suffer little economic harm were it unable to ex-
port seal skins to the United States. The South
African government has steadfastly maintained its
policies against far greater international pres-
sures in other areas.
To meet the standards of the above cases, the
plaintiffs' injury must be characterized as an
injury caused by the United States government,
namely, the government's failure to abide by the
obligations created by Security Council resolutions
voted under the United Nations Charter, a United
States treaty. The attenuated nature of such an
asserted interest, particularly if it is abstracted
from plaintiffs' exclusion from Namibia, is
159. 426 U.S. 26 (1976).
160. Id. at 45 (footnote omitted).
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obvious. If their exclusion from Namibia is con-
sidered, plaintiffs would no doubt be within the
"zone of interests" the Security Council resolu-
tion on Namibia intended to protect.1 61 But if
plaintiffs claim standing only on the basis of their
interest in enforcing the law and in requiring
the United States to abide by its treaty obliga-
tions under the Charter, the Supreme Court would
probably reject their claim as an attempt "to
employ a federal court as a forum in which to air
[their] generalized grievances about the conduct
of government. "162
Exclusion from Namibia and plaintiffs'
interest in enforcing the law must be combined in
order to fashion an argument for plaintiffs'
standing.163 Accordingly, to increase the likeli-
hood of clearing the threshold barriers in litiga-
tion seeking to enforce United Nations resolutions
on Namibia in American courts, plaintiffs should be
161. See Data Processing Serv. Org., Inc. v. Camp,
397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970) (requiring plaintiffs, in order to
invoke statute, to be within "zone of interests" intended to
be protected by statute).
162. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 106 (1968).
163. There is no congressional enactment involved in
the Namibian case under which plaintiff Congressman Diggs
could invoke special standing as a legislator. In Kennedy
v. Sampson, 511 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 1974), the court held
that Senator Kennedy had standing to challenge President
Nixon's use of the "pocket veto," because this would dilute
the power of his vote. Several other attempts by congress-
men to claim special standing by virtue of their legislative
role, however, have been rejected by the courts. See,
e.g., Harrington v. Bush, 553 F.2d 190 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (a
challenge to CIA funding); Harrington v. Schlesinger, 528
F.2d 455 (4th Cir. 1975) (a challenge to war expenditures).
Congressman Diggs claimed and was accorded standing in
Shultz, Dent, and Richardson on the grounds that he had
been denied admission to Namibia, and not because of his
congressional status.
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selected who can claim to represent the people of
Namibia themselves. The Council for Namibia,
the internationally-recognized representative of the
territory's population, has shown no inclination to
bring such actions.1 64 On the other hand, SWAPO,
which claims the loyalty of a large fraction of the
inhabitants of Namibia, and Theo-Ben Gurirab,
SWAPO's representative to the United Nations, were
plaintiffs in Dent.
In addition to selecting plaintiffs who repre-
sent the Namibian people, it is important to redefine
the nature of plaintiffs' grievance as official
United States action which lends legitimacy to the
South African regime in Namibia. This injury might
appear slight but the causal nexus between it and the
challenged United States action would be direct and
obvious. One strong reason for courts to allow such
vindication of the rights and interests of Namibian
inhabitants is the fact that South African subjugation
164. If it wished to sue, the United Nations Council for
Namibia would probably be in the strongest position to gain
standing to defend Namibian interests and to enforce Security
Council resolutions on Namibia in American courts. The Council
was created by the United Nations for the express purpose of
defending Namibian interests and of exercising authority over
the territory until such time as the territory gains self-rule.
See Shockey, Enforcement in United States Courts of the United
Nations Council for Namibia's Decree on Natural Resources,
2 YALE STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 285, 304-11 (1976)
(arguing that the Council for Namibia could serve as plaintiff).
Foreign governments have traditionally been granted
standing to sue in American courts as a matter of comity; this
right, however, is not extended to governments which the United
States does not recognize. See Pfizer, Inc. v. India, 434
U.S. 308 (1978); United States v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398
(1964); Lubman, The Unrecognized Government in American Courts:
Upright v. Mercury Business Machines, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 275 (1962).
The United States has taken a rather complex position on the
authority of the Council for Namibia. It has consistently main-
tained that South African administration over the territory
is illegal and should be replaced by that of the Council, but
it has interpreted the resolution establishing the Council to
mean that it can only exercise its authority once it is
physically present in Namibia. See Shockey, supra, at 303; note
309 infra. Consequently, it is debatable whether the Council
would be treated as a recognized government entitled to stand-
ing to sue in American courts.
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deprives the Namibians of the very entity which
would normally be expected to defend their inter-
ests in international litigation, an independent
government. The right to self-determination and
the related vital interests of the Namibian people,
after all, are what is really at stake in the
Namibian case, and not the exclusion of a few
individuals from that territory.
It is not unprecedented to allow plaintiffs to
invoke the rights of third parties.165 The
Supreme Court has acknowledged this right in various
cases. In the most famous of these cases, Pierce
v. Society of Sisters,1 6 6 the Court held that a
religious congregation which operated parochial
schools had standing to vindicate the constitutional
rights of parents whose children were prohibited
by state statute from attending the schools. In
Barrows v. Jackson,1 6 7 the Court held that a white
home-owner had standing to invoke the constitu-
tional rights of potential non-white purchasers
in defending an action for breaking a racially
restrictive covenant. In several recent cases,
the Court has acknowledged the standing of doctors
to invoke the constitutional right of privacy of
third persons in actions challenging state laws
which prohibited the distribution of contraceptive
devices and information about abortion. 16 8
Furthermore, the Court in NAACP v. Alabamal69 per-
mitted a civil rights organization which refused
to release its membership lists to a state agency
to invoke its members' constitutional right of
assembly under the due process clause.1 7 0
Such decisions are exceptions to the Supreme
Court's general rule that "[o]rdinarily, one may
165. See, e.g., Sedler, Standing to Assert Constitu-
tional Jus Tertii in the Supreme Court, 71 YALE L.J. 599
(1962); Annotation, Supreme Court's Views as to Party's
Standing to Assert Rights of Third Persons (Jus Tertii) in
Challenging Constitutionality of Legislation, 50 L.Ed. 2d
902 (1978).
166. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
167. 346 U.S. 249 (1953).
168. See, e.g., Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106 (1976);
Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976>; Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). But see Tileston v.
Ullman, 318 U.S. 44 (1943) (doctor denied standing).
169. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
170. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 2.
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not claim standing in this Court to vindicate the
constitutional rights of some third party."ll
It is settled, however, that "limitations on a liti-
gant's assertion of jus tertii are not constitu-
tionally mandated, but rather stem from a salutary
'rule of self-restraint' designed to minimize
unwarranted intervention into controversies where
the applicable constitutional questions are ill-
defined and speculative." 1 7 2
All of the cases discussed above, however,
involved invocation of constitutional rights of
individuals by third parties. Thus, a major diffi-
culty which would confront plaintiffs seeking to
assert the rights and interests of the Namibian
people is that no constitutional claim is involved
in their case. Nevertheless, the prudential
principles which led to a grant of standing in
Society of Sisters and Jackson are relevant to the
situation of the Namibian population. The Court
in Jackson held that the general rule against
permitting the assertion of jus tertii claims was
outweighed by "the need to protect [these] funda-
mental rights" in circumstances "in which it would
be difficult if not impossible for persons whose
rights are asserted to present their grievance
before any court."1 7 3 It is not difficult to
imagine the reprisals to which an inhabitant of
Namibia might be subject for bringing an action In
an American court to challenge either directly or
indirectly South African rule over his 'homeland.
If surrogates are not permitted to represent the
rights of Namibians in American courts, it is
unlikely that anyone will be able to defend these
rights.
The Supreme Court has held that a similar
argument provides no basis for standing:
It can be argued that if respon-
dent is not permitted to litigate this
issue, no one can do so. In a very
real sense, the absence of any parti-
cular individual or class to litigate
these claims gives support to the
argument that the subject matter is
committed to the surveillance of
171. Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 255 (1953).
172. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 193 (1976).
173. 346 U.S. 249, 257 (1953).
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Congress, and ultimately to the
political process. Any other con-
clusion would mean that the Founding
Fathers intended to set up something
in the nature of an Athenian democracy
or a New England town meeting to over-
see the conduct of the National Gov-
ernment by means of lawsuits in
federal courts.174
This stricture, however, should be limited to
domestic political issues, which are susceptible
to political change by those whose interests are
at stake. The Namibians, on the other hand, have
no elected representative in Congress or the
executive. Nevertheless, their vital interests are
affected by the question of whether the United
States complies with its putative treaty obligations
to Namibia under the United Nations Charter. In
their case, the prudential considerations which
militate against permitting plaintiffs judicial review
where more appropriate political redress is available
do not obtain. Thus, the Namibian litigation or
similar prospective efforts to enforce United Nations
resolutions as treaty obligations of the United States
illustrate the kind of exceptional situations, like
that in Baker v. Carr,1 7 5 in which standing to sue
is warranted despite the general prudential considera-
tions to the contrary.
It will be difficult, in light of recent Supreme
Court standing cases, for future litigants like those
in the Diggs cases to gain standing to sue, Indeed,
it seems unlikely that the present Court would approve
standing in the Diggs cases if it reviewed the ques-
tion today. All the leading Supreme Court cases,
however, deal with standing to raise questions of
statutory and constitutional law. These decisions,
therefore, do not directly preclude a grant of stand-
ing in an action to enforce United States treaty
obligations. The vigorous dissents of Justices
Brennan and Marshall indicate, moreover, that the
Court's tightening of the standing doctrine has not
mustered total support and it is conceivable that
a future Court might relax standing rules. Finally,
174. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 179
(1974).
175. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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plaintiffs like those in the Diggs cases could claim
extraordinary political circumstances to justify
relaxation of the traditional standing requirements.
In any event, the holdings on standing in ShuZtz and
Richardson have not been overruled or disapproved by
other courts and future plaintiffs seeking the
enforcement of United Nations resolutions will
probably use them to good effect in clearing the
threshold barriers to litigation and gaining a
hearing on the merits.
IT. The Substantive Issues
This part of the article considers the sub-
stantive legal issues raised by the question whether
the United Nations resolutions invoked by the plain-
tiffs in the seal skins case are binding as a matter
of United States domestic law. These are issues of
American treaty law, because plaintiffs' claims
that these resolutions should be enforced are
based on the fact that the United Nations Charter is
a treaty of the United States. As noted previously,
this question encompasses the following substantive
legal issues: whether United Nations member states
are obligated to comply with Security Council
resolutions; whether the United Nations Charter
and Security Council resolutions constitute
international legal obligations of the United
States; whether the United States recognizes
any such obligations as a matter of United States
domestic law; and whether the Charter and Security
Council resolutions are self-executing treaties
under American law, or, if not, whether they have
been "executed."
A. Obligations of United Nations Member States
under International Law
In order to bind the United States legally, a
Security Council resolution must first be binding
on all member states under the United Nations
209 [EVOL.4
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Charter.1 76 Accordingly, the first question which
arises in determining whether Security Council
resolutions on Namibia are binding on the United
States is whether in general members states are
obligated to comply with Security Council resolu-
tions.
The Security Council has the status of an
executive body whose specific powers are enumerated
in the Charter. Chapter V (Articles 23-32) speci-
fies the composition, duties, and powers of the
Council. Article 25 states:
The Members of the United Nations
agree to accept and carry out the deci-
sions of the Security Council in accord-
ance with the present Charter.177
Article 24 provides, in pertinent part:
In order to ensure prompt and effec-
tive action by the United Nations, its
Members confer on the Security Council
primary responsibility for the mainten-
ance of international peace and security,
and agree that in carrying out its duties
under this responsibility the Security
Council acts on their behalf.17 8
Chapter VI (Articles 33-38), "Pacific Settlement
of Disputes," authorizes the Security Council to seek
solutions to international disputes through negotia-
tion, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration,
judicial settlement, and other means.179 Chapter VII
176. Although it is generally held that the United Nations
Charter is not binding on non-member states, the Charter is one
of the sources of customary international law. See McNeill,
Regional Enforcement Action Under the United Nations Charter and
Constraints Upon States Not Members, 9 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 1, 4-6
(1975).
177. U.N. CHARTER art. 25.
178. U.N. CHARTER art. 24(1).
179. The other means include "resort to regional agencies
or arrangements, or other peaceful means of [states'] own choice
U.N. CHARTER art. 33(1). Art. 36(3) states that "the Security
Council should also take into consideration that legal disputes
should as a general rule be referred by the parties to the Inter-
national Court of Justice in accordance with provisions of the
Statute of the Court."
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(Articles 39-51), "Action with Respect to Threats to
the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggres-
sion," empowers the Security Council to call for
sanctions or military force to protect international
peace and security when it is endangered.18 0
The question whether Security Council resolu-
tions are binding on member states or merely hortatory
has engendered considerable controversy. In its
Advisory Opinion of 1971 on Namibia, the International
Court of Justice ruled that Security Council Resolution
276 concerning Namibia was binding on member states
even though it had not been issued under the authority
of Chapter VII of the Charter.181 After careful study
of the Charter and its history, numerous scholars
have concluded that the Court was correct in its view
that Article 25's provision making Security Council
resolutions binding on member states applied not only
to emergency measures taken under Chapter VII, but
also to the broad authority conferred on the Security
Council by Article 24.182
Other authorities, however, have adopted the
view that Article 25 applies only to "decisions" taken
under Chapter VII183 and not to resolutions passed
pursuant to Chapter VI, and State Department spokesmen
180. The United Nations sanctions against Rhodesia, upon
which Diggs v. Shultz, 470 F.2d 461 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
411 U.S. 931 (1973), was based, were adopted specifically under the
authority of Chapter VII of the Charter. Security Council
Resolution 232 was the first instance in which mandatory sanctions
had been voted under Chapter VII. See Note, supra note 7, at 92;
note 290 infra.
181. Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences for States
of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West
Africa), Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970),
[1971] I.C.J. 16, 52-53 [hereinafter cited as Namibia Advisory
Opinion]. See note 266 infra (quoting Resolution 276).
182. See, e.g., Higgins, supra note 7, at 286; Sohn,
The Development of the Charter of the United Nations: The Present
State, in THE PRESENT STATE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND OTHER ESSAYS
39, 55-57 (Bo§ ed. 1973); Note, Self-Execution of United Nations
Security Council Resolutions under United States Law, 24 U.C.L.A.
L. REV. 387, 402-03 (1977).
183, See, e.g,, Dugard, Na=,n$a (South Plest Africa-: The
Court s- Opini on, South Africa s Response, and Prospects for the
Future, 11 COLUM, J, TRANSNATtL L, 14, 31-,32 1972). Cf, Rovine,
The World Court Op-nion on Namibita, 11 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 203,
226-30 (1972) (criticizing the failure of the International Court
of Justice to explicate the relation between Security Council
resolutions on Namibia and Chapter VII of the Charter),
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have taken this approach in recent years. 18 4 One of
the ramifications of this position, which may explain
why the executive has adopted it, is that a real danger
of international conflict would be required before
the effect of Security Council resolutions could be
deemed binding upon American courts.1 85
The United Nations resolutions concerning Namibia
were taken under authority granted in Chapter VI.
The position of litigants seeking to enforce these
Security Council resolutions in American courts would
be stronger if it were clear and undisputed that
Article 25 applied to Chapter VI. There are no
reported holdings by American courts on this question,
184. The Deputy Legal Adviser of the Department of State,
for instance, took the following position in a letter sent to the
Justice Department attorney in Diggs v. Richardson, 555 F.2d 848
D.C. Cir. 1976), during the litigation of the case:
Since the Namibia resolutions of the Security
Council neither invoked the Council's mandatory
authority under Chapter VII of the Charter nor
indicated an intention to be legally binding,
the United States would not regard those
resolutions as having automatic binding force.
This is one reason why, in our explanation of
[the] vote on Resolution 301, we stated that
we accepted the conclusions of the Advisory Opinion
[of the International Court of Justice] but not
necessarily all of the reasoning.
Letter from George H. Aldrich to Bruno A. Ristau (Nov. 3, 1975),
reprinted in E. McDowell, supra note 3, at 89.
185. The belief that no real danger was actually present
was the reason given by the United States for its veto of the
proposed Security Council resolution of June 6, 1975, imposing
a mandatory arms embargo on South Africa. See 73 DEP'T STATE
BULL. 44 (1975). In view of the violence in neighboring
Rhodesia, the Cuban military involvement in Angola; and South
African resistance to the United Nations plan for Namibia, the
danger of such a conflict seems less remote at present.
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however, and the State Department view, although it
is entitled to deference, is not conclusive upon
the courts. Accordingly, the above-cited interna-
tional law authorities give Namibian litigants a
strong basis for arguing that Security Council
Resolution 301 is binding on member states under
the Charter.
B. Obligations of the United State-s under
International Law
A necessary although not sufficient precondition
to the enforcement of Security Council resolutions on
Namibia in American courts is that the resolutions
be adjudged to constitute international legal obliga-
tions of the United States. The United Nations
Charter is a treaty of the United States and by
ratifying it, the United States plainly subjected
itself to the international legal responsibilities
imposed by resolutions passed pursuant to the
Charter. 186 Thus the court of appeals in Diggs v.
186. Article 2(2) of the Charter provides:
All Members, in order to ensure to all of them
the rights and benefits resulting from membership,
shall fulfil in good faith the obligations
assumed by them in accordance with the present
Charter.
And Article 2(5) of the Charter provides:
All Members shall give the United Nations
every assistance in any action it takes 'in
accordance with the present Charter, and
shall refrain from giving assistance to any
state against which the United Nations is
taking preventive or enforcement action.
It has been argued that:
[elven those recommendations of the General
Assembly and the Security Council which cannot
be considered binding . . . may nevertheless
have certain important effects. A Member of
the United Nations would not be fulfilling in
good faith its obligations under the Charter,
if it were simply to ignore such recommendations,
without adducing any plausible reasons for not
giving effect to them. . . . a resolution recommend-
ing 'a specific course of action creates some
213 [VOL. 4
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Shultzl 8 7recognized that the Charter and Security
Council Resolution 232 created international legal
obligations for the United States.1 8 8 Moreover,
the generally favorable attitude of the executive
branch, particularly of the State Department,
toward the official United Nations position on
Namibia makes it unlikely that the courts would
balk in future cases at concluding that resolutions
on Namibia do in fact constitute United States
international treaty obligations.
186 (Continued)
legal obligation', however 'rudimentary, elastic
and imperfect' it might be.
Sohn, supra note 182, at 57 (quoting Belaunde, Peruvian
spokesman at the United Nations).
187. 470 F.2d 461 (D. C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
411 U.S. 931 (1973).
188. The court, however, held these obligations
judicially unenforceable because Congress had abrogated them
by passing the Byrd Amendment. See pp. 261-62 infra. In its
consideration of their binding effect under United States
domestic law, the court did not differentiate between the
legal status of the United States treaty itself (the Charter)
and that of the actions or declarations of the body it
created (Security Council Resolution 232, in this case).
Instead, "[tihe court, without explanation, assumed that a
resolution could be a treaty commitment of the United States
binding on domestic courts even though it was clearly not
part of the original charter which is the operative treaty."
Note, supra note 7, at 85. This previously cited Note,
however, concurs with the court's implicit assumption that
a mandatory Security Council resolution has domestic force
because it is "an extension of a treaty." Id. at 84 n.9.,!
This conclusion derives strong support from the fact that
the United States' veto power gives it the ability to block
passage of any Security Council resolution with which it
does not agree. Failure of the United States to exercise
the veto, and a fortiori its vote in favor of a resolution
(as in the case of Resolutions 232 on Rhodesia and 276 and
301 on Namibia), appear to manifest an intention on the
part of the United States to incur binding treaty obliga-
tions under the resolution in question. Because of the
power of United States delegates to pass on Security Council
resolutions, those which the United States ratifies have
been considered as equivalent to executive agreements
with the same binding force as such agreements. Note, supra
note 182, at 405.
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C. Obligations of the United States under
Domestic Law
As Diggs v. Shultz1 8 9 demonstrates, however,
mere acknowledgment by a court that a treaty provision
vision constitutes an international legal obligation
of the United States does not ensure that the court
will enforce or give effect to such a provision.
To assess its enforceability, reference must be
made to principles of domestic treaty law which
grow out of the constitutional scheme.
Article VI of the Constitution governs the
status of treaties under American law:
This Constitution, and the Laws of
the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties
made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall
be the supreme Law of the Land . . .190
This clause establishes no order of priority between
treaties and statutes of the United States, both of
which, together with the Constitution, are "the
supreme Law of the Land." The courts have accordingly
ruled that treaties are on the same level as federal
statutes, neither higher nor lower in legal force
and effect.191
Purported United States treaty obligations
have often been challenged, and courts have had
to decide whether to honor them. The historic case
of Foster & Elam v. Neilsonl 9 2 qualified the control-
ling force of treaties in a manner which the federal
courts have since followed.
The central question in Foster & Elam was
whether a treaty provision should be given effect
without implementing legislation. Chief Justice
Marshall's opinion held that some treaties do not
become effective until they are implemented by the
legislative branch:
189. 470 F.2d 461 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411
U.S. 931' (1973).
190. U.S. CONST. art." VI, § 2.
191. See, e.g., Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The
Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581, 600 (1899).
192. 27 U. S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829); see note 47 supra.
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Our constitution declares a treaty to be
the law of the land. It is, consequently,
to be regarded in courts of justice as
equivalent to an act of the legislature,
whenever it operates of itself without
the aid of any legislative provision.
But when the terms of the stipulation
import a contract, when either of the
parties engages to perform a particular
act, the treaty addresses itself to the
political, not the judicial department;
and the legislature must execute the
contract before it can become a rule for
the Court.193
In elaboration of Marshall's principle, the
doctrine has developed that only the first group,
those treaties which operate of themselves without
the need for legislative implementation, are binding
on the United States by virtue of Senate ratifica-
tion. These are known as "self-executing" treaties,
enforceable by the courts without implementing
legislation. The second group of treaties are not
inherently binding and can remain inoperatiVe in
the absence of implementing legislation. Litigants
seeking to enforce Security Council resolutions in
American courts must consequently anticipate the
argument that the resolutions do not establish self-
executing treaty obligations. They must be prepared
to argue that the resolutions do fulfill the criteria
for determining what constitutes a self-executing
treaty, or, alternatively, that the resolutions have
been executed.
In the century and a half since Chief Justice
Marshall opened the "loophole" in Foster & Elam,
construing only some treaties as self-executing, the
federal courts have enshrined this principle firmly
in precedent. The courts, however, have not developed
from it clear rules for assessing the effect of
specific treaties: "The self-execution question is
perhaps one of the most confounding in treaty law.
'Theoretically a self-executing and an executory
provision should be readily distinguishable. In
193. Foster & Elam v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253,
314 (1829).
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practice it is difficult.'"194 No one criterion Is
conclusive in assessing whether a treaty is self-
executing. Moreover, many of the court decisions are
irreconcilable. 195
Nevertheless, two principles of the self-execu-
ting treaty doctrine can be elicited from the case law.
First, the courts have maintained a distinction
between general international law objectives and
domestically enforceable rights.1 96 The self-executing
194. United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862, 876 (5th.
Cir. 19.79) (citation and footnote omitted); cf. Comment,
Criteria for Self-Executing Treaties, 1968 U. ILL. L.F. 238,
247 (1968) (characterizing the International Convention for
the Protection of Industrial Property) ("[Tihe Convention's
history indicates that the criteria used to determine whether
a treaty establishes judicially enforceable rules are too
elusive to produce any kind of uniformity. The formulas are
meaningless in the abstract, and when applied to a particular
treaty they are too vague for judicial guidance."). In Postal,
plaintiffs had been convicted of conspiring to import marijuana
into the United States after their sailboat was apprehended
by the Coast Guard off the Florida Keys. On appeal, plaintiffs
claimed that the court lacked jurisdiction since they had been
seized beyond United States territorial waters. Their vessel
was registered in the Grand Cayman Islands, and article VI
of the Convention on the High Seas provided that ships Should
be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of their country
of registry while on the high seas. The court considered the
following factors in reaching its conclusion that the
Convention's article was not self-executing: the historical
policy of the United States, with which plaintiffs' claims
conflicted; the legislative history of the Convention, in-
cluding statements by the United States delegate to the
1958 Law of the Sea Conference; and the failure of the
Grand Cayman Islands government to protest the seizure. See
United States v. Postal, supra, at 878-84.
195. Id. at 244 nn.26-27 (citing cases).
196. See, e.g., United States v. Vargas, 370 F. Supp.
908 (D.P.R. 1974); Sei Fujii v. State, 38 Cal.2d 718, 722,
242 P.2d 617, 621 (1952).
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treaty doctrine has made it possible for the United
States to subscribe to generally normative inter-
national law principles without making itself
immediately answerable for the practical application
of these principles. Second, the self-executing
treaty doctrine, like the political question doctrine,
has been used to safeguard the constitutional
separation of powers.197
Application of the first principle requires an
examination of whether a treaty and its history
evidence an intention on the part of the signatories
to confer judicially enforceable rights on individual
parties; specifically, the United States must have
intended that a treaty operate as an internal act
without further legislative action. Therefore, in
determining whether a treaty is self-executing,
courts generally have given important weight to the
intentions of the signatories.1 9 8
In some exceptional cases, a statement in the
treaty itself indicates the intention of the
signatories.199 Thus, courts readily attribute
present effect to a negative stipulation, since it
clearly rules out certain action by t lsignatories. 2 0 0
Culver v. Secretary of the Air Force, U for instance,
involved a treaty provision which declared that it
was "'the duty"? of American troops in NATO countries
"'to abstain from any activities inconsistent with
the spirit of the present Agreement, and, in particu-
lar, from any political activity in the receiving -
197. See, e.g., Turner v. American Baptist Missionary
Union, 24 F. Cas. 344, 345-46 (C.C. Mich. 1852) (No. 14,251)
(treaty requiring appropriations held non-self-executing
because art. I, 8 7 cl. 1 of the Constitution reserves the
origination of appropriations bills to the House of
Representatives).
198. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 194, at 240; Note,
Security Council Resolutions: When Do They Give Rise to
Enforceable Legal Rights? The United Nations Charter, the
Byrd Amendment, and a Self-Executing Treaty Analysis, 9 CORNELL
INT'L L.J. 298, 300 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Security Council
Resolutions and Enforceable Legal Rights]; Note, supra note 7,
at 101.
199. 14 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 309-10
(1970).
200. See Note, supra note 182, at 395 (citing cases).
201. 559 F.2d 622 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
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state.,, 2 0 2  The plaintiff, an Air Force captain
stationed in Germany, challenged the constitu-
tionality of an Air Force regulation prohibiting
political activity by servicemen while abroad.
Although the self-executing treaty issue apparently
was not litigated, the court of appeals evidently
presumed that this treaty provision was self-execu-
ting since it based its dismissal of plaintiff's
claim on the provision.
In most cases, however, the intention of the
signatories as to whether the treaty should be self-
executing or non-self-executing is not manifest and
can be inferred only from the text of the document
and the circumstances surrounding its origin. As
with many exercises in legal construction, a variety
of approaches are possible and the result is rarely
obvious. It is easier, furthermore, to specify
what is not a self-executing treaty provision than to
say what is one; indeed, any treaty provision that
does not fall into any of several categories is
likely to be held self-executing.
Perhaps the most obvious instance of a treaty
provision not intended to confer immediately enforce-
able legal rights is one which manifestly envisions
or is contingent upon future implementation. The
Court in Foster & Elam v. Neilson, 203 for instance,
held that a treaty text providing that Spanish land
grants "shall be ratified and confirmed" after United
States annexation was not self-executing because
Congress had not acted to ratify the grants.204 A
202. Id. at 628 n.8 (citing The Status-of-Forces Treaty
(1951), 4 U.S.T. 1792, T.I.A.S. No. 2486, Art. II, at 1796).
203. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829).
204. On the strength of a second translation from the
Spanish text of the treaty providing that the land grants in
question "'shall remain ratified and confirmed"' Foster & EZam
was later overruled in United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet,)
51, 88 (1833) (emphasis added). See note 47 supra.
This history illustrates the essentially semantic nature of
deciding whether a treaty is self-executing. The meaning of
treaty terms is often ambiguous: "shall", for instance, has one
meaning which signifies the future tense, implying non-self-
execution, and another which signifies a command or self-
execution. Generally, any verb in the future tense is read to
indicate that a treaty involves a contractual commitment to take
subsequent action. See Self-Executing Treaties and the Human
Rights Provisions of the United Nations Charter: A Separation of
Powers Problem, 25 BUFFALO L. REV. 773, 777 (1976) [hereinafter
cited as Self-Executing Treaties].
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treaty between two states to take mutual legislative
action, similarly, is non-self-executing because it
indicates that both signatories intended that its
effectiveness depend on legislative implementation.205
Finally, provisions which endorse broad, gneral,
long-range humanitarian goals rather than confer
immediately enforceable individual rights are
generally viewed as non-self-executing. Courts
have generally been unwilling to conclude that United
States treaties endorsing, in general terms, peaceful
approaches to the resolution of international
disputes were intended without legislative implemen-
tation to bar the future conduct of war and related
activities by the government In Hamilton v. Regents
of University of California, 2 06 for instance, the
Supreme Court upheld the dismissal of a complaint
which argued that a California law requiring university
students to take a course in military tactics violated
the Kellogg-Briand Pact. 2 07 The Fifth Circuit in
Simmons v. United States208 rejected the appellant's
claim that United States participation in the Vietnam
War violated various treaties and articles of the
United Nations Charter.209  Similarl the Second
Circuit held in Dreyfus v. Von Finck210 that the Hague
Convention on War, the Kellogg-Briand Pact, the Treaty
of Versailles, and the Four Power Occupation Agreement
were not self-executing and did not confer on plain-
tiff the right to litigate in American courts for
the return of property confiscated by Nazi authorities
when he lived in Germany during the war. 211
205. See, e.g., Note, supra note 7, at 103-04; Comment,
supra note 109, at 387-98.
206. 293 U.S. 245 (1934).
207. Id. at 265.
208. 406 F.2d 456 (5th Cir. 1969).
209. Id. at 460 (U.N. CHARTER arts. 2(4) and 33(1)).
210. 534 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1976).
211. Id, at 30-31. Even if these treaties had been held
to be self-executing, of course, there is some question whether
they would have conferred a right of action on the plaintiff,
because the court further held that a violation of international
law does not occur "when the aggrieved parties are nationals of
the acting state." Id. at 31. Application of such a principle
might cause problems to potential Namibian plaintiffs were it not
for the almost unanimous view that South Africa's continued occu-
pation of Namibia is in violation of international law; therefore,
South Africa's actions in Namibia are not immune from challenge by
native Namibian plaintiffs on the grounds that such plaintiffs
were nationals of the acting state.
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Treaty provisioms not vulnerable to any of the
previously discussed challenges, on the other hand,
are likely to be held self-executing. This is particu-
larly true if their terms appear precise and specific
enough to obviate the need for subsequent implementa-
tion. 21 2 Ex parte Toscano21 3 furnishes an illustra-
tion. During a civil war in Mexico, a Mexican armed
force crossed the border into the United States.
Article XI of the 1907 Hague Convention on the
rights and duties of neutral powers in wartime
provided that "'[a] neutral power which receives on
its territory troops belonging to the belligerent
armies shall intern them, as far as possible, at a
distance from the theater of war.',,21 4 The district
court in Toscano ordered the Mexican soldiers interned
under the authority of the Hague Convention even
though Congress had passed no act implementing the
Convention.
Asakura v. Seattle 2 1 5 involved a challenge to
a municipal ordinance denying aliens the right to
be licensed as pawnbrokers. The Japanese plaintiff
contended that the ordinance violated a Treaty of
1911 between the United States and Japan, which
provided in part that American citizens and Japanese
subjects had the right to reside in the other country
and "'to carry on trade, wholesale and retail
and generally to do anything incident to or necessary
for trade upon the same terms as native citizens or
subjects, submitting themselves to the laws and
regulations there established.,"216 Finding that
pawnbroking constituted a "trade" permitted to citi-
zens under Washington state law, the Supreme Court
held the treaty self-executing and struck down the
ordinance.
In Bacardi Corp. of America v. Domenech2 1 7 the
Court held that the General Inter-American Convention
for Trademark and Commercial Protection was self-
212. It is reasonable to assume that inclusion in a
treaty of detailed and specific terms of the sort usually
found in implementing legislation evidences the signatories'
intention that the treaty take effect without implementing
legislation.
213. 208 F. 938 (S.D. Cal. 1913).
214. Id. at 940 (citing art. XI of the Hague Convention).
215. 265 U.S. 332 (1924).
216. Id. at 340 (citing provision of Treaty of 1911).
217. 311 U.S. 150 (1940).
[VOL. 4
1978] SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 222
executing; consequently, the court invalidated a
Puerto Rican statute. The statute, which prohibited
the marketing of alcoholic beverages under a trade-
mark used previously outside Puerto Rico, was
apparently designed with the specific purpose of
blocking the Bacardi Corporation from entering the
Puerto Rican Market.21 8 The Trademark treaty, on the
other hand, provided that "'[elvery mark duly regis-
tered or legally protected in one of the Contracting
States shall be admitted to registration or deposit
and legally protected in the other Contracting
States, upon compliance with the formal provisions
of the domestic law of such States.'" 21 9 The Supreme
Court found that the Puerto Rican statute dis-
criminated against foreign trademarks, and therefore it
invalidated the statute on the grounds that it was
incompatible with the treaty's protection of such
trademarks.220
The second broad principle of the self-executing
treaty doctrine, as noted previously, 2 21 is to
safeguard the constitutional separation of powers.
Its application in this sphere is governed by
principles similar to those underlying the political
question doctrine and in a sense is part of that
doctrine. The separation of powers most obviously
dictates that a treaty not be self-executing when the
Constitution has specifically assigned exclusive
responsibility for handling a treaty issue to the
legislative branch. Thus a treaty requiring appro-
priations for its implementation is not self-executing,
because Article I of the Constitution provides that
appropriations bills must originate in the House of
Representatives.222
Treaties dealing with the disposition of govern-
ment property, on the other hand, are not subject to
the same kind of constitutional limitation. In Edwards
v. Carter, 22 3 sixty members of the House of Representa-
218. Id. at 156.
219. Id. at 160 n.9 (citing art. III of Convention).
220. Id. at 164-66.
221. See pp. 217-18 supra.
222. U.S. CONST. art. I, 8 7, cl. 1; art. I, § 9, cl. 9;
see Turner v. American Baptist Missionary Union, 24 F. Cas. 344,
345 (C.C. Mich. 1852) (No. 14,251) (treaty provision requiring
expenditure of federal funds held "not operative, in the sense
of the Constitution, as money cannot be appropriated by the
treaty-making power").
223. 580 F.2d 1055 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S.
907 (1978).
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tives sought a declaratory judgment that the treaty
returning the Panama Canal to Panama was uncon-
stitutional, on the grounds that approval by the
House of Representatives as well as the Senate was
required before the United States could dispose of any of
its territory.22 4 The Court of Appeals of the District
of Columbia assumed that the treaty was self-
executing, but nevertheless held that the consti-
tutional authority for Congress to dispose of
United States property 2 2 5 was permissive rather than
exclusive, and that the treaty in question constituted
a legitimate alternative means of disposing of such
property. 226
The constitutional status of treaties dealing
with foreign commerce is similar to that of treaties
disposing of government property, in that the
separation of powers principle does not mandate House
of Representatives participation in such action.
Article I of the Constitution gives Congress the
power to regulate commerce with foreign states, 2 27
but this power is not exclusive.22 8  Consequently,
the courts usually hold treaties dealing with
foreign commerce to be self-executing.2 9
The foregoing discussion demonstrates that there
are no simple rules to determine whether a treaty
provision is self-executing. In order to assess
whether Security Council resolutions on Namibia are
binding, a three-fold inquiry is necessary. First
we will consider previous cases containing claims
that provisions of the United Nations Charter (under
which the resolutions were passed) were self-executing;
this investigation will show that Charter provisions
and Security Council resolutions are neither self-
executing nor non-self-executing as a class, Accord-
ingly, we will next examine the wording of the
224. Id. at 1056.
225. U.S. CONST., art. IV, 33, cl. 2 (property clause).
226. 580 F.2d at 1057-59.
227. U.S. CONST. art. I, S 8, cl. 3.
228. For example, the President's power to negotiate and
conclude trade agreements with foreign countries has long been
recognized. See Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v.
Kissinger, 506 F.2d 136, 143-45 (D.C. Cir. 1974); id. at 158-62
(Leventhal, J., dissenting) (citing examples).
229. See Security Council Resolutions and Enforceable Legal
Rights, supra note 198, at 300 n.16 (citing cases). Other treaties
usually held to be self-executing are those dealing with extradition,
consular rights, most-favored-nation treatment, and the right of aliens,
See Self-Executing Treaties, supra note 204, at 778-79 (citing cases),
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resolutions themselves to analyze whether they should
be held self-executing on the grounds that they dis-
close an intention on the part of theii signatories
to create binding legal obligations. Finally, we
will review the record of the federal government's
policies on Namibia to determine whether it can be
argued that the resolutions, even assuming they are
not self-executing, have nonetheless been officially
executed.
1. Are Security Council Resolutions and the
Charter Self-Executing?
Federal courts have reached differing conclu-
sions on the question whether provisions of the
United Nations Charter and resolutions passed under
its authority are self-executing under American
law.2 3 0 The only case apart from Diggs v. Dent 2 3 1
to declare even in dictum that the entire Charter is
non-self-executing was Pauling v. McElroy:
The provisions of the Charter of
the United Nations, the Trusteeship
Agreement for the Trust Territory of the
Pacific Islands, and the international
law principle of freedom of the seas
relied on by plaintiffs are not self-
executing and do not vest any of the
plaintiffs with individual legal rights
which they may assert in this Court.
The claimed violations of such inter-
national obligations and principles may
be asserted only by diplomatic negotia-
tions between the sovereignties con-
cerned.232
230. The Supreme Court has not ruled authoritatively on
whether the Charter, or any part of it, is self-executing, and
the passing references to the Charter in six Supreme Court
cases are insignificant. See Security Council Resolutions and
Enforceable Legal Rights, supra note 198, at 301 n.19 (discuss-
ing these cases). It is quite possible, of course, for part of
a treaty to be held self-executing while another part is held
to be non-self-executing; this is true of the Charter and
Security Council resolutions as well.
231. See note 2 supra.
232. 164 F. Supp. 390, 393 (D.D.C. 1958), aff'd per
curiam on other grounds, 278 F.2d 252 (D.C. Cir.), cert, denied,
364 U.S. 835 (1960).
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Pauling involved an attempt to enforce rights under
Articles 73 and 76 of the Charter;2 3 3 consequently,
the statement declaring the entire Charter to be non-
self-executing is dictum.
A number of Charter articles have been held non-
self-executing, particularly in the field of human
rights. A challenge to a California law restricting
the ownership of land by aliens in Sei Fujii v. State 234
led to the most influential decision to date declaring
the human rights provisions of the Charter non-self-
executing.
In Sei Fujii, a Japanese alien ineligible for
citizenship appealed a lower court holding that land
which he had bought had escheated to the state under
the California Alien Land Law. Plaintiff argued that
the law violated both the equal protection clause 2 3 5
and Articles 55 and 56 of the United Nations Charter.
Article 55 of the Charter commits the United Nations
to "promote", inter alia, "universal respect for,
and observance of, human rights and fundamental
freedoms for all without distinction as to race,
sex, language, or religion. ''23b Article 56 states
that:
All Members pledge themselves to take
joint and separate action in co-operation
with the Organization for the achieve-
ment of the purposes set forth in
Article 55.237
The California Court of Appeals bypassed the equal pro-
tection argument to strike down the statute on the
grounds that it conflicted with the preamble and
articles 'of the Charter.23 8
233. See U.N. CHARTER ar-t. 73 (obligations of nations
assuming responsibilities for non-self-governing territories); id.
art. 76 (objectives of international trusteeship system).
234. 217 P.2d 481 (Dist. Ct. App. Cal. 1950), aff'd on
other grounds, 38 Cal.2d 718, 242 P.2d 617 (1952).
235. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 2.
236. U.N. CHARTER art. 55(c).
237. Id. art. 56.




On appeal, the California Supreme Court affirmed
the lower court's decision on equal protection grounds
but rejected its holding that the statute was invalid
because it was inconsistent with the Charter: "The
provisions in the charter pledging cooperation in
promoting observance of fundamental freedoms lack the
mandatory quality and definiteness which would indicate
an intent to create justiciable rights in private
persons immediately upon ratification. Instead,
they are framed as a promise of future action by the
member nations." 2 3 9
While commentators have criticized Sei Fuji, 2 0
it represents the dominant approach of American courts
to the problem of the domestic effect of Articles 55
and 56. Accordingly, Articles 55 and 56 have been
held to be non-self-executing by subsequent courts in
rejecting challenges under hese articles brought
against visa requirements,2 1 immigration quotas,242
and a New York literacy test determining voting
eligibility.% 23
Article 73(a) of the Charter has also been held
to be non-self-executing. In United States v. Vargas2 4 4
the district court denied a motion to dismiss an
indictment, filed by sixteen Puerto Rican draft resisters,
which argued that the Selective Service Act violated
the United States treaty obligations under A.rticle 73(a)
of the Charter. Article 73(a), which deals with non-
self-governing territories, requires administering
powers to recognize the interests of the inhabitants
of these territories as "paramount" and commits them
"to ensure, with due respect for the culture of the
peoples concerned, their political, economic, social,
and educational advancement, their Just treatment, and
their protection against abuses.1"24 Defendants argued
that Article 73(a) is self-executing and that their
forcible conscription into the United States armed
forces violated United States obligations under Article
73(a) to respect the political and cultural aspirations
239. Sei Fujii v. California, 38 Cal.2d 718, 724, 242 P.2d
617, 621-22 (1952).
240. See, e.g., Note, supra note 7, at 101-04; Seif-
Executing Treaties, supra note 204, at 780-86.
241. See Hitai v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv.,
343 F.2d 466 (2d Cir. 1965).
242. See Vlissidis v. Anadell, 262 F.2d 398 (7th Cir. 1959).
243. See Camacho v. Rogers, 199 F. Supp. 155 (S.D.N.Y.
1961).
244. 370 F. Supp. 908 (D.P.R. 1974).
245. U.N. CHARTER art. 73(a).
19783 226
YALE STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER
of the Puerto Rican people. In rejecting this claim,
the court held that Article 73(a) is not "self-
executory" and that it was "not a specific mandate,
but rather a general standard or goal", which could
not be held binding without "enabling legislation.
'I246
As noted previously, the intention of the
signatories that a treaty provision be self-executing
is generally reflected in the fact that it does not
merely endorse a principle or objective in broad
terms, but is sufficiently precise and detailed so
that the obligations it establishes; can be enforced
without implementing legislation.2 47 The courts in
Sei Fujii and Vargas presumably considered Articles
55 and 73(a) mere general statements of purpose, too
vague and tentative to be self-executing treaty
obligations. The decisions reflect both the courts'
belief that the signatories to the Charter did not
intend Articles 55, 56, and 73(a) to create immediately
enforceable individual legal rights, and a desire to
safeguard and preserve the full range of legislative
power and authority which would necessarily be
restricted by an overriding treaty obligation.
Results in other cases, however, contradict
the dictum in Pauling v. McElroy 248 that the entire
Charter is non-self-executing. The Court of Appeals of
the District of Columbia, the same court that affirmed
Pauling, held in Keeney v. United States249 that
Articles 100 and 105 of the Charter, which guarantee
to the United Nations and its officials the privileges
and immunities necessary to ensure their independence,
were self-executing. Courts in Balfour, Guthrie & Co.
v. United States 250 and in Curran v. City of New York 2 51
have held that Article 104 of the Charter, which confers
legal capacity on the United Nations, was self-executing.
Concededly, Articles 100, 104, and 105 deal
only with the internal operations of the United Nations
in New York City. They have only limited relevance to
the substantive international law issues involved in
the conduct of foreign affairs. Two other recent cases,
however, support the proposition that broad international
law principles embodied in Charter provisions are self-
246. 370 F. Supp. at 915.
247. See pp. 218-20 supra.
248. 164 F. Supp. 390, 393 (D.D.C. 1958), aff'd per curiam
on other grounds, 278 F.2d 252 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S.
835 (1960).
249. 218 F.2d 843 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
250. 90 F. Supp. 831 (N.D. Cal. 1950).
251. 191 Misc. 299, 77 N.Y.S.2d 206 (Sup. Ct. 1947)?
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executing. In United States v, Toscanino,2 52 the
appellant, an Italian citizen, appealed his conviction
on a narcotics charge. He alleged that agents of the
Federal Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs helped
to abduct him forcibly and illegally from Uruguay in
violation of Article 2(4) of the Charter. Article
2(4) prohibits infringement of the territorial
sovereignty of a nation. The Second Circuit impliedly
held Article 2(4) to be self-executing by remanding the
case to the district court for an evidentiary hearing
to determine whether appellant could adduce evidence to
support his charges. 253
A Ninth Circuit decision, Saipan v. Dep't. of
Interior.,2 5 is significant because of its parallels
with the Namibian case. The court in Saipan held that
the Trusteeship Agreement 255 between the United
States and the United Nations for the administration
of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (Micro-
nesia), entered into under Article 73 of the Charter,
is self-executing. Citizens of the island of Saipan
sued to enjoin the implementation of a lease agree-
ment between the High Commissioner for the Trust
Territory and Continental Airlines to construct a
hotel on public land on Saipan, unless an environ-
mental impact study was made under the National
Environmental Policy Act.25 6 Concluding that princi-
ples of comity dictated that plaintiffs initially
pursue their remedy in the High Court of the Trust
Territory, the Ninth Circuit dismissed their suit on
jurisdictional grounds. 25 7 The court emphasized,
however, that this dismissal was without prejudice
252. 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974).
253. Id. at 281. But see United States ex rel. Lujan v.
Gengler, 510 F.2d 62 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1001
(1975) (limiting Toscanino to situations in which the defendant
was tortured, as opposed to merely being kidnapped or illegally
abducted from a foreign country to face charges in the United
States).
254. 502 F.2d 90 (9th Cir. 1974).
255. Trusteeship Agreement for the Former Japanese
Mandated Islands, July 18, 1947, 61 Stat. 3301, T.I.A.S. No. 1665.
The Trusteeship Agreement is both a treaty between the United
States and the United Nations, and a statute passed by Congress.
256. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1970).
257. 502 F.2d at 100.
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and added that "[iuf our assumption that the High
Court has the power to review the decision of the
High Commissioner proves to be invalid, then the
federal district court must assume jurisdiction
of this case.'"25 8
The court of appeals ruled in addition,
however, that the Trusteeship Agreement was a self-
executing treaty which "can be a source of rights
enforceable by an individual litigant in a domestic
court of law."2 59 It rejected defendant's argument
that the provisions of the Trusteeship Agreement
could be enforced only before the Security Council:
The preponderance of features in
this Trusteeship Agreement suggests the
intention to establish direct, affirma-
tive, and judicially enforceable rights.
[T]he concern with natural resources
and the concern with political development
are explicit in the agreement and are
general international concerns as well;
the enforcement of these rights requires
little legal or administrative innovation
in the domestic fora; and the alternative
forum, the Security Council, would present
to the plaintiffs obstacles so great as
to make their rights virtually
unenforceable. 260
In reaching this decision, the court refrained from
deciding plaintiffs' contention that Articles 73 and
76 were independently self-executing.261 As noted
previously, however, the Trusteeship Agreement was
entered into under Article 73 of the Charter.26 2
Although the holding that the Trusteeship Agreement
is self-executing does not require the conclusion that
Article 73 is self-executing, Saipan presents an
interesting parallel with the Namibian fur seal skins
litigation, because the resolutions on Namibia were
also passed under the authority of the Charter.263
The preceding survey demonstrates that
Charter provisions have been accorded varying treatment
258. Id.
259. Id. at 97.
260. Id. at 97-98.
261. Id. at 97.
262. See p. 66 supra.
263. See note 282 infra.
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in American courts. Some, especially those in the
field of human rights, have been held to be non-
self-executing, but others have been held to be
self-executing. The question of whether Security
Council resolutions on Namibia are self-executing
was not litigated before Diggs v. Dent. 2b4 The
question can only be addressed through a detailed
analysis of the two resolutions on Namibia.
2. Are Security Council Resolutions 276 and 301
Self-Executing?
The strongest foundation for any claim that
the United Nations position on the Namibian question
imposes binding legal obligations on the United
States is to be found in the relevant resolutions
of the Security Council, whose "decisions" the members
agree to "accept and carry out" under Article 25.265
The most important of these are Resolutions 276266 and
264. See note 2 supra.
265. U.N. CHARTER art. 25.
266. S.C. Res. 276, 25 U.N. SCOR 1-2, U.N. DOC. S/INS./25
(1970): The Security Council,
Reaffirming the inalienable right of the people of
Namibia to freedom and independence recognized in
General Assembly resolution 1514(XV) of 14 December 1960,
Reaffirming General Assembly resolution 2145(XXI)
of 27 October 1966, by which the United Nations
decided that the Mandate for South West Africa was
terminated and assumed direct responsibility for
the Territory until its independence,
Reaffirming Security Council resolution 264 (1969)
of March 1969 in which the Council recognized the
termination of the Mandate and called upon the Govern-
ment of South Africa to withdraw immediately its
administration from the Territory,
Reaffirming that the extension and enforcement of
South African laws in the Territory together with the
continued detentions, trials and subsequent sentencing
of Namibians by the Government of South Africa constitute
illegal acts and flagrant violations of the rights of the
Namibians concerned, the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and the international status of the Territory,
now under direct United Nations responsibility,
Recalling Security Council resolution 269 (19.69)
of 12 August 1969,
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301,267 for which the United States voted and for which
266. (Continued)
1. Strongly condemns the refusal of the Government
of South Africa to comply with the resolutions of the
General Assembly and Security Council pertaining to
Namibia;
2. Declares that the continued presence of the South
African authorities in Namibia is illegal and that
consequently all acts taken by the Government of South
Africa on behalf of or concerning Namibia after the
termination of the Mandate are illegal and invalid;
3. Declares further that the defiant attitude
of the Government of South Africa towards the Council's
decisions undermines the authority of the United
Nations;
4. Considers that the continued occupation of
Namibia by the Government of South Africa in defiance
of the relevant United Nations resolutions and of the
Charter of the United Nations has grave consequences
for the rights and interests of the people of Namibia;
5. Calls upon all States, particularly those
which have economic and other interests in Namibia,
to refrain from any dealings with the Government of
South Africa which are inconsistent with paragraph 2
of the present resolution;
6. Decides to establish, in accordance with
rule 28 of its provisional rules of procedure, an
Ad Hoc Sub-Committee of the Council to study, in
consultation with the Secretary-General, ways and
means by which the relevant resolutions of the Council,
including the present resolution, can be effectively
implemented in accordance with the appropriate
provisions of the Charter, in the light of the flagrant
refusal of South Africa to withdraw from Namibia,
and to submit its recommendations by 30 April 1970;
7. Requests all states, as well as the specialized
agencies and other relevant organs of the United
Nations, to give the Sub-Committee all the information
and other assistance it may require in pursuance of
the present resolution;
8. Further requests the Secretary-General to
give every assistance to the Sub-Committee in the
performance of its task;
9. Decides to resume consideration of the question
of Namibia as soon as the recommendations of the
Sub-Committee have been made available.
267. S.C. Res. 301, 26 U.N. SCOR 8, U.N. DOC. S/INS./27
(1971): The Security Council,
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the executive branch has continued to voice support. As
will later be demonstrated, it is doubtful that public
267. (Continued)
Reaffirming the inalienable right of the people
of Namibia to freedom and independence as recognized
in General Assembly resolution 1514(XV) of 14
December 1960,
Recognizing that the United Nations has direct
responsibility for Namibia following the adoption
of General Assembly resolution 2145(XXI), and that
States should conduct any relations with or
involving Namibia in a manner consistent with that
responsibility,
Reaffirming its resolutions 264 (1969) of 20 March
1969, 276 (1970) of 30 January 1970 and 283 (1970) of
29 July 1970,
Recalling its resolution 284 (1970) of 29 July 1970
requesting the International Court of Justice for an
advisory opinion on the question:
"What are the legal consequences for
States of the continuing presence of
South Africa in Namibia notwithstanding
Security Council resolution 276 (1970)?",
Gravely concerned at the refusal of the Government
of South Africa to comply with the resolutions of the
Security Council pertaining to Namibia,
Recalling its resolution 282 (1970) of 23 July 1970
on the arms embargo against the Government of South
Africa and stressing the significance of that resolu-
tion with regard to the Territory of Namibia,
Recognizing the legitimacy of the movement of the
people of Namibia against the illegal occupation of
their Territory by the South African authorities and
their right to self-determination and independence,
Taking note of the statements by the delegation
of the Organization of African Unity led by the
President of Mauritania, in his capacity as current
Chairman of the OAU Assembly of Heads of State and
Government,
Noting further the statement by the President
of the United Nations Council for Namibia,
Having Heard the statements by the delegation
of the Government of South Africa,
Having considered the report of the Ad Hoc Sub-
Committee on Namibia (S/10330),
1. Reaffirms that the Territory of Namibia is
the direct responsibility of the United Nations and
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expressions of support for the resolutions by the
Secretary of State and other government spokesmen
constitute an "execution" of the resolution,
267. (Continued)
that this responsibility includes the obligation to
support and promote the rights of the people of
Namibia in accordance with General Assembly
resolution 1514(XV);
2. Reaffirms the national unity and territorial
integrity of Namibia;
3. Condemns all moves by the Government of South
Africa designed to destroy that unity and territorial
integrity, such as the establishment of Bantustans;
4. Declares that South Africa's continued illegal
presence in Namibia constitutes an internationally
wrongful act and a breach of international obligations
and that South Africa remains accountable to the
international community for any violations of its
international obligations or the rights of the
people of the Territory of Namibia;
5. Takes note with appreciation of the advisory
opinion of the International Court of Justice of
21 June 1971;
6. Endorses the Court's opinion expressed in
paragraph 133 of the advisory opinion:
"(1) that, the continued presence
of ,South Aflica in Namibia being illegal,
South Africa is under obligation to
withdraw its administration from Namibia
immediately and thus put an end to its
occupation of the Territory;
"(2) that States Members of the United
Nations are under obligation to recognize
the illegality of South Africa's presence
in Namibia and the invalidity of its acts
on behalf of or concerning Namibia, and to
refrain from any acts and in particular
any dealings with the Government of South
Africa implying recognition of the
legality of, or lending support or
assistance to, such presence and adminis-
tration;
"(3) that it is incumbent upon States
which are not Members of the United Nations
to give assistance, within the scope of
subparagraph (2) above, in the action which
has been taken by the United Nations with
regard to Namibia."
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which would impose treaty obligations
267. (Continued)
7. Declares that all matters affecting the rights
of the people of Namibia are of immediate concern to
all Members of the United Nations and as a result
the latter should take this into account in their
dealings with the Government of South Africa, in
particular in any dealings implying recognition
of the legality of or lending support or assistance
to such illegal presence and administration;
8. Calls once again on South Africa to withdraw
from the Territory of Namibia;
9. Declares that any further refusal of the
South African Government to withdraw from Namibia
could create conditions detrimental to the maintenance
of peace and security in the region;
10. Reaffirms the provisions of resolution 283
(1970), in particular paragraphs 1 to 8 and 11;
11. Calls upon all States in discharge of their
responsibilities towards the people of Namibia and
subject to the exceptions set forth in paragraphs
122 and 125 of the advisory opinion of 21 June 1971;
(a) To abstain from entering into treaty
relations with South Africa in all cases in which
the Government of South Africa purports to act on
behalf of or concerning Namibia;
(b) To abstain from invoking or applying those
treaties or provisions of treaties concluded by
South Africa on behalf of or concerning Namibia
which involve active intergovernmental co-operation;
(c) To review their bilateral treaties with
South Africa in order to ensure that they are not
inconsistent with paragraphs 5 and 6 above;
(d) To abstain from sending diplomatic or
special missions to South Africa that include
the Territory of Namibia in their jurisdiction;
(e) To abstain from sending consular agents
to Namibia and to withdraw any such agents already
there;
(f) To abstain from entering into economic
and other forms of relationships or dealings with
South Africa on behalf of or concerning Namibia
which may entrench its authority over the
Territory;
12. Declares that franchises, rights, titles or
contracts relating to Namibia granted to individuals
or companies by South Africa after the adoption of
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enforceable in American courts.2 6 8 The most promising
approach in litigation seeking to enforce Resolutions
276 and 301 is to argue, as did plaintiffs in Diggs v.
Dent 269 that these resolutions are self-executing.
The district court in Dent rejected this claim,
asserting that "the provisions of the Charter of the
United Nations are not self-executing and do not vest any
of the plaintiffs with any individual legal rights
which they may assert in this court". 2 7 0 This con-
clusion put the district court squarely in conflict
with the holding in Keeney v. United States 271 that
267 (Continued)
General Assembly resolution 2145(XXI) are not subject
to protection or espousal by their States against
claims of a future lawful Government of Namibia;
13. Requests the Ad Hoc Sub-Committee on Namibia
to continue to carry out the tasks entrusted to it by
paragraphs 14 and 15 of resolution 283 (1970) and, in
particular, taking into account the need to provide
for the effective protection of Namibian interests
at the international level, to study appropriate
measures for the fulfilment of the responsibility of
the United Nations towards Namibia;
14. Requests the Ad Hoc Sub-Committee on Namibia
to review all treaties and agreements which are
contrary to the provisions of the present resolution
in order to ascertain whether States have entered
into agreements which recognize South Africa's
authority over Namibia, and to report periodically
thereon;
15. Calls upon all States to support and promote
the rights of the people of Namibia and to this end
to implement fully the provisions of the present
resolution;
16. Requests the Secretary-General to report
periodically on the implementation of the provisions
of the present resolution.
268. See pp. 255-57 infra.
269. See note 2 supra.
270. Id., 14 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS at 797.
271. 218 F.2d 843 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
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at least two provisions of the Charter, Articles 100
and 105, were self-executing. The court of appeals
in Diggs v. Richardson2 7 2 impliedly disapproved the
broad district court holding when it affirmed the
decision concerning Resolution 301 on the narrowest
grounds: it held only that subsection (d) dealing
with the sending of diplomatic or special missions
to Namibia and subsection (f) discouraging economic
dealings with South Africa concerning Namibia were
not self-executing.273
Resolution 301 "requests" and "calls upon"
member states to "abstain from sending diplomatic
or special missions to South Africa that include
the Territory of Namibia in their jurisdiction."274
As noted previously, negative treaty stipulations are
more readily held self-executing than other types
of treaty provisions. 2 7 5 While the verbs employed
in Resolution 301 appear to be hortatory, those
voting for Resolution 301 undoubtedly intended to
prohibit such missions.276
272. 555 F.2d 848, 849 (D.C. Cir. 19-76).
273. Judge Leventhal's opinion is confusing on this
point. First, he states that the holding of the case is
"that the U.N. Security Council Resolution involved here is
not self-executing." Id. at 850 n.9. In the same context of
the self-executing treaty doctrine, however, he declares that
"we made [make?] no decision with respect [to?] those provi
sions of U.N. Security Council Resolution 301 which are not
involved here." Id. at 851 n.10. The most reasonable con-
clusion in seeking to reconcile these seemingly inconsistent
statements is that the court meant the second statement
literally, while in the first passing reference to the non-
self-executing Security Council resolution, the Court intended it
to be understood that it was referring only to the parts of
Resolution 301 involved in the case (Subsections Cd) and (f)).
274. S.C. Res. 301, 26 U.N. SCOR 8, U.N. DOC. S/INS./27
(1971).
275. See p. 218 supra.
276. A textual analysis of relevant provisions of
Resolution 301 in Note, supra note 182, at 412-17,
concludes that it is possible to argue on the basis of the
resolution's wording that its drafters intended it to be self-
executing, although the author later concludes from a
consideration of "Material Outside of the Agreement" that the
resolution is not self-executing. Id. at 417-19.
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Plaintiffs in Dent contended that Resolution 301
imposed direct and explicit international obligations,
requiring no legislative implementation to bind the
executive branch. They emphasized that (1) Resolution
301 embodied a call to take immediate action rather
than a contract or agreement to do so in the future,
(2) the executive branch had full authority over
the conduct of foreign affairs involved in the case,
so that no congressional participation was necessary
to give binding domestic effect to the resolution's
provisions, and (3) unlike the treaty provisions in
Diggs v. Shultz, 277 which required compliance both
by private persons and by governments to enforce the
trade embargo, Resolution 301 was addressed solely
to action by governments.27 8 Plaintiffs argued that
although legislative action might be deemed necessary
or appropriate in such matters before a government
could impose binding obligations upon individual
citizens, it was logical to hold the executive branch
itself directly accountable for the international
obligaticns to which it had already acceded when it
voted for Resolution 301.
The view that United States action should con-
form to Security Council resolutions is persuasive
in light of the fact that no resolution can be
passed without United States support, or at least
acquiescence.2 7 9 The underlying rationale for the
self-executing treaty doctrine is the principle that
the United States should not be bound by interna-
tional treaty obligations to which the appropriate
branches of government have not agreed. The situations
277. 470 F.2d 461 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411
U.S. 931 (1973).
278. Judge Leventhal in Diggs v. Richardson agreed that
the provisions of Resolution 301 were addressed to governments,
calling upon them "to take certain action"; he concluded from
this, however, that these provisions "were not addressed to the
judicial branch of our government." 555 F.2d 848, 851 (D.C. Cir.
1976). In effect, he found the provisions were non-self-executing.
279. The United States and the four other permanent
members of the Security Council have the power to veto any
Security Council resolution. See U.N. CHARTER art. 27.
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in which it can be argued that enforceable rights
and obligations arise can be analytically divided
into five procedural alternatives:
(1) upon passage of the resolution by the
Security Council, (2) upon passage of the
resolution by the Security Council only if
the United States casts an affirmative vote,
(3) upon passage of the resolution by the
Security Council plus confirmation of its
provisions through a presidential order as
provided in the United Nations Partici-
pation Act, (4) upon passage of the
resolution by the Security Council plus
its formal ratification as a treaty by the
President upon the advice and consent of
the Senate, (5) upon passage of the resolu-
tion by the Security Council plus some type
of legislative implementation by Congress.28 0
Because of the positive endorsement by the appro-
priate branch of the United States government, there
is no question that alternatives (4) and (5) create
binding treaty obligations. Shultz demonstrates that
a presidential executive order under the third
alternative can give definite and binding force to
a resolution. Similarly, it can be argued that
under the second alternative, by instructing a
representative to vote for a Security Council resolu-
tion, the President is in effect entering into a
binding executive agreement pursuant to Article 25 of
the Charter. Only in the case of alternative (1) can
no colorable argument be made that passage of a
Security Council resolution creates United States
treaty obligations, because this alternative does not
necessarily entail approval of the resolution by any
branch of the United States government.2 81
The executive branch in recent years has adopted
the view that United Nations "decisions" are legally
binding upon members under Article 25 only in situa-
tions where world peace is threatened. According
to this view, Resolutions 276 and 301 could not
impose binding legal obligations because they were
280. Security Council Resolutions and Enforceable Legal
Rights., supra note 198, at 310 (footnote omitted).
281. Id. at 312.
1978] 238
YALE STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER
ratified under Chapter VI of the Charter rather than
Chapter VII.2 8 2 The International Court of Justice,
however, has taken the position that the binding
effect of Article 25 pertains to Security Council
resolutions passed under Chapter VI as well as
Chapter VII of the Charter.283
Since the International Court of Justice posi-
tion reflects the dominant view, the United States
should not vote in favor of a Security Council
resolution and then adopt a minority construction of
the resolution. Members of the United Nations should
respect International Court of Justice opinions,2 84
and it would thus be more reasonable for the United
States to adhere to the Court's view of the meaning
and effect of Security Council resolutions and then
to proceed to vote either for or against them on
that basis.
The consequence of this analysis in the context
of the Namibian case is that by voting for Resolution
301, the United States subjected itself to the
obligations of a self-executing treaty.2 85 As we
282. Cf. Higgins, supra note 7, at 277-83 (generally
describing view). According to the executive branch's view
of Article 25, only a Security Council resolution invoking
Articles 39 and 41 of the Charter (regarding threats to world
peace) can impose binding legal obligations upon member states.
See Security Council Resolutions and Enforceable Legal Rights,
supra note 198, at 309 n.62; Note, supra note 182, at 418-19.
Resolutions 276 and 301 were passed pursuant to Article 24 of
the Charter.
283. Namibia Advisory Opinion, supra note 181. This
position is supported by Higgins, supra note 7, and Note,
supra note 7, at 89-91.
284. Article 92 of the United Nations Charter states
that "[tihe International Court of Justice shall be the
principal judicial organ of the United Nations." Article 93(1)
states that "[aIll Members of the United Nations are ipso facto
parties to the Statute of the International Court of Justice."
285. That such a conclusion is reasonable, albeit
not compelled, is recognized in Note, supra note 182, at 416.
The writer concludes, however, that Resolution 301 does not
impose binding legal obligations on the United States because
he interprets United States intent as favoring the narrowest
possible scope for Security Council resolutions deemed binding
on member states. Id. at 419. It is submitted that this is
a one-sided application of the "intent" test, and that the effect
of a United States vote for a Security Council resolution




have noted, it is difficult to reduce to defini-
tive rules the criteria by which courts have
determined whether specific United States treaty
obligations were self-executing.2 8 6 Probably the
most difficult proposition for plaintiffs to
establish im the Namibian case was that Article
25 of the Charter and Resolution 301 together
could bind the United States without further
legislative implementation. Once this is accepted,
however, it should not be difficult for the
prohibitions of Resolution 301 to satisfy the
tests of self-execution. The prohibitions are
categorical and specific, and they are easier
to apply than various positive injunctions.2E7
If American courts' appreciation of the character
of our international treaty obligations increases,
future courts may well hold treaty provisions
similar to those in Resolution 301 to be self-
executing.
3. If Resolutions 276 and 301 are Held to be Non-
Self-Executing, Have They Been Executed by
the United States Government?
Even if it is determined that a claimed treaty
obligation of the United States is non-self-executing,
the obligation may still be held binding if a court
concludes that it has been "executed". The princi-
ple that a treaty can be executed is an outgrowth of
the separation of powers principle. Without execu-
tion, some treaty obligations would remain nugatory,
but when Congress acts to implement them, it removes
any danger that their enforcement would infringe
upon its constitutional authority.
The United Nations Participation Act of
286. See pp. 216-l7 supra.
287. For example, see the positive treaty term which
was held self-executing in Asakura v. Seattle, 265 U.S. 332,
340-43 (1924) (holding that a municipal ordinance excluding
aliens from pawnbroker business violated treaty with Japan
which gave Japanese subjects "'liberty to enter, travel and
reside"' in the United States "'to carry on trade, wholesale
and retailt" ).
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1945288 furnishes an important example of congres-
sional action to execute a treaty. The Act
authorizes the President to impose economic and
communications sanctions when the Security Council,
under Article 41 of the Charter, so requests, and
to subject violators of the sanctions to criminal
penalties.2 89 President Johnson exercised his
authority under the United Nations Participation
Act when he issued executive orders, pursuant to
Security Council resolutions, imposing sanctions
on the white minority regime in Rhodesia.2 9 0
288. 22 U.S.C. § 287(c) (1976). The Act provides in
pertinent part:
§287c. Enforcement of economic and
communication sanctions; penalties
(a) Notwithstanding the provisions of any
other law, whenever the United States is called
upon by the Security Council to apply measures
which said Council has decided, pursuant to
article 41 of said Charter, are to be employed
to give effect to its decisions under said
Charter, the President may, to the extent
necessary to apply such measures, through any
agency which he may designate, and under such
orders, rules, and regulations as may be
prescribed by him, investigate, regulate, or
prohibit, in whole or in part, economic rela-
tions or rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic,
radio, and other means of communication be-
tween any foreign country or any national
thereof or any person therein and the United
States or any person subject to the jurisdic-
tion thereof, or involving any property sub-
ject to the jurisdiction of the United States.
Much of this language merely repeats the terms of
Article 41 of the United Nations Charter.
289. Subsection (b) of 22 U.S.C. 0 287(c) (1976),
establishes penalties of up to a $10,000 fine or ten years in
prison for violation of this section.
290. Security Council Resolution 232 of 1966, for
which the United States voted, imposed an embargo on
importation of specified goods from Rhodesia, including
chrome. S.C. Res. 232, 21 U.N. SCOR 7, U.N. DOC. S/INS./21
(1966). President Johnson by executive order thereupon
banned the importation of the specified goods into the United
States. See EXEC. ORDER NO. 11,322, 3 C.F.R. 606 (1966-70).
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The circumstances of the Namibian case were
different, however. Security Council Resolutions
276291 and 301292 were passed under the authority
of Article 24 of the Charter. There is no federal
statute comparable to the United Nations Partici-
pation Act providing for United States implementa-
tion of Article 24 resolutions. 2 93 This does not
dispose of the question of execution, however,
290 (Continued)
In 1968, the Security Council, again with United
States support, passed Resolution 253, which extended the
embargo to all Rhodesian products, 23 U.N. SCOR 15, IJ,N. DOC,
S/INS./23 (1968). President Johnson then issued a second
executive order banning all Rhodesian imports into the United
States. EXEC. ORDER NO. 11,419, 3 C.F.R. 737 C196670).
Passage of the Byrd Amendment by Congress in 1971 effectively
nullified these measures. P.L. No. 92-156, 85 Stat. 427 (1971),
amending the Strategic and Critical Materials Stock Piling
Act, 50 U.S.C. § 98-98h (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
Resolutions 232 and 253 could thus be regarded either
as self-executing under the United Nations Participation Act
or as executed by executive orders. Consequently, the
Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia in Diggs v.
Shultz, 470 F.2d 461 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S.
931 (1973), had no occasion to analyze self-executing treaty
questions in reaching its conclusion that the United States
was required by international treaty obligations to observe
the Rhodesian embargo.
291. S.C. Res. 276, 25 U.N. SCOR 1-2, U.N. DOC. S/INS./25
(1970), see note 266 supra.
292. S.C. Res. 301, 26 U.N. SCOR 8, U.N. DOC. S/INS./27
(1971); see note 267 supra.
293. In the appeal of Dent, the Justice Department claimed
that "it is manifest, we submit, that absent express action by
the Political Branches of the Government Security Council
Resolutions do not become part of the law of the land." Brief
for the Defendant-Appellee at 21, Diggs v. Morton (sub nom.
Diggs v. Richardson), 555 F.2d 848 (D.C. Cir. 1976), in Dent
File, supra note 14. This proposition is hardly "manifest",
given the fact that the courts have held both United Nations
Charter provisions and agreements signed pursuant to them to
be self-executing. See pp. 227-29 supra.
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because courts have held that treaty obligations can
be executed in ways other than by federal statute.294
Viewed as a consequence of the separation of
powers doctrine, the principal function of the require-
ment that a treaty be executed is to ensure that
Congress is consulted on important matters which
overlap with its legislative function.2 9 5 Another
reason for requiring treaties to be executed, however,
is that their terms may be too vague or general to
indicate how they are to be carried out. In such
cases, the necessary clarification may sometimes be
provided by execution.
The first case, United States v. Robins,29 6 in
which the executive executed a treaty arose under the
Jay Treaty of 1794 with Great Britain. Article
XXVII of the treaty provided for the extradition of
British subjects charged with murder and forgery
but did not specify which American officials were
responsible for taking this action. A British
seaman, who was suspected of participating in a
mutiny aboard a British ship which resulted in the
death of an officer, was arrested and imprisoned
in a South Carolina prison on a murder charge. The
Secretary of State informed the district court that
the British consul had asked for the extradition
294. Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 272-73
(1796) (Iredell, J., concurring), cpntains dicta to the effect
that the executive and the judiciary could also executd the
provisions of a treaty. Since Justice Iredell had heard the
case below, he recused himself at the Supreme Court level but
nevertheless read his Circuit Court opinion when the Supreme
Court handed down its decision. His statement implying that the
executive branch can execute a treaty is thus doubly a dictum.
295. The president has the principal responsibility in
the constitutional scheme for conducting foreign affairs; the
executive branch is responsible for originating, negotiating, and
concluding treaties. The Constitution also gives the Senate,
however, the power and duty to advise on and consent to treaties.
The Framers presumably deemed such a power necessary since
treaties are equal in force to statutes, and Congress' exclusive
power to legislate might be compromised if the executive could
conclude treaties without it.
296. 27 F. Cas. 825 (D.S.C. 1799) (No. 16,175).
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of the seaman under Article XXVII and that President
Adams had authorized him to communicate "his advice
and request" that the seaman be delivered to the
consul or other appropriate agent of Great Britain.2 97
After a habeas corpus proceeding, District Judge Bee
ordered the seaman surrendered to the British consul.
Judge Bee purported to exercise an inherent
power of the federal judiciary to execute the treaty,
but this seemed unwarranted in the absence of any
jurisdictional grant by statute or treaty. As a result,
the case has come to be viewed as onq in which Presi-
dent Adams rather than the district court executed the
treaty, and
it has been looked upon as authority for
the proposition that the President, in virtue
of his constitutional grant of executive
power, is competent to execute a treaty,
when . . . the treaty fails to confer such
competence on any particular officer, and
Congress has not filled this void by an
appropriate grant of authority.298
The conclusion that the President can execute a non-self-
executing treaty is reinforced by Supreme Court holdings
that even without Senate ratification, binding treaty
obligations can be incurred when the President concludes
an executive agreement. 29 9 Consequently, even if a
court holds that Resolutions 276 and 301 are not self-
executing, the possibility that they have been executed
by executive action must be investigated.
The court of appeals in Diggs v. Richardson 3 0 0
held in effect that Resolution 301 had not been executed
when it concluded that there was no "domestic legisla-
tion evincing any intention for judicial enforcement" 3 01
297. Id. at 826-27.
298. United States ex rel. Martinez-Angosto v. Mason,
344 F.2d 673, 683-84 (2d Cir. 1965). Article II, § 3 of the Con-
stitution, which imposes upon the President the duty to "take Care
that the Laws be faithfully executed," has been cited in support
of this inferred presidential power. See United States ex rel.
Martinez-Angosto v. Mason, supra, at 683.
299. See, e.g., United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 223
(1942); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 330-31 (1937);
Security Council Resolutions and Enforceable Legal Rights, supra
note 198, at 308 n.55.
300. 555 F.2d 848 (D.G. Cir. 1976).
301. Id. at 851 (footnote omitted).
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of its provisions. The court apparently did not even
consider the possibility that the resolution might have
been executed by the executive, nor is it likely that
the parties briefed this issue.
To determine the accuracy of the court of appeals'
conclusion that Resolution 301 had not been executed,
it is necessary to review the policy of both the execu-
tive and legislative branches towards Namibia in the
years after adoption of Resolution 301 in 1971. Since
1971 Congress has rarely considered the Namibian
question, 3 0 2 and it has taken no action that could be
considered an execution of Resolution 301. As the fol-
lowing history will show, the executive stance on
Namibia has been too equivocal to constitute the
decisive action required for execution of a treaty
provision. Consequently, it would be difficult to
challenge the implicit conclusion of the court of
appeals that the federal government has not taken any
direct specific action which would constitute an
execution of Resolution 301.
a. Recent United States Policy on Namibia
The 1971 Namibia Advisory Opinion held that the
South African mandate over Namibia had terminated, that
South Africa's continued presence in Namibia was illegal,
and that United Nations members were obligated to
refrain from any acts or dealings implying recognition
of the legality of South African administration of
Namibia. 3 3 On October 4, 1971, Secretary of State
Rogers declared that the United States accepted the
Court's opinion.304 The United States voted for
302. The only congressional body to take up the Namibian
question appears to have been Congressman Diggs' Subcommittee on
Africa. See, e.g., Critical Developments in Namibia: Hearings
Before the Subcommittee on Africa of the House Committee on
Foreign Affairs, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (Feb. 2, and Apr. 4, 1974)
[hereinafter cited as Critical Developments in Ncmibia]. The
recent five-power (United States, Britain, France, West Germany,
and Canada) initiative seeking a compromise solution to the
Namibian dispute has not become an issue in Congress.
303. See note 181 supra (citing case).
304. See 65 DEP'T STATE BULL. 437, 439 (1971) (address
to United Nations General Assembly).
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Resolution 301 endorsing the International Court of
Justice opinion two weeks later.3 05
While continuing formal opposition to South
African policies on Namibia, the Nixon and Ford
administrations took little action to promote United
Nations objectives. The State Department's first
application of Resolution 301 grew out of the Commerce
Department's consideration of the Fouke Company's
waiver application. At the behest of Congressman
Diggs and others, Deputy Secretary of State Ingersoll
informed Secretary of Commerce Dent that the State
Department did not believe that the proposed third
visit by Commerce Department personnel to Namibia
"[could] be brought into conformity with the
obligations" of Resolution 301.306 As the litigation
in the seal skins case indicates, no action was
taken by the President to resolve the intra-executive
conflict over the importation waiver.
In September 1974 the Council for Namibia
issued a decree for the protection of the territory's
natural resources. 3 0 7 The decree declared South
African concessions for the exploitation of Namibian
natural resources null and void, stated that the
Council's approval was required for any further con-
cessions, and proclaimed that ships exporting
Namibian natural resources and the cargoes of such
ships were liable to seizure by or on behalf of the
Council.308 The United States abstained from the
General Assembly resolution calling for compliance
with the decree. 3 0 9 Thus the record of the Nixon
305. See 65 DEP'T STATE BULL. 609-10 (1971) (state-
ment by Ambassador Bennett to the Security Council).
306. DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW 1974, at 599-600 (A. Rovine ed. 1975) (letter of August 2,
1974) [hereinafter cited as A. Rovine].
307. See 29 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 24A) 27-8, U.N. DOC.
A/9624/ADD. 1 (1975).
308. See id.
309. 29 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 31) 106, U.N. DOC. A/9631
(1974). The principal reason why the United States abstained on
Resolution 3295 was that it also implicitly requested action by the
Security Council under Chapter VII. See 73 DEP'T STATE BULL 44 (1975).
The United States has taken a rather ambivalent
attitude towards the Council for Namibia. Although it has made
modest financial contributions to the Council's activities, it
abstained on United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2248,
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and Ford Administrations on Namibia does not disclose
any intention to execute Resolution 301.310 On the
contrary, the State Department's opposition to the
309 (Continued)
establishing the Council. It has declined to become a member
of the Council and has interpreted Resolution 2248, directing
the Council to proceed to Namibia and granting it broad
administrative powers "to be discharged in the Territory," to
mean that the Council can exercise its powers only when it is
admitted to Namibia. G.A. Res, 2248 (s-v), 5th Sp. Sess. U.N.
GAOR, Supp. (No. 1) 1, U.N. DOC. A/6657 (1967); see 73 DEP'T
STATE BULL. 36 (1975) (statement of Assistant Secretary of
State for African Affairs Davis before a Subcommittee of the
House Committee on International Relations). The State
Department, however, has also taken the position "that
enforcement jurisdiction regarding [the decree for the
protection of Namibian natural resources] rests not with the
Executive Branch but rather with the courts and the parties
involved." 73 DEP'T STATE BULL. 37-38 (1975).
The rather conservative posture of United States
policy on South Africa during this period is illustrated by
the fact that the United States joined Britain and France
in vetoing Security Council resolutions calling for the
expulsion of South Africa from the United Nations and a
mandatory arms embargo against South Africa. See McDowell,
Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to
International Law, 69 AM. J. INT'L L. 861, 880-82 (1975).
310. An explanation for the contrast between
the Nixon and Ford Administrations' formal support for the
United Nations position on Namibia and other Southern
African issues, on the one hand, and their consistent
opposition to collective action by governments in the United
Nations and elsewhere to censure or penalize South Africa,
on the other, is perhaps to be found in National Security
Study Memorandum 39. The Memorandum was a secret 1969 State
Department study of Southern Africa and United States policy
options commissioned by Henry Kissinger. For its text, which
was leaked to the press in 1969, see THE KISSINGER STUDY
OF SOUTHERN AFRICA (M. El-Khawas & B. Cohen eds. 1976) [here-
inafter cited as THE KISSINGER STUDY]. This study, an exercise
in Realpolitik, is remarkable both for its candor and prag-
matism and for the inaccuracy of its predictions. It shows
that the official American view of Southern Africa was based
on the conviction that the white-dominated regimes in the area
were there to stay and could not be dislodged by the black
majority. It thus counselled American support for these regimes,
which was to be provided without a forthright repudiation of the
Kennedy-Johnson arms embargo against South Africa or of support
for majority rule. Cf. note 311 infra.
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imposition of Chapter VII sanctions3 11 might be inter-
preted as evidence that the government did not wish
to implement or execute Resolution 301.
The Carter Administration has considerably
changed United States policy toward Africa. One
objective of this transformation is to seek rapproche-
ment with such mainstream African countries as Nigeria.
Among the policy changes implemented thus far have been
United States support for a mandatory arms embargo
against South Africa 3 1 2 and repeal of the Byrd Amendment
311. Se5 pp. 211-12 supra. In explaining the United
States veto (together with France and Great Britain) of the Security
Council resolution imposing a mandatory arms embargo on South
Africa, Ambassador Scali stated that although the United States
had voluntarily banned all arms shipments to South Africa for the
past 12 years, it did not believe that the Namibian situation const:
tuted the actual threat to world peace required for the invocation
sanctions under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. See
McDowell, supra note 309, at 880-81; 73 DEP'T STATE BULL. 272 (1975'
(statement by Assistant Secretary of State Buffum before the Sub-
committee on Africa of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations).
The same reason was later given in explanation of the United States
abstention or "no" vote on other Namibian resolutions passed almost
unanimously by the General Assembly. See E. McDowell, supra note 3
at 637, 722.
The United States again vetoed a draft Security Council
resolution imposing a mandatory arms embargo against South Africa
under Chapter VII of the Charter on October 19, 1976. Ambassador
William Scranton opposed the embargo on the grounds that it might
prejudice the delicate negotiations then under way to bring about a
peaceful independent settlement for Namibia. Id. at 721-22. In
addition, the United States joined Britain and France in vetoing a
Security Council resolution calling for the expulsion of South Afri
from the United Nations on October 30, 1974). See 73 DEP'T STATE
BULL. 271, 272 (1975). The United States however, continued to giv
formal support for Namibian independence when it voted for Security
Council Resolution 366 of December 17, 1974, and Resolution 385 of
January 30, 1976. See id. at 272-73.
312. President Carter decided on this historic change
after the South African government hardened its stance and adopted
various repressive measures against domestic opponents on October
19, 1977. On October 31, 1977, Ambassador Young announced to the
Security Council that the United States would support a mandatory
arms embargo against South Africa under Chapter VII of the Charter.
This .resolution was adopted unanimously on November 4. On the same
day, the House of Representatives voted 347 to 57 to condemn the
actions of the South African government. See Press Releases, United
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which had permitted the importation of Rhodesian
chrome. 3 1 3 Although such policies have drawn the
wrath of some American conservatives, there are
signs that they have created a much more positive
political climate for the United States among
African countries. 314
b. The United Nations Five-Power Plan
for Namibia
With respect to Namibia, the State Department,
with the collaboration of Britain, Canada, France,
and West Germany (the "contact group"), has spear-
headed an effort to negotiate a compromise independence
312 (Continued)
States Mission to the United Nations, October 19, 1977, October 31,
1977, November 4, 1977 (on file with Yale Studies in World Public
Order). In February 1978, the Commerce Department extended the
United States ban on arms exports to South Africa to products or
technology that might be used by South Africa's police or armed
forces. In recent months, business groups have been lobbying to
have the ban relaxed. Hovey, Ban on Arms to Pretoria Worrying
U.S. Business, N.Y. Times, Dec. 21, 1978, at A18, col. 1.
313. See amendments to the United Nations Participation
Act, 22 U.S.C. § 287c (1976). While the Nixon and Ford Adminis-
trations formally opposed the Byrd Amendment, they did not
actively work for its repeal. In 1975 the House of Representa-
tives voted down a bill to repeal the Amendment by a vote of
209 to 187. President Carter, however, strongly endorsed repeal
when he took office and sent Ambassador Young to lobby for it in
the House of Representatives. The House passed a repeal bill
on March 14, 1977, by a vote of 250-146. The next day, the Senate
passed another repeal bill 66-23 and then voted to substitute
the House bill, thus enabling the bill to go directly to the
President without passing through a conference committee. On
March 17, President Carter announced the repeal in his speech to
the United Nations, and he signed it into law the next day. See
Recent Developments - Import Restrictions: Repeal of the Byrd
Amendment, 18 HARV. INT'L L.J. 713, 715 (1977).
314. See Lewis, Diplomacy Not Bluster, N.Y. Times, July
17, 1978, at 17, col. 1.
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settlement between the South African government and
SWAPO. 31 5 The "front line" African states 316 and the
Security Council have endorsed this initiative,317
but in light of recent events it is unlikely that the
South African government can be prevailed upon to make
the kinds of concessions necessary to gain international
acceptance for the plan as a bona fide and legitimate
settlement.
The central provision of the five-power plan is
that the United Nations will conduct elections in
Namibia during a transitional period before independence.
On September 29, 1978, the Security Council approved
a plan to send 7,540 United Nations troops and 1,000
civilian officials to Namibia to supervise and control
these elections. 318
From the outset, it has been difficult to imagine
how implacable adversaries such as South Africa and
SWAPO, the principal parties, could be induced to
compromise. A principal point of contention, which
the five-power plan does not resolve, concerns future
sovereignty over Walvis Bay, Namibia's only deep-water
port and naval outlet. 319 It appeared that a major
315. See AFRICA: Peaceful Solution to the Conflict in
Ncanibia and Southern Rhodesia; 78 DEP'T STATE BULL. 15 (1978)
(remarks of Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher before
the Litigation Section of. the American Bar Association). For
a description of the negotiating process conducted by the
"contact group" and the text of the United Nations Proposal for
a Namibian Settlement, see 78 DEP'T STATE BULL. 50 (1978).
316. The black-ruled countries bordering on the Southern
African areas still ruled by whites: Angola, Zambia, Botswana,
and Mozambique.
317. Speakers at the Organization for African Unity
meeting in Khartoum in the Sudan endorsed the plan in July 1978.
See N.Y. Times, July 19, 1978, at 2, col. 3. See p. 292 infra
(Security Council's endorsement of the plan).
318. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 4, 1979, at A5, col. 1.
319. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance indicated in
remarks to the Security Council on July 27, 1978, that the
"contact group" had left Walvis Bay out of the proposed agreement
on Namibia because the views of the opposing parties "appeared
to be irreconcilable." 78 DEP'T STATE BULL. 45 (1978). The
"contact group" took the position that the question of sovereignty
over Walvis Bay could only be resolved through negotiations between
the South African government and the future government of Namibia.
Great Britain claimed Walvis Bay before Germany took over
Southwest Africa as a colony in 1881. Consequently, the claim
of South Africa, as Britain's successor, to Walvis Bay is much
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breakthrough had occurred, nevertheless, when Prime
Minister Vorster of South Africa announced on
April 25, 1978, that his government had agreed to
the five-power plan.3 2 0 After breaking off negotia-
tions temporarily when the South Africans attacked
its sanctuaries in Angola, moreover, SWAPO also
agreed to the plan on July 12, 1978.321
Since that time, however, prospects for a
peaceful resolution of the guerrilla war under the
five-power plan have fluctuated. On July 27, 1978,
the Security Council coupled an endorsement of the
five-power plan with a call for "reintegration of
Walvis Bay" into Namibia in order to promote Namibia's
"territorial integrity and unity." 3 2 2 Prime Minister
Vorster reacted angrily and reiterated South Africa's
intention to retain sovereignty over the Bay.3 2 3 On
319 (Continued)
stronger than its claim to Nambia, which it received as a
trust territory following Germany's defeat in World War I.
Namibian nationalists believe that it is crucial that Walvis
Bay be part of an independent Namibia, if the country is
not to be an economic satellite of South Africa. See N.Y.
Times, Apr. 25, 1978, at 4, col. 3.
Another dispute in the earlier stages of the negotiations,
which appears to have been resolved, centered on the number of
South African troops and United Nations troops that would remain
in Namibia during the transitional period before independence.
South Africa currently has some 15,000 to 18,000 troops in
Namibia. SWAPO had demanded that this be reduced to 1,500, while
the South Africans apparently wished to keep at least 4,000
troops in Namibia until independence. See N.Y. Times, Mar. 21,
1979, at 3, col. 2; id., Dec. 28, 1978, at 3, col. 4; id., Apr. 26,
1978, at 1, col. 2; id., Apr. 16, 1978, § 4, at 18, col. 3.
320. See.N.Y. Times, Apr. 26, 1978, at 1, col. 2. Eight
days later, on May 3, the General Assembly voted 119-0 with 21
abstentions to recommend that the Security Council impose an oil
embargo and "comprehensive economic sanctions" on South Africa.
See N.Y. Times, May 4, 1978, at 6, col. 6.
321. See N.Y. Times, May 9, 1978, at 8, col. 3; id.,
May 7, 1978, § 4, at 22, col. 1; id., May 5, 1978, at 1, col. 1.
322. See United Nations Security Council: Reports,
Resolutions and Statements on the Situation in Namibia, 17 INT'L
LEGAL MATERIALS 1537 (1978); N.Y. Times, July 28, 1978, at 3, col. 1.
323. See N.Y. Times, July 29, 1978, at 3, col. 4; id.,
July 26, 1978, § 2, at 8, col. 5. South Africa apparently took
the position that the Security Council was reneging on its
commitment to leave the status of Walvis Bay to negotiations between
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July 31, after a day-long cabinet meeting, the South
African government formally withdrew approval of the
five-power plan.324
After the talks broke down, South Africa
complicated matters when it held its own elections
for a Namibian assembly in early December. 3 23 The
elections were condemned by many United Nations
members and were boycotted by SWAPO. Predictably,
the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance, the party supported
by the South Africans, won eighty-two percent of the
vote and forty-one of the fifty seats in the new
Assembly.326
Differences between the two sides have focused
in recent months on arrangements concerning SWAPO
guerrillas. South Africa and the Democratic Turnhalle
Alliance have demanded direct surveillance by the
United Nations of SWAPO military bases in Angola and
Zambia, while the United Nations plan would leave
such surveillance to the Angolan and Zambian govern-
ments. 3 27 The five-power plan also envisions the
323 (Continued)
a new Namibian government and South Africa. The South Africans
declared that they would only discuss the status of Walvis Bay
with a new Namibian government, and not with the Security
Council. See N.Y. Times, July 18, 1978, at 12, col. 1.
324. See N.Y. Times, Aug. 1, 1978, at 1, col. 2. The
South Africans did not; however, shut the door on a possible
future compromise.
325. See N.Y. Times, Dec. 9, 1978, at 20, col. 4; id.,
Dec. 7, 1978, at 2, col. 3. The Security Council condemned
the election in Resolution 439, adopted on November 13, 1978,
by a vote of 10 to 0, with 5 abstentions (the "contact group").
See 79 DEP'T STATE BULL. 52 (1979) (text of resolution).
Ambassador McHenry, speaking for the "contact group" in the
Security Council on December 4, 1978, also called the South
African-supervised elections "illegal". Id. at 60.
326. See N.Y. Times, Dec. 21, 1978, at A10, col. 1. The
Democratic Turnhalle Alliance, a coalition of whites and
conservative blacks, and SWAPO are only the most prominent among
a large number of political parties in Namibia. For an analysis
by Tom Wicker of the tangled political situation in Namibia
see N.Y. Times, Dec. 3, 1978, at 19, col. 4.
327. See N.Y. Times, Mar. 13, 1979, at 3, col. 4 (South
Africa's criticism of Secretary General's report of February 26 as
deviating from the peace plan South Africa accepted); id., Mar. 19,
1979, at 3, col. 1; id., Mar. 6, 1979, at A2, col. 3.
YALE STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER
regrouping of SWAPO guerrillas at specified places
during the transitional period, which South Africa
has attacked as permitting SWAPO to have military
bases.328 In the meantime, guerrilla skirmishing
in Namibia has continued, and the South Africans
have repeatedly invaded Angola to attack SWAPO
camps. On March 28, 1979, the United Nations
Security Council condemned South Africa for "pre-
meditated, persistent and sustained armed invasions"
of Angola,329 and no compromise on how to deal with
the SWAPO guerrillas is in sight.330
A deter ioration in relations between the
United State6 and. South Africa has further diminished
the likelihood of a successful compromise settlement.3 3 1
328. See N.Y. Times, Mar. 13, 1979, at 3, col. 4.
329. See N.Y. Times, Mar, 29, 1979, at 2, col. 3; id.,
Mar. 20, 1979, at 13, col. 1.
330. On May 6, 1979, a South African representative
indicated that his government was willing to proceed with
United Nations-supervised elections in Namibia, provided that
SWAPO not be permitted to set up military bases in the
interim. Whether this represented a decision by South Africa
to comply with the United Nations plan was doubtful in view
of the fact that the South African government had recently
arrested more than 40 leaders of SWAPO, which the United Nations
supports. See N.Y. Times, May 7, 1979, at A4, col. 3. On May
24, the General Assembly voted 96 to 16 (with 9 abstentions)
to bar the South African delegation from participating in the
debate on Namibia. See N.Y. Times, May 25, 1979, at A9, col. 2.
This action made South African cooperation with the United
Nations plan for Namibia even less likely.
331. On April 12, 1979, Prime Minister P.W. Botha
expelled three United States Embassy personnel from the
country for what he charged was their use of the Ambassador's
plane for aerial espionage at sensitive installations. See
N.Y. Times, Apr. 13, 1979, at Al, col. 6. The next day, the
United States reacted by expelling two South African military
attaches from the United States. See N.Y. Times, Apr. 14, 1979,
at 4, col. 5.
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New South African Prime Minister Botha has accused
American diplomat Donald McHenry, who has led the
negotiating team promoting the five-power plan, of
receiving confidential data on Namibia from Colin
Eglin, the South African opposition leader.33 2 In
addition, he has accused the Carter Administration
of "double-dealing" in the negotiations. 3 3 3 On
May 14, Botha said that South Africa would risk
international economic sanctions rather than accept
the five-power plan for Namibia and described the
prospects of his government's agreeing to the plan
as "slim.,334
Prospects for a compromise settlement thus,
appeared bleak in late June 1979. Negotiations
appeared to be stalled, and a compromise may become
even more difficult if South Africa holds to the
September 30, 1979 deadline that it has set for
Namibian independence.3 3 5 The twists and turns
332. See N.Y. Times, Apr. 13, 1979, at A4, col. 3,
Botha's charges are part of a press campaign of personal
attacks on McHenry by the South Africans. See N.Y. Times,
Mar. 11, 1979, at 4, col. 1.
333. See N.Y. Times, Apr, 13. 1979, at A4, col. 3;
id., Mar. 7, 1979, at 1, col. 4; id., July 29, 1978,
at 3, col. 4; id. July 26, 1978, § 2, at 8, col. 5. Some
observers view the South African accusations against
McHenry and the expulsion of American personnel accused
of spying as an attempt to divert attention from the
Information Ministry scandal and particularly from South
African government-financed attempts to manipulate the
American political process by, inter alia, trying to buy
the Washington Star and to bribe labor leaders and others.
This scandal led to the resignation of President (former
Prime Minister) Vorster on June 4, 1974. See N.Y. Times,
June 5, 1979, at 1, col. 6. The South African attacks
were also interpreted by some diplomats as an indication
that South Africa did not wish to cooperate in carrying
out the United Nations plan for Namibia. See N.Y. Times,
Apr. 13, 1979, at A4, col. 3.
334. See N.Y. Times, May 15, 1979, p. A9, col. 1.
335. See N.Y. Times, Mar, 20, 19-79, at 13, col. 1.
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of South African policy, moreover, have prompted
wide-spread suspicion among observers at the
United Nations that South Africa never intended
to accept the United Nations plan, and that its
periodic expressions of agreement have been calcu-
lated merely to buy time and to forestall support
by the Western powers for sanctions or other more
Draconian measures against South Africa.33 6 It is
possible, if not likely, that unless a breakthrough
in negotiations occurs soon, South Africa will go
ahead with a plan to grant independence to a
Namibian client state on its own terms.
The foregoing account demonstrates that the
Carter Administration has moved United States policy
on Southern Africa much closer to that of the
United Nations.3 3 7 In particular, it has taken a
336. See note 333 supra. See also Wicker, Confusion
in Africa, N.Y. Times, Dec. 3, 1978, at E19, col. 5. Support
for the view that South Africa is not firmly committed to
cooperating with the United Nations plan for Namibia has
recently been provided by a South African proposal for a
new Southern African block comprising South Africa, Rhodesia,
Namibia, and the black states of Botswana, Lesotho, and
Swaziland, which are economically dependent on South Africa.
See N.Y. Times, Apr. 21, 1979, at 5, col. 1.
337. Thus Ambassador Young attended and participated
in the United Nations-sponsored International Conference
in support of the Peoples of Zimbabwe and Namibia in Maputo,
Mozambique on May 16-21, 1977, which was attended by 92
United Nations member states. The Maputo Declaration
condemned South Africa and called for Namibian independence
under SWAPO as the "sole and authentic Liberation Movement"
of the Namibian people. See 77 DEP'T STATE BULL. 55, 59
(1977). In his speech at the conference, Ambassador Young
also reiterated President Carter's support for Security
Council Resolution 385 on Namibia. Id. at 58. The Maputo
Declaration, inter alia, recognized Walvis Bay as "an
integral part of Namibia" and condemned the Turnhalle
tribal talks as "a South African strategem to perpetuate
its ruthless &olonial and racist policies and practices
under false pretenses." Id. at 62.
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much more vigorous and active position than its
predecessors in support of Namibian independence.
Secretary of State Vance and Assistant Secretary of
State McHenry have played key roles in the five-
power initiative to mediate the Namibian dispute,33
8
even where it was plain that this would antagonize
the South Africans. Their efforts have won the
plaudits of African leaders. 3 3 9 Because of the
necessarily tentative character of diplomacy, how-
ever, these initiatives cannot be considered an
"execution" of Resolutions 276 and 301, if the latter
are assumed to be non-self-executing. Neither Con-
gress nor President Carter has taken the direct and
explicit action necessary officially to bind the
United States under these resolutions.
If the Western powers fail to dissuade South
Africa from establishing an "independent" Namibia,
and a client state without international legi-
timacy is created, it is conceivable that the Carter
Administration might act directly to execute Resolu-
tion 301.340 If this were to occur, it would consi-
derably facilitate efforts to enforce United Nations
338. McHenry's efforts have led to a press campaign of
personal attacks on him by the South Africans. See p. 254 &
note 332 supra.
339. See N.Y. Times, July 19, 1978, at 2, col. 3 (account
of meeting of Organization of African Unity in Khartoum); Lewis,
supra note 314.
340. Pressures by Third World countries for sanctions
against South Africa have increased in recent months, as .imple-
mentation of the five-power plan has been delayed because of
disagreements between South Africa and the United Nations. See
N.Y. Times, Nov. 11, 1978, at 6, col. 2. On December 21, 1978,
the General Assembly voted 123-0 (with 17 abstentions, including
the United States and other Western nations) to ask the Security
Council to impose sanctions against South Africa for not agreeing
to the United Nations plans for supervised elections in Namibia.
See N.Y. Times, Dec. 22, 1978, at 8, col. 5. The Carter Adminis-
tration, moreover, has considered the option of imposing
sanctions against South Africa if it fails to comply with the
United Nations plan. See U.S. Studies Sanctions As a Path to a
Free Ncanibia, N.Y. Times, Nov. 29, 1978, at A7, col. 1. President
Carter is reported to have warned Foreign Minister Roelof F.
Botha of South Africa on December 2, 1978, that the United States
would support economic sanctions against South Africa unless it
cooperated with the United Nations in advancing Namibian inde-
pendence. See N.Y. Times, Dec. 3, 1978, at 16, col. 1. If the
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resolutions on Namibia through lawsuits in American
courts.
For the present, however, it is doubtful that
an American court would decide that the federal
government had executed Resolutions 276 and 301. It
seems likely, therefore, that the success of any
further litigation would require a holding that
Resolutions 276 and 301 were self-executing.
Nevertheless, even if a court holds that the
resolutions are self-executing and plaintiffs are success-
ful in withstanding all other procedural and sub-
stantive challenges to their cause of action, they
will still have one final obstacle to hurdle. As
Diggs v. Shultz341 demonstrated, the courts will not
enforce United States treaty obligations if they
conclude that the obligations have been abrogated or
"overridden" by a subsequent inconsistent statute.
The likelihood of such a conclusion will now be explored.
III. The Treaty Override Issue
A court determination that a treaty provision
is self-executing does not signify its immunity from
subsequent attack. Just as statutes may be repealed or
superseded by subsequent legislation, treaties may be
abrogated or rendered inoperative by subsequent con-
flicting statutes.342
340 (Continued)
five-power plan continues to be stymied, international pressures
on the United States and other Western powers to agree to
sanctions against South Africa may become overwhelming and the
Carter Administration might yield to such pressures in order
-to preserve the "credibility" which its African policies have
gained for it with African leaders.
341. 470 F.2d 461 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411
U.S. 931 (1973).
342. It is true, of course, that treaty obligations can
also be abrogated or nullified by a war between the signatories,
although this is not inevitable. See Akins v. United States,
407 F. Supp. 748 (Cust. Ct. 1976); Karnuth v. United States
ex rel. Albro, 279 U.S. 231 (1929). But see McCandless v. United
States ex rel. Diabo, 25 F.2d 71 (3rd Cir. 1928); Society for




The court in Diggs v. Shultz343 found that Con-
gress had overridden United States treaty obligations
to observe the sanctions against Rhodesia by passing
the Byrd Amendment.344 Similarly, defendants in
Diggs v. Dent345 argued that Congress had overridden
any United States treaty obligations arising under
Resolutions 276346 and 301347 when it passed the
MMPA. Because the override argument is likely to
be raised in opposition to any future efforts to
enforce United States treaty obligations, it is use-
ful at this point to give a brief outline of the law
of override and then to use Resolutions 276 and 301
to illustrate how the doctrine might be applied
in an appropriate case.
The doctrine that valid United States treaties
may be overridden is derived from Article VI of the
Constitution, which declares both treaties and
domestic laws enacted pursuant to the Constitution
to be "the supreme Law of the Land."'34 8 The courts
have held that treaties and statutes are of equal
legal force and effect.349 Nevertheless, conflicts
have arisen between treaties and federal statutes and
courts have had to decide which should prevail.350
The Supreme Court addressed this problem in The Head
Money Cases. 351 There the Court assumed that the
act of Congress challenged by plaintiffs did conflict
with American treaty obligations and it acknowledged
that the treaty in question was a law. It further
declared, however, that
343. 470 F.2d 461 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411
U.S. 931 (1973).
344. Id. at 465-66.
345. See note 2 supra. Neither the district court in Dent
nor the court of appeals in Diggs v. Richardson, 555 F.2d
848 (D.C. Cir. 1976), ruled on this issue.
346. See note 266 supra.
347. See note 267 supra.
348. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
349. See Edye v. Robertson (The Head Money Cases), 112 U.S.
580 (1884).
350. See pp. 261-65 infra (discussing override issue in
Shultz and Dent).
351. Edye v. Robertson, 112 U.S. 580 (1884).
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even in this aspect of the case there is
nothing in this law which makes it
irrepealable or unchangeable. The Con-
stitution gives it no superiority over
an act of Congress in this respect,
which may be repealed or modified by an
act of a later date. Nor is there any-
thing in its essential character, or in
the branches of the government by which
the treaty is made, which gives it this
superior sanctity.35 2
The Court reiterated this principle more recently in
Reid v. Covert:
This Court has also repeatedly taken
the position that an Act of Congress,
which must comply with the Constitu-
tion, is on a full parity with a
treaty, and that when a statute which
is subsequent in time is inconsistent
with a treaty, the statute to the extent
of conflict renders the treaty null.353
Frequently, of course, there is only an apparent
or alleged inconsistency between a treaty and a subse-
quently-enacted statute. Unless it is manifest that
Congress intended to abrogate the treaty when it
passed the statute, courts will go to great lengths
to reconcile the two: "A treaty will not be deemed to
have been abrogated or modified by a later statute
unless such purpose on the part of Congress has been
clearly expressed.11354 Furthermore, "the intention to
abrogate or modify a treaty is not to be lightly imputed
to the Congress."355
352. Id. at 599 (footnote omitted). The court in The
Head Money Cases went on to imply that since treaties require
the approval of only the President and the Senate, while
statutes also require the approval of the House of Representa-
tives, statutes should command equal, if not superior, deference
when they conflict with treaty provisions.
353. 354 U.S. 1, 18 (1956). This principle has been
called the "later in time rule" and derives from the maxim
"lex posterior derogat priori" (a later law takes precedence
over an earlier law which is inconsistent with it). See Moser
v. United States, 341 U.S. 41, 45 (1951).
354. Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 120 (1933).
355. Pigeon River Improvement, Slide & Boom Co. v.
Charles W. Cox, Ltd., 291 U.S. 138, 160 (1934); accord, Clark v.
Allen, 331 U.S. 503 (1947).
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Thus a simple conflict between the terms of
a treaty and a statute does not constitute an override
unless Congress, by passing the latter, had the clear
and discernible purpose of nullifying the former in
whole or in part. The District of Columbia District
Court elaborated on this principle as follows:
Repeals by implication are not favored.
in other words, a statute will not be
construed to repeal by implication an
earlier enactment if it is at all pos-
sible to reconcile both. A fortiori
this principle applies when there is
an apparent inconsistency between an
Act of Congress and an earlier treaty.
If at all feasible the Act of Congress
will be so interpreted and applied as
not to affect the provisions of the
treaty. 356
The Supreme Court's decision in Menominee Tribe v.
United States 3 5 7 exemplifies this principle of statu-
tory construction. Congress had passed a statute
ending the Menominees' tribal status, but the Court
refused to hold that this impliedly abrogated the
hunting and fishing rights guaranteed by treaty to
the tribe because Congress had not explicitly stated
that such was its intent.
Another rule of statutory construction which
courts have followed in narrowing the sphere of
possible treaty overrides is that expressed in
Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras v. McCuZloch:
If at all possible, any construction of
statute that would be violative of the
principles of international law should
be avoided. Thus, Mr. Chief Justice
Marshall had occasion to observe that,
'an Act of Congress ought never to be
construed to violate the law of nations,
if any other possible construction remains',
The Charming Betsy, 2 Cranch 64, 118, 2 L.Ed.
208.358
356. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras v.
McCulloch, 201 F. Supp. 82, 89 (D.D.C. 1962), aff'd, 372 U.S.
10 (1963); accord, United States v. Lee Yen Tai, 185 U.S. 213
(1902); Chew Heong v. United States, 112 U.S. 536, 549-50 (1884).
357. 391 U.S. 404, 412-13 (1968); accord, United States
v. Consolidated Wounded Knee Cases, 389 F. Supp. 235, 238
(D. Neb. & D.S.D. 1975).
358. 201 F. Supp. 82, 89 (D.D.C. 1962), aff'd, 372 U.S.
10 (1963).
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Thus, explicit evidence of congressional intent to
controvert United States international legal obli-
gations is required before a statute can be held
to have superseded a treaty.
Despite these demanding standards, courts have
nevertheless held that certain statutes exhibited
the explicit intention necessary to abrogate a treaty
provision.359 The most recent application of the
override principle came in Diggs v. Shultz.3 60 In
1966 the Security Council adopted Resolution 232,361
which directed that all member states impose an embargo
on trade with Southern Rhodesia.362 To comply with
the embargo, the President issued Executive Orders
11,322 and 11,419.363 In 1971 Congress countered the
terms of the embargo by enacting the Byrd Amendment.36 4
The Byrd Amendment sought to avoid American dependence
on the Soviet Union as a supplier of the vital chromium
ore previously imported from Southern Rhodesia. The
Amendment provided that the President could not pro-
hibit importation of a strategic material from any
non-Communist country or area unless its importation
from Communist areas or countries was also prohibited3 65
In arguing on appeal that the Byrd Amendment
had not overridden United States treaty obligations
under the Security Council resolution imposing
sanctions on Rhodesia, appellants in Shultz argued
that the Amendment did not by its terms require
importation of chromium ore from Southern Rhodesia.366
They pointed out that instead of allowing such importa-
tion, the President could either have banned all importa-
tion from Communist countries or declassified chromium
ore as a strategic material.
359. See Pigeon River Improvement, Slide & Boom Co. v.
Charles W. Cox, Ltd., 291 U.S. 138, 160 (1934); Whitney v. Robertson,
124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888).
360. 470 F.2d 461 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411
U.S. 931 (1973).
361. S.C. Res. 232, 21 SCOR 7, U.N. DOC. S/INS./2 (1966).
362. See note 290 supra (discussing resolution),
363. Diggs v. Shultz, 470 F.2d 461, 463 (D.C. Cir. 1972)
(discussing executive orders).
364. The Byrd Amendment amended the Strategic and Critical
Materials Stock Piling Act, 50 U.S.C. § 98-98h (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
At the urging of the Carter Administration, the Byrd Amendment was
repealed in March 1977. See note 313 supra.
365. Diggs v. Shultz, 470 F.2d 461, 463 (D.C. Cir. 1972)
(citing Amendment),
366. Id. at 465-66,
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The court of appeals rejected this argument,
facing squarely the fact that Congress had intention-
ally abrogated the international treaty obligations
of the United States:
We think that there can be no
blinking the purpose and effect of
the Byrd Amendment. It was to detach
this country from the U.N. boycott of
Southern Rhodesia in blatant disregard
of our treaty undertakings. The legis-
lative record shows that no member of
Congress voting on the measure was
under any doubt about what was involved
then; and no amount of statutory inter-
pretation now can make the Byrd Amend-
ment other than what it was as presented
to the Congress, namely, a measure
which would make--and was intended to
make--the United States a certain treaty
violator. The so-called options given
to the President are, in reality, not
options at all. In any event, they are
in neither case alternatives which are
appropriately to be forced upon him by a
court.3 67
The court felt that it had no alternative but to
uphold the Byrd Amendment, in light of the unmistakable
evidence that Congress in passing the Amendment had
acted in full awareness that it was defying United States
international treaty obligations under the United Nations
Charter. The court's strikingly condemnatory language
made it clear that it would have struck down the Amend-
ment if it had perceived any means of avoiding the obvious
congressional override which the Amendment contained.
Because they held that Resolutions 276 and 301 were not
self-execut ng, the courts in Diggs v. Dent36 8 and Diggs v.
Richardson3b9 did not reach the question of override.
This question Was briefed by the parties, how-
ever, and the overri) issue is likely to be raised in
all cases of this sort. Accordingly, it is appropriate
to analyze the putative treaty obligations arising under
these resolutions as an example of how the theory of
override might be applied by the court. This question
will be addressed by scrutinizing the relevant legislative
367. Id. at 466 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
368. See note 2 supra.
369. 555 F.2d 848 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
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and executive action following passage of Resolutions
276 and 301.
Statutory construction of the MMPA370 was
critical to the outcome of the Namibian fur seal skins
case. Section 1371(a)(3)(A) of the Act provides that
the Secretary of Commerce "is authorized and directed
to determine when, to what extent, if at all,
and by what means, it is compatible with this chapter
to waive the requirements of this section so as to
allow taking, or importing of any marine mammal, or
any marine mammal product."3 7 1 The Fouke Company,
the prospective importer, contended that this section
had overridden any possible United States treaty
obligations under the United Nations Charter and
resolutions prohibiting the importation of seal skins
from Namibia. This claim seemed questionable since
Section 1371(a)(3)(A) merely conferred on the Secretary
the discretion to grant waivers to take or import
marine mammals or their products; it did not mandate
the granting of such waivers. The plaintiffs in Dent
argued forcefully that the MMPA, far from displaying
any evidence of congressional intent to override
United States treaty obligations with respect to
Namibia or other areas, instead reflected Congress'
desire to respect such international obligations.372
The State Department considered the question
whether the MMPA overrode Resolutions 276 and 301 and
apparently concluded that it did not. Deputy Secre-
tary of State Ingersoll stated:
The Department of State cannot support
a waiver of the restriction against
importing these seal skins because of
their Namibian origin. The Department's
position is based on the 1971 Advisory
Opinion of the International Court of
Justice regarding relations with South
Africa on Namibian matters. The United
States accepted the conclusions of the
Advisory Opinion of the Court as reflect-
ing US obligations under international
law. Pertinent provisions of the Advisory
370. Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C.§ 1361 (1976).
371. Id. § 1371(a)(3) (A).
372. Reply Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 11-12,
Diggs v. Morton (sub nom. Diggs v. Richardson), 555 F.2d 848
(D.C. Cir. 1976), in Dent File, supra note 14.
263 [VOL. 4
SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS
Opinion, as restated in UN Security
Council Resolution 301 (1971), set forth
our obligation to recognize the invalidity
of South Africa's acts on behalf of or
concerning Namibia and to refrain from
acts or dealings with South Africa imply-
ing recognition of the legality of, or
lending support or assistance to, its
presence and administration in Namibia.
We believe that US Government approval
of an application to import Namibian fur
seal skins from South Africa would be
contrary to our international legal
obligations in that it would necessarily
recognize the validity of South African
management of Namibian mammal resources.
We anticipate that any such action would
place the US Government in a position of
contravening its international legal
obligations and its longstanding policy
of opposing South Africa's illegal occupa-
tion of Namibia, thus adversely affecting
the foreign relations of the United States
and subjecting us to justifiable criticism.37 3
Ingersoll's letter made no mention of the possi-
bility of an override of the MMPA, although he had
previously raised that possibility.374 Furthermore,
373. Letter of October 24, 1975, to Commerce Department,
Dent File, supra note 14. The following letters from State
Department officials express essentially the same view: Letter
of August 27, 1975, from Acting Assistant Secretary of State
Thomas A. Clingan, Jr. to Deputy Assistant Secretary of Commerce
Sidney R. Galler; Letter (undated) from Nathaniel Davis of
the State Department to Administrative Law Judge Mast; Letter
of January 16, 1976 from Deputy Secretary of State Ingersoll
to Secretary of Commerce Morton. See Dent File, supra note 14,
374. Letter of August 2, 1974, to Secretary of Commerce.
Frederick D. Dent, reprinted in A. Rovine, supra note 306, at
598-600. The letter expressed the State Department's belief
that the proposed third visit of Commerce Department personnel
could not "be brought into conformity with the above obligations
(Resolution 301)." Id. at 600. Noting that under the NMPA the
Secretary of Commerce was "directed" to act on applications for
waivers, however, Ingersoll suggested that the Department of
Commerce "may wish to consult with the Department of Justice,
as to whether this recent legislative direction overrides inter-
national law considerations." Id.
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Acting Assistant Secretary of State Clingan stated
that permitting the importation of the Namibian fur
seal skins would not be consistent with either the
conservation objectives of the MMPA or with general
United States foreign policy.3 7 5 It is implicit in
this statement that the State Department had concluded
that the threshold requirement for consideration of
the override issue, an unavoidable conflict between
the relevant treaty provisions and the terms of a
subsequent statute, was lacking. The Commerce
Department also apparently concluded that the State
Department had excluded the possibility of an over-
ride. After unsuccessfully soliciting the Justige
Department's opinion on the override question,37o the
new Secretary of Commerce, Elliott Richardson,
eventually reversed his department's initial decision
and denied the waiver to permit importation of seal
skins from Namibia, in deference to the State Depart-
ment's position that granting the waiver would contra-
vene international legal obligations of the United
States. 377
If the federal courts had reached the override
issue in the seal skins case, they most likely would
have arrived at the same conclusion as the State
Department. As noted previously, Chief Justice Marshall
observed in The Charming Hetsyp that a congressional
statute should, if possible, be construed so as not
to violate the law of nations.378 In the absence of
any direct conflict between the provisions of the MMPA
and Resolutions 276 and 301, a court would probably
conclude that the exercise of the Secretary of Commerce's
discretion in deciding whether to grant a waiver should
be limited by the international legal obligations of
the United States, especially those contained in
Resolutions 276 and 301.
375. Letter of August 27, 1975, to Deputy Assistant Secre-
tary of Commerce Galler, Dent File, supra note 14.
376. The Commerce Department followed Ingersoll's
suggestion in seeking the opinion, see note 374 supra, but the
Justice Department declined to give such an opinion. (Inter-
view with Leonard Meeker, Esq., International Project, Center for
Law and Social Policy (Spring 1976).)
377. See 41 Fed. Reg. 10,940 (1976) (R. Schoning, Direc-
tor, NMFS) (granting waiver "would not be consistent with the
foreign policy of the United States").
378. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804); see p. 260 supra.
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Another way in which a treaty obligation may
be overridden is through presidential action. The
President has the discretion to terminate or to
violate treaties. 3 7 9 No President, however, has
taken official action directly abrogating the treaty
obligations of the United States under Resolutions
276 and 301.
This conclusion can be challenged by invoking
National Security Study Memorandum 39,380 which was
commissioned by future Secretary of State Kissinger
in April 1969 as an in-depth analysis of American
interests on the Southern African subcontinent. To
protect those interests, Memorandum 39 favored its
"Option 2", whose basic premise was that "the whites
are here to stay and the only way that constructive
change can come about is through them."381 With
respect to Namibia, the study group suggested among
its "operational examples" for applying Option 2
that "[w]ithout changing the United States legal
position that South African occupancy of Southwest
Africa is illegal, we would play down the issue and
encourage accommodation between South Africa and the
United Nations."3 82 While the line between its
analysis of the factual situation in Southern Africa,
on the one hand, and its recommendations respecting
United States strategy, on the other, is unclear,
Memorandum 39's prediction that the black independence
movements in Namibia, Rhodesia, Angola, and Mozambique
were destined to remain ineffective obviously condi-
tioned its strategic recommendations. The Study pre-
dicted that African and Asian nations would likely
379. See, e.g., Tag v. Rogers, 267 F.2d 664, 668 (D.C.
Cir. 1959). Courts have not questioned the President's
authority to violate a treaty obligation, although the consti-
tutional basis for this authority is unclear. See L. HENKIN,
FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 171 (1972). Presidents
have abrogated treaties on their own initiative on repeated
occasions. See Staff of Senate Committee on Foreign Relations,
95th Cong., 1st Sess., The Role of the Senate in Treaty Rati-
fication, Appendix 4, Precedents for U.S. Abrogation of Treaties,
at 74-76 (Comm. Print 1977) (citing examples). Senator Barry
Goldwater recently brought an action challenging on constitu-
tional grounds President Carter's termination of the defense
treaty with Taiwan without prior congressional authorization.
See Goldwater, supra note 38.
380. THE KISSINGER STUDY, supra note 310.
381. Id. at 105.
382. Id. at 107.
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increase pressure on South Africa to evacuate
Namibia, but that "the South African police and
military forces [would] be able to successfully
counter any insurgent or dissident activity for
the foreseeable future".3 8 3
Subsequent United States actions disclose
the likelihood that Option 2 indeed became part of
official United States policy. The United States
opposed efforts to expel South Africa from the
United Nations. Although the United States did
not officially alter its arms embargo against
South Africa, it increased the dollar value of
its exports of civilian airplanes and helicopters.
These exports enabled the South African aircraft
industry to concentrate on military production.
Similarly, Export-Import Bank loan guarantees to
United States businesses operating in South Africa
were liberalized.3 84 In addition, United States
investment in South Africa grew considerably, and
the Treasury Department ruled that taxes paid by
American businesses to South Africa in connection
with Namibian operations could be credited against
United States income taxes. 3 85 Finally, the United
States has continued its refusal to join the Council
for Namibia.
One might argue that these policies, taken
together with Memorandum 39, evince the intention of
the executive branch to abrogate any United States
treaty obligations under Resolutions 276 and 301.
It would be difficult, however, for courts to take
judicial notice of or give any legal weight to the
Memorandum, which was intended to be secret and
advisory, and was couched in terms of tentative policy
options. Neither Option 2 nor any of the other options,
moreover, was ever publicly adopted as official policy,
A court might conceivably take note of execu-
tive action that embodied an Option 2 approach and
conclude that the executive did not intend its official
383. Id. at 124.
384. See Critical Developments in Namibia, supra note
302. It is also true, nevertheless, that since 'Xay 1970 the United
States has officially discouraged American investment in Namibia
and has not made available Export-Import Bank credit guarantees
for trade with Namibia.
385. Id. at 65, 119.
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statements of support for the United Nations position
on Namibia to be taken literally. Court action of
this type seems unlikely, however. Although federal
courts have often refused to enforce the letter of
United States treaties, this has been in cases where
public, explicit action by the executive or by
Congress had overridden or superseded the treaty
obligation in question. In no case was refusal to
honor a treaty clause based on a process by which the
court inferred from a pattern of executive actions
that actual American policy was contrary to that
officially enunciated. Instead, official declara-
tions of policy by authorized government representa-
tives have been controlling, rather than any indirect
inferences from activities which might be interpreted
to yield a contrary result.
In any event, the official record is somewhat
mixed. It is true that the United States has opposed
efforts in the United Nations to penalize South
Africa for its refusal to give independence to
Namibia.3 86 Official executive policy on Namibia,
nevertheless, has always reflected United States
support for Namibian self-determination. In recent
years, the United States has supported Security Council
Resolutions 366 of December 17, 1974, and 385 of
January 30, 1976, which reaffirmed the terms of previous
United Nations resolutions on the subject.3 8 7
Clearly, no evidence of an intention to override
any United States obligations under Resolutions 276
and 301 can be found in the policies of the Carter
Administration.388 The policies of the State Department
386. See note 311 supra (United Nations resolutions
on South Africa opposed by the United States during the Nixon and
Ford Administrations).
387. See U.N. DOC. S/PV. 1812 (1974), at 77-814 U.N.
DOC. S/RES.385 (19.76). See also 74 DEP'T STATE BULL.
243 (1976) (statement by Ambassador Moynihan in the Security
Council regarding Namibia).
388. Indeed, in the fall of 1977, the Carter Adminis-
tration took a dramatic step to bring United States policy closer
to the prevailing United Nations position by reversing the
United States' earlier stand and endorsing the imposition of
a mandatory arms embargo on South Africa. See p. 249. supra.
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in the Ford and Nixon Administrations were somewhat
more ambivalent. The principal reason for the State
Department's hesitancy in supporting United Nations
resolutions on Namibia during the Ford and Nixon
administrations, however, was apparently a reluctance
to endorce mandatory Chapter VII sanctions rather
than lack of support for Namibian independence. Much
more unqualified opposition to the United Nations'
position on Namibia as reflected in Resolutions 276
and 301 would be necessary to find an override of
these resolutions by the United States.
A final argument in favor of an override in
the seal skins case could be made by asserting that
the Commerce Department had overridden Resolutions
-276 and 301 when it initially granted the waiver to
permit importation. It is not clear, however, that
lower government officials have the power or authority
to override treaty obligations. While the courts
will not challenge the actions of a President in
violating or terminating a United States treaty, the
actions of a cabinet official are not entitled to the
same deference. 389
There is no indication, moreover, that the
initial grant of the waiver by the Commerce Department
represented its considered policy decision to violate
the international obligations imposed by Resolution
301. Indeed, Secretary of Commerce Richardson's
later reversal of the waiver testifies that this was
not the case. Richardson based his decision on inter-
national law, but he did not present it as a
reversal o-fa previous international law conclusion
of the Commerce Department. If the initial grant of
the waiver had effectively overridden United States
international legal obligations under Resolutions 276
and 301, it would be anomalous for the Secretary of
Commerce to overturn that decision later in order to
comply with applicable United States international
obligations.
In summary, no colorable argument can be made
that United States treaty obligations under Resolu-
tions 276 and 301 have been overridden by the legisla-
tive or executive branch. The Byrd Amendment, now
repealed, is likely to remain the unique instance in
which the United States formally and explicitly
389. See, e.g., Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102
(1933); Chew Heong v. United States, 112 U.S. 536 (1884); 24
U. KAN. L. REV. 395, 404-05 (1976).
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repudiated binding United Nations treaty obligations.
Conclusion
Plaintiffs seeking to enforce United Nations
resolutions on Namibia in American courts face an.
arduous task. They will confront a series of
obstacles, and the special vulnerability of public
interest litigation is likely to compound the sub.-
stantive legal problems of their lawsuit.
We have divided the issues in such litigation
into three subject areas: (1) Are there any
jurisdictional or other threshold barriers in
American courts to the assertion of claims based on
United Nations resolutions? (2) Are particular
United Nations resolutions binding as a matter of
United States domestic law? (3) Have particular
United Nations resolutions nevertheless been
effectively nullified as a matter of United States
domestic law by subsequent and inconsistent congres-
sional or presidential actions? 3 90 The last of
these is not likely to pose a problem for potential
litigants: there have been no United States legis-
lative overrides of United Nations measures since
the repeal of the Byrd Amendment. It appears un-
likely that Congress in the future will take this
course in abrogating United States treaty obligations
under the United Nations Charter. Consequently, the
remaining two subject areas, the jurisdictional or
threshold hurdles and the substantive domestic law
issues, would no doubt comprise most of the issues
litigated.
There are two major threshold hurdles for
plaintiffs to cross: the political question doctrine
and standing to sue. Both of these are essentially
prudential and discretionary principles, whose
application to uncertain future controversies is hard
to predict, The political question doctrine should
be the easier barrier to surmount. Neither a case
involving Resolution 301 on Namibia nor a future
lawsuit to enforce other Security Council resolutions
390. See pp. 164-65 supra.
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is likely to involve issues as sensitive as those
which have militated in favor of judicial abstention
in the past. It is significant in this regard that
the court of appeals in Diggs v. Richardson 391
sidestepped the district court's political question
holding and went on to adjudicate the substantive
legal issues. There is no compelling reason why a
future court presented with an attempt to invoke
a Security Council resolution should not also clear
the political question hurdle and reach the sub-
stantive issues.
Although the holdings on standing of Diggs v.
Shultz392 and Diggs v. Dent393 remain undisturbed and
should afford plaintiffs considerable support,
standing represents a formidable obstacle. The
vulnerability of an action to enforce Security
Council resolutions will increase if plaintiffs are
only "public interest" surrogates for Namibian
interests. Arguments for permitting the assertion of
third party rights by such plaintiffs, however, are
particularly persuasive in light of the difficulty
Namibians or other such nationalities would have in
suing in American courts.
ecent Supreme Court cases restricting the
standing of public interest litigants seem adverse
to such actions, although none of these cases involved
a treaty claim and there are no important American
precedents regarding standing in the area of inter-
national law. While generalizations about standing
are notoriously risky and it is hard to predict the
application of the amorphous standing rules to future
hypothetical cases, plaintiffs' chances of prevailing
on this issue will be enhanced if some of the plain-
tiffs are natives of the territory or country in
controversy with a direct and tangible grievance, like
Theo-Ben Gurirab in Dent.
Substantive domestic law questions constitute
the most important group of issues that plaintiffs
must face. There is little question that Security
Council resolutions impose obligations upon United
Nations members as a matter of international law.
The United Nations Charter is itself a treaty
391. 555 F.2d 848 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
392. 470 F.2d 461 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411
U.S. 931 (1973).
393. See note 2 supra.
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ratified by the United States and by other member
states. The Charter makes it plain that the Se-
curity Council has power under Article 25 to bind
member states to comply with its resolutions when,
under Chapter VII, a threat to world peace exists.
Security Council Resolutions 276 and 301 con-
cerning Namibia, however, were passed pursuant to
the Security Council's authority to mediate and
arbitrate international disputes under Chapter VI.
Scholars disagree on whether Article 25's power to
compel compliance extends to Chapter VI resolu-
tions. In any event, the International Court of
Justice has given an affirmative answer to this
question. Once the United States ratifies a
Security Council resolution, as it did in the case
of Resolution 301, it seems anomalous to attempt to
vitiate the ratification by adopting the position
that such resolutions do not bind members--a posi-
tion rejected, moreover, by the International Court
of Justice.
Whether Security Council resolutions are
binding as a matter of domestic law is a separate
inquiry with several parts. The principal question
is whether the claimed treaty provision is self-
executing, or, if it is not, whether it has never-
theless been executed by the federal government. It
is difficult to generalize about standards in this
area: whether a treaty is self-executing must be
determined by intensive scrutiny of its individual
provisions and subject matter. Courts have held some
Charter sections to be self-executing and others to
be non-self-executing. While the court of appeals
in Richardson held limited provisions of Resolution
301 to be non-self-executing, future courts might
decide differently with respect to this or other
resolutions. Demonstrating that Resolution 301 or
other Security Council resolutions in future litiga-
tion are self-executing, however, is no doubt the
most difficult and important task that plaintiffs
will face.
Even if it is held that Resolution 301 or other
Security Council resolutions are non-self-executing,
plaintiffs may still prevail if they can show that
the resolution in question has been executed by
either Congress or the executive. A review of the
Southern Africa policy of the last three Administra-
tions reveals that it has varied from the Realpolitik
of Henry Kissinger and National Security Study
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Memorandum 39 in the early 1970's to the aggressively
pro-black African position of United Nations
Ambassador Young at present. The federal government's
record on Namibia, however, discloses no direct and
clear action either to execute Resolution 301 (assuming
that it is non-self-executing) or to abrogate it
(assuming that it either is self-executing or has been
executed). It is not inconceivable, of course, that
if South Africa maintains its current hard-line
stance against concessions on Namibia, international
pressures might grow strong enough to persuade the
Carter Administration to impose sanctions on South
Africa or take other action to execute Resolution 301.
In summary, litigation in American courts to
enforce Security Council Resolution 301 or other
Security Council resolutions is fraught with legal
difficulties, both jurisdictional and substantive. It
is difficult to predict the success of future litiga-
tion involving different resolutions, countries, and
issues. The Namibian action, in any case, has served
a real purpose in international law. Although it
may have failed to achieve directly its principal
international law objectives, the case won a substantial
victory in the administrative decision to bar importa-
tion of seal skins from Namibia. Another of the
accomplishments of this litigation is intangible but
nonetheless real; it helped focus needed attention on,
and may thereby have contributed to the eventual
solution of, one of the most intractable international
law controversies of recent years.
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